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INTRODUCTION. 
The perennial problem of political philosophy is 
the relation of the individual to society. Society may 
be defined as the most general term referring to the 
whole complex of the relations of man to his fellows. 
This problem may then be restated as the relation of the 
individual to the state when the latter is regarded as an 
agency for social control having as ita object the regula-
tion of the external relationships of man in society. 
Throughout the history of political thought there 
have always been two conceptions of government and law: 
a descending and an ascending conception, to borrow the 
1) 
terminology of Walter Ullmann. According to the first 
conception all authority is derived qy the ruler from a 
source above and outside the people that makes up the bo-
dy politic. Theocratic kingship is an example of this 
conception. According to the ascending conception of go-
vernment and law all authority resides in the people and 
the ruler derives his authority from the consent of the 
people and is responsible to them for his actions. 
The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes is a 
good example of the descending conception of government. 
According to him human society can only be maintained in 
an orderly fashion by an all-powerful and absolute autho-
rity, preferably a despotic monarch who stands outside 
and above the body politic. The ascending conception, 
on the other hand, found eloquent expression in the doc~ 
trine of Jean-Jacques Rousseau who located the supreme 
authority in the people as a whole, conceived as a cor-
porate body with a will of its own. 
Some/ ••••••••••• 2 
1) olitics in the Middle ea. 
Some of the most characteristic differences be-
tween these two schools of thought may best be sketched 
by examining their respective attitudes to certain impor-
tant questions. The first of these is the attitude to 
the nature of man. We see at once that Hobbes and his 
school regard man as an atomistic individual who is in 
constant strife with his fellow~men and who has to be for~ 
ced by a superior authority to maintain peace and order. 
Although Rousseau does not deny that man has egoistic ten-
dencies, he also recognizes that man has a capacity for 
compassion towards his fellow~men. According to him men 
are thus able to form a community and to govern themselves 
without the restraining power of an absolute despot. 
Man can indeed only realize all his potentialities as a 
member of an orderly community. This school of thought, 
in opposition to that of Hobbes, does not believe in an 
inevitable antithesis between individual man and the state. 
The other important question is that of method. 
Hobbes lived at a time when the philosophers thought that 
the new scientific view of life, and consequently the ma~ 
thematical method, would be able to solve all our problems. 
Hobbes did therefore not hesitate to apply the mathemati-
cal method to his study of human relations. The result 
was an atomistic conception of the individual and a treat-
ment of politics in a purely mechanistic and materialistic 
fashion. Rousseau, on the other hand, realized that the 
methods of the natural sciences were not applicable to 
human affairs, because man was not a mechanical unit, but 
a creature of flesh and blood with its own will and pas-
sions. He also realized that the needs of man can only 
be satisfied in a community. 
To place these developments in 1heir proper his-
torical perspective, we shall very briefly show how the 
late medieval political thought entertained no essential 
antithesis between individual and community but subjected 
everybody,{.~~, ;3 
L 
everybody to a universal law which the Christians iden~ 
tified with the wirll of God. 
After the breakdown of the feudal system, a mul~ 
titude of corporations sprang up, all of which were more 
or less autonom.ous and were able to safeguard their mem~ 
bers against arbitrary violation of rights by the terri.., 
torial prince. This was mainly the position which Cal~ 
vin and his followers wished to maintain. The stand they 
took on the notion of contract, sovereignty of law and 
the recognition of the people as a corporate body and the 
subject of rights is stated adequately in the Vindiciae 
contra tyrannos. 
After the discoveries of Kepler, Copernicus and 
Galilee and the growth of the natural soiences, the theo~ 
cratic tradition of the Middle Ages was undermined. The 
rights of the various corporations were gradually usurped 
by the emergent centralized nation-state,. It was at 
this stage that Hobbes made his appearance and based his 
political theory on. the assumption that the individual 
stocd isolated against the power of the whole common~ 
wealth concentrated in the person of the sovereign mo~ 
narch~ Hobbes, however, did not arise out of a vacuum. 
He had his precursors and in this respect the doctrines 
of Bodin and Le Bret deserve our attention. 
A more detailed discussion of the political doc~ 
trines of Hobbes and Rousseau brings us to the conclusion 
that the latterts position constitutes in many respects 
a definite return to the political thought of the late 
Middle Ages via Plato~ It also appears that the influence 
of Althusius on Rousseau may have formed an effective 
bridge between his position and that of the sixteenth 
century. 
Because of the logical consistency of his thought 
and the lucidity with which he expressed his doctrine, 
there ••••••••••• 4 
there does not exist much controversy about the tea~ 
ching of Hobbes. Rousseau, on the other hand, is one 
of the most controversial figures in the history of po-
litical thought and consequently we were obliged to de ... 
vote much more attention to him than to Hobbes in order 
to clear the ground of many of the misinterpretations of 
his doctrine that accumulated over the years. 
On the whole, however, serious scholarship agrees 
with the interpretations of philosophers with the stan ... 
ding of Bosanquet and Ernst Cassirer. Both of them re-
cognized the ethical function waich Rousseau assigned to 
the state: to form the citizen in such a way that he 
will not only live for his own interests, but for the 
interests of the community of which he is a member. 
fo achieve such a state of affairs the recognition of 
the sovereignty of law ~ a law to which all~members of 
the community freely submit " was required. To the idea 
of the power state, Rousseau opposed the idea of the 
constitutional state, for his sovereign law cannot be 
. 
arbitrary or capricious, but it is a law which the in~ 
dividual himself recognizes as valid and necessary, and 
to which he therefore assents for its own sake as well 
as for his own. 
Philosophical anthropology did not receive much 
attention from philosophers up to the second half of 1he 
19th century. It was only towards the end of the 19th 
and the first half of the 20th century that people like 
Feuerbach, Scheler, Heidegger and Buber paid special atten-
tion to this aspect of philosophy. Buber gives an ex" 
and 
cellent survey of developments in this fiel~by compa~ 
ring his observations with the ideas of Rousseau we were 
able to show that Rousseau's political doctrine is in 
accordance with the -·contemporary view of the true na-
ture of man. 
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In conclusion we were able to point out that in 
both totalitarian and Western states of our time, the 
atomistic individualism. initiated by Hobbes, is still re-
sponsible for creating circumstances which cause the in~ 
dividual to feel isolated and abandoned to the full power 
of the centralized state. In our age with ita craze for 
planning, the temptation to regard men as things that can 
be dealt with in the same way as all other things, is not 
always successfully.withstood. In other words, there is 
still a strong tendency to apply the methods of the natu• 
ral sciences to the behaviour of human beings as Hobbes 
did. This tendency is a characteristic of modern abso~ 
lutism and totalitarianism. To our mind, the average 
man can only regain confidence and a feeling of really 
belonging to the body politic if small, autonomous cor~ 
porations are allowed to develop within each of the large 
nation-states of our day. If we regard the human being 
as a free and reasonable agent who is able to exercise 
a power of choice, it is only natural that he should be 
allowed to exercise t.his power in a responsible way. 
In such a small conn:nunity or corporation the individual 
will feel himself at home and he will be able to par,., 
take effectively in its activities. This is the mes~ 
sage of Rousseau for the time in which we live. 
CHAl'TER 1. 
A SHORT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND. 
To see the political doctrines of Hobbes and 
·Rousseau in their proper historical perspective, one 
has to go back to Greek philosophy. It was Socrates who 
convinced Plato that philosophy had to ~egin with the 
problem of man. Plato, however, soon realized that we 
cannot find an adequate definition of man so long as we 
confine ourselves within the limits of man's individual 
life. The nature of man only becomes clear and intelli• 
gible if we consider man's political and social life. 
In this way Plato changed the whole problem of man: he 
declared politics to be the clue to human psychology. 
The soul of the individual is bound up wit~~~~ 
social nature, we cannot separate the one from the other. 
If public life is wicked and corrupt, private life can-
not develop and cannot reach its end. This point is 
very important, because, as we shall see later, this 
was exactly the view to be advocated by Rousseau. If 
we want to change the ethical life of man, we must 
first find the right political order. In order to ac-
hieve this, the first step to be taken in Plato's time, 
was to replace the mythical gods by what Plato described 
as the highest knowledge: the "Idea of the Good." If 
this idea is the essence and the very core of divine 
nature, the conception that God is the author of evil 
becomes absurd. According to Plato, the state has no 
other and no higher aim than to be the administrator of 
justice. In Plato's language, however. juet.ice ie the @± __ 
general principle of order, regularity. unity &nd law-
fulness. With this conception we may say that Plato 
-
became the founder and the first defender of the idea 
of the Legal State. This, in theory, was also one of 
the most outstanding achievements of Rousseau. 
Wh.a. t ••••••• 7 
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What Plato is asking for in his "Republic"is 
not the best, but the ideal state. It is one of the 
first principles of Plato's theory of knowledge to in• 
sist upon the radical distinction between empirical and 
ideal truth. 
In mythical thought man is possessed b.Y a good 
or evil demon; in Plato man chooses his demon. Man cea~ 
see being in the iron grip of a superhuman force. He is 
a free agent who has to take full responsibility. Not 
only the individual, but also the state has to choose 
its demon. Only by choosing a good demon can a state 
secure its real happiness. 
Whereas in Plato's theory man had to choose the 
long way to attain the idea of the good and to under-
stand its nature: the way that leads from arithmetic to 
geometry, from geometry to astronomy, harmonics, and 
dialectic, Augustine rejects this circuitous way. 
According to him all learning and philosophical specu• 
lation is null and void in so far as it does not lead 
us to the knowledge of God. 
The Greek conception of an eternal and imperso" 
nal law was unacceptable and incomprehensible to the 
Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages. It is by ratio~ 
nal thought that we are to find the standards of moral 
conduct and it is reason, and reason alone that can 
give them their authority. In contrast with this Greek 
intellectualism, prophetic religion is characterized by 
its deep and resolute voluntarism. God is a person and 
that means a will. No mere logical methods of arguing 
can make us understand this will. God must reveal him~ 
self, he must make known his comma.ndmen ts. From God 
himself man has to learn good and evil, not from dialec-
tic. 
Thus the real difference between Greek and 
Jewish ••••••• a 
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Jewish religious thought is that according to the for-
mer, the ethical law is n~ given or proclaimed qy a 
superhuman being, but that we have to find and to prove 
it ourselves qy rational and dialectic thought. This 
was the conflict between reason and faith that broke out 
time and again during the Middle Ages. 
Yet, in accordance with the doctrine of Plato, 
the thesis that the first and principal task of the 
state is the maintenance of justice, became the very fo-
cus of medieval political theory. There was, however, 
a difference which entails the moat important practical 
consequences. The Middle Ages could not conceive of any 
abstract, impersonal justice. In monotheistic religion 
the law must always be traced back to a personal source. 
Without a law-giver there can be no la.w. Law is the 
will of God. There was still another aspect in which 
medieval thought deviated from Plato and Aristotle. 
According to Plato 1 ~ustice is not the same as e,aya11:t.Y 
of rigbt;. Aristotle speaks of born slaves and alleges 
-
that there are a great many men who are incapable of ru-
ling themselves. To this Platonic and Aristotelian 
ideal of justice the Stqjs philosophers added an entire-
ly new conception: ths:~ cotu<eption gf the funda,ment~l 
-
~ualiq of men before God. This conception became one 
of the cardinal points of the medieval theory. The 
Stoic conception that all men are free because they are 
all endowed with the same reason, found its theological 
interpretation and justification in the added dictum 
that this very reason is the image of God. From this 
premise it follows that the authority of no political 
power ~an ever be absolute. It is always bound to the 
laws of justice. Even the principle of the divine 
right of kings was always subject to certain fundamental 
lim.i ta ti ons •••••• 9 
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limitations. The sovereign is not under any external 
compulsion to obey the laws, but the power and authority 
of the natural law remain unbroken. 
1) 
Walter Ullmann described lucidly the dual cha• 
racter of medieval kingship. As theocratic king, the 
to 
king derived his authority from God/whom alone he was 
responsible for his regime. In his capacity as feudal 
overlord, however, he had to proceed b,y consultation and 
agreement with the other parties in the feudal contract. 
This feudal aspect of medieval kingship eventually led 
numerous writers to speak indiscrim.inately of a ~actum 
between the king and his peoples. It was here that the 
well~known notion of contract originated. 
Before describing the status and nature of popu-
lar associations or corporations in the Middle Ages, the 
remarkable opinions of the Postglossator Bartolus 
2) 
(1314•135?) deserve our attention. Trying to provide 
a justification of some North Italian cities which en-
acted their own laws without any reference to a pope or 
an emperor, Bartolus worked out the doctrine of the 
people's legislative sovereignty. According to him, no 
king orpope had any say in the people's own usages and 
customs, but once this element of the consent of the 
people was realized, the next step suggested itself: if 
the citizens can b.Y tacit consent create unwritten law, 
why can they not exercise the same law-creating ability 
in the Shape of the written law? B,y demonstrating the 
free people as the ultimate bearer of legislative com-
petency, Bartolus has indeed no difficulty in establis• 
hing the people as the sovereign. There was no room 
left for a superior, for a sovereign, standing outside 
and above the people. He also realized that his system 
of •••••••• lo 
1) Principles of government and politics in the Middle 
Ages. London, Methuen, 1961. Chapter 3. 
2) Ullmann: Op.cit. pp.282-28?. 
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of practical democracy is only feasible in confined 
communities. The clergy,however, are not bound b,y the 
laws of the laymen. 
Except for this last provision, Bartolus' doc~ 
trine contains two concepts which will recur in the doc~ 
trine of Rousseau, namely the people's legislative so ... 
vereignty and the feasibility of real democracy only in 
small communities~ 
From this brief survey of the historical back-
ground of political thought, it is c~ear that the abso-
lute and unlimited power which Hobbes claims for his 
sovereign is an unhistorical and revolutionary notion. 
Similarly, his notion of the individual as an atomistic 
unit which is always in a state of war with other indi• 
viduals, and from which he deduces the necessity of an 
absolute coercive power, is totally foreign to the his-
tory of political thought. We never find the individual 
on his own, but always as a member of a community or 
people which is the real subject of rights. 
We shall see that it is Rousseau who maintains 
historical continuity in his political doctrine. Like 
the Greek philosophers, he believes that man is able by 
virtue of his rational powers to recognize a moral law 
to which he will submit himself voluntarily for his own, 
as well as for the community's, good. He acknowledges 
the people as a corporate body and as the subject of rights 
and the creator of its own law. Individuals only exer• 
cise their rights as members of the corporate body which 
is the people. There is thus not the eternal strife be-
tween individuals which necessitates an absolute and un ... 
limited coercive power as envisaged b,y Hobbes. 
I 
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CHAPTER 2. 
CORPORATIONS IN TEE LATE MIDDLE AGES. 
Since the fourteenth century the clergrand the 
Pope had been suffering loss of prestige and of moral 
authority. The Church was increasingly menaced by the 
growth of nationalist sentiment and organization. With 
the a.dvent of the Reformation in the sixteenth centur't 
one country after another and city after cityt esta-
blished its local control of the Church and absorbed 
much of its property and jurisdiction. Out of the an-
archy that prevailed at that timet the monarchs of 
both England and France made strenuous efforts effec• 
tively to centralize government. 
It is this drive for centralization and abso~ 
lutism that found its ultimate culmination in the 
massacre of St. Bartholomew's night in 1572. The mea-
ning of this event was that the French king was now 
claiming absolute power over all thingst including re-
ligious belief and practicet within his realm. This 
development constitutes such a distinct break with the 
prevailing system of corporate bodies which had arisen 
in the Middle Ages, that it will be necessary to have Y' 
good look at political conditions in the late Middle 
Ages in order to appreciate the revolutionary character 
of this change. 
The late Middle Ages were characterized b.Y a 
great variety of corporations: village communities, 
;)1 guildst towns and cities. These unions are the natural 
answer to the human urge to act within a group, so as 
to be more articulate and to give to individual views 
a greater margin of deplol)ent. 
Francois Hotoman tells us that already in the 
early •••••••• l2 
1) Franco-Gallia. London, Longmans, 1938. pp. 1-2. 
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early Middle Ages the Franks and the Gauls did not form 
one coirllD.on people under the jurisdiction of one single 
sovereign. Various cities and communities had their 
own governments or parliaments. Each year on the 1st 
of May a public council of the all the peoples was held 
on which the most important matters were discussed with 
the general permission and consultation of all the es~ 
tates. 
2) 
According to Lagarde the corporations came 
into their own upon the decline of the feudal regime. 
At that time two services, namely the administration of 
justice and military service passed increasingly from 
the landlords into the hands of the emergent cities and 
guilds. 
What were these corporations in reality? 
Coornaert defines a corporation as "un groupement eco• 
nomique de droit publique; soumettant sea membres a une 
discipline collective pour !'exercise de leur profession~ 
Clearly implicit in this definition is the contractual 
relationship between the individual and the group. on .... 
ly by submitting to the discipline and rules of his 
particular corporation does the individual member obtain 
the right to exercise his trade or profession. In this 
way there existed corporations of traders, industrial 
workers, agricultural workers, etc. According to 
Lousse a corporation "nait de l'union, de !'ordonnance~ 
raisonBee, volontaire et durable de plusieurs personnes 
auq,uel 
inferieures a elle, en vue d.'un but unique;chacun de ses 
personnes ne pourrait tendre si elle etait laissee a 
. 4) 
ses propres moye~s." 
A great ••••••••• 13 
2) La structure politigue et sociale de !'Europe aux 
xlve siicle. p.98. 
3) u 1 est-ce u'une cor oration dans 11 ancienne France? 
In ~iversit de Louvain. Recueil de travaux: L'Or-
ganisation corporative du Moyen.Age a la fin de 
l'Ancien Regime. p.9.) 
4) La societe d'ancien regime.· p.l32. 
3) 
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A great variety of Sl ch corporations existed 
in the Middle Ages. There were guilds of craftsmen 
such as carpenters and tailorsr merchant guildsr eccle-
siastic corporations such as convents, chapters, chari~ 
table establishments and universities, cities, some of 
which were entirely freer and rural agricultural workers. 
Apart from their outward variety, the corpo-
rations differed considerably as regards their internal 
structure and authority. There were simple corporations 
only comprising the labourers in one single industry 
such as the textile industry, while the complex corpo-
rations comprised workers in more than one industry. 
As far as their authority was concerned, there were 
also twon main classes, i.e. corporations which recog-
nized no higher authority and those which recognized 
the authority of a prince. Over and above all these 
corporations there were still the estates each of 
which contained various corporations and individuals, 
namely the clergy,the nobility, the bourgeoisie and 
the peasant farmers. 
All corporations enjoyed a great measure of 
internal autonomy, even the corporations "superiorem 
recognoscentes". In respect of their members they all 
had the power of police and the administration of jus-
tice, as well as of legislation, military command in 
case of danger, and taxation~ 
5) 
According to Pothier they could legislate on 
all these subjects and their members were required to 
obey such laws, o¢oondition that these laws did not 
conflict with the general laws of the country, the 
civil liberty or the interest of third parties. As 
far as the domestic affairs of a corporation were con~ 
cerned, the corporation was entitled to act according 
to its ••••••••••• 14 
5) Trait~ des personnes et des choses. (~uoted b,y 
Lousse, op.cit. P• 166) 
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to its own discretion. Domestic affairs included 
such things as conditions of admission, and rights 
and duties of members. 
Those corporations which recognized a prince, 
usually concluded a contract with the prince to get 
their rights and privileges acknowledged by him in the 
form of a written charter. Such marter reaffirmed 
all the powers mentioned above and granted the permis-
sion of the prince to the implementation thereof. 
Sometimes the prince himself took the initiative to 
acknowledge the powers of a corporation, especially 
when he desired any aid of such a corporation. 
The relation of the corporation to the prince 
had much in common with that of a feudal vassal with 
this important difference, however, that whereas the 
relation between landlord and vassal was a relation 
between two physical persons, that between the cor-
poration and the prince was a relation between a per-
sona moralis and a physical person. 
It was expec·ted of the corporation to render 
military and financial aid to the prince and also to 
be willing to partake in consultations. The prince 
never addressed requests for military and financial 
aid to the individuals, but only to the corporations 
and it was their duty to obtain such aid from their 
individual members. 
On the other r~nd the prince had the duties 
of loyalty to his oath and chart~ and of safeguar~ 
ding the peace, safety and interests of the corpora-
tions. 
It is important to understand clearly lhat 
position the individual member occupied in the cor-
poration. Lousse sums up the position as ftilows: 
"Elle (the ~orporation) prive l'individu d'une partie 
de son independence, elle l'assujettit au corps qui le 
domine •••••••••••• 15 
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domine. Mais loin de le laisser absorber par lui, de 
laisser dissoudre sa personnalite, elle lui confere une 
6) 
qualite qu'il ne possedait pas encore ••• " The indi• 
vidual, on joining a corporation, did loose a part of 
his independence but he was never totally absorbed by 
the corporation, on the contrary, membership endowed him 
with a status he did not have before. This is also the 
the position of the individual in Rousseau~ body politic 
as we shall see later. 
Lousse also points out that the individuals at 
that time regarded the corporations only "comme des moy-
ens utiles a realiser, d'accord avec sea semblables, cer-
taines fins secondaires, en harmonie avec son but final: 
developper sea facultes, realiser un equilibre tranquille, 
?) 
pratiquer la vertu, accumuler lea chances de salut." 
In other words, the individual members thought that the 
corporations afforded them with useful means to develop 
their potentialities and to work towards their salvation. 
This idea recurs in Rousseau's writings. 
On the other hand, the opportunity to associate 
oneself with one's equals, means that the individual is 
not isolated and abandoned entirely to himself. It gives 
him solidarity with his fellow~workers for the defence 
8) 
of his rights. 
Within in each corporation a strict hierarppy 
was maintained. The guilds, for instance-, had four ca-
tegories of members: supporters, apprentices, associates 
and masters. Similar grades were to be found among the 
nobility, the clergy and in the universities. The place 
and status of a member in the hierar~hfof his corporation 
depended on his knowledge of, and proficiency in, his 
profession. Only those members who were recognized as 
6~l Op. cit., p.l62. 
Op. cit. ' p .193. 
Op. cit., p.244. 
masters ••••••••• l6 
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masters of their profession enjoyed all the rights and 
privileges and could air their views in the general 
councils held from time to time. The corporation, how-
ever, protected the interests of its members against 
third parties and guaranteed members the free disposal 
of their possessions and person. Members could come 
and go freely wherever they liked and were even free to move 
to 
/the jurisdiction of another landlord. They had free ac~ 
cess to the prince a~d they could petition him or appear 
in person before his court. All of them had the right to 
be judged by their peers. 
This wide variety of members did not, however, 
militate against the unity of the corporation. Each cor~ 
poration, just like a landlord, had a name, a patron, 
a seat, a belfry and bells, archives and treasury, a 
flag and banner with its own design, a costun1e, a rank 
and a seal. Each had its own patrimony with which it 
could deal as it thought fit. It could act as a legal 
person both in private and civil capacity. It was pro~ 
vided with special organs of legislation, representa~ 
tion and execution. In short, it r~d all the characte-
ristics and rights of a persona moralis. 
It enjoyed legislative power in respect of all 
the persons which were under its jurisdiction. Its mem• 
bers had to obey its rules so that peace could prevail. 
In order to preserve internal peace, it could exercise 
police functions, it could control the admission of 
foreigners and expel undesirable persons. It could de-
cide on war and peace and it saw to it that taxes were 
levied in an equitable manner and actually collected the 
taxes on behalf of the prince~ It could mint its own 
currency, organize labour, develop the trade, organize 
welfare services, assume responsibility for public health, 
education, culture and recreation. It could do ever.ything 
that ••••••••••• l7 
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that a landlord could do at that time and a great deal 
more. 
In its pritV-ate legal capacity the corporation 
enjoyed the same rights as an individual; it could pos~ 
sees property, could sign rontracts, inherit, plead, 
and claim. 
All corporations had the same type of inter·nal 
organisation consisting of representative and executive 
organs.- The representative organ consisted of indivi-
duals or a college which could take decisions on behalf 
of the corporation. There were at least three such bo-
dies, a general assembly convened on special occasions, 
a smaller council whose duty it was to expedite current 
matters and one or more chiefs or presidents. 
The executive organ only consisted of subordi~ 
nate functionaries who received their orders from the 
above~mentioned bodies and to whom they were respon-
sible. They had no political character at all and were 
only administrative officials. 
In the case of corporations "superiorem non 
recogniscentes", the general assembly had "vraiment la 
9) 
plemi tude de la potestas." The dec is ions of other 
corporations were liable to annulment by superior autho~ 
rities, but against these they defended both their cor~ 
porative arld individual liberties. Their competence had 
theoretically no other limits than the sphere of acti-
vity of the corporation. 
The majority of the corporations had a council 
whom they themselves appointed. Its members had to pro-
mise to abide by the constitution like an ordinary mem~ 
ber and not to exceed the powers entrusted to them. 
They had to govern the corporation during a fixed period 
or for life and had to ensure that the laws were enforced. 
The •••••••••• l8 
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The chief or chairman of the council had to preside 
at meetings, carry our resolutions, supervise subor-
dinate officials, inform and guide the members. 
At the meetings of the general assembly the ma~ 
jority vote required depended on the importance of the 
matters to be decided. As far as serious questions were 
concerned, especially those affecting the unwritten 
rights of members, real unanimity was required. 
The corporation as an orderly commtt~ity created 
its own laws and in this respect old traditions and cus-
toms formed the basis. Those corporations which recog ... 
nized the authority of a ruler, negotiated with him to 
obtain official recognition of their privileges and 
liberties. The ruler could never force the corporations 
to obey his commands unconditionally. Between the ruler 
and the corporations matters were settled in a spirit of 
consultation and mutual agreement. In other words, a re• 
ciprocal contractual relationship existed between the 
two parties. 
Individuals had no right to resist the ruler. 
This right could only be exercised b,y the magistratus 
inferiores whose duties it was to protect the rights of 
individuals. In the late Middle Ages this duty was the 
responsibility of the estates. 
It is thus necessary briefly to explain the na-
ture and status of the estates. They were also corpo-
rate bodies, but they consisted of a loose grouping of 
both individuals and primary corporations - a permanent 
union of equals, i.e. of the same social class within 
the framework of the same territory. The members of 
an estate co-.operated as free agents without abandoning 
any~.of their rights and privileges. The estates also 
negotiated with the prince for official recognition 
so that they could speak on behalf of their members. 
The •••••••••• 19 
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The best known estates were those of the clergy, 
the nobility and the bourgeoisie. The latter often con-
sisted of two est~s, namely the bourgeoisie or city-dwel-
lers proper and the rural peasant farmers. Each estate 
had its own statute which comprised the following: the 
pact of confederation of the members of the estate, the 
requests to the prince and the charter of concession. 
This statute thus constitutes a double contract: that 
between the members of the estate to form and remain 
loyal to the aims of the estate and that between the es-
tate as a ~orporate body and the prince whereb,y the lat-
ter acknowledges the rights and status of the estate in 
return for financial and military aid from the estate. 
This right of confederation of the estates was 
often exercised simultaneously with the jus rasistendi 
against a ruler who did not keep his oath, who distur-
bed the ~ace and who had consequently to be reminded 
Df his duties. A ruler who violated his contract and 
who acted arbitrarily, was guilty of tyranny. In all 
his dealings he had to act in such a way that tl1e laws 
of the various groups and peoples in his commonwealth 
were strictly observed. In other words, he had to ack~ 
nowledge and observe the sove~gnity of law and could 
under no circumstances regard himself as standing above 
the law. 
Each estate had to render financial and military 
aid to its prince- The prince could, however, undertake 
nothing of any importance for which money and soldiers 
were required without consulting the estates and for 
this reason the Estates-General were convened from time 
to time. From his side the prince owed faith and pro-
tection to the estates. These conditions did indeed 
form the terms of the contract between the prince and 
the estates. 
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Against the prince who was unfaithful to his 
conventions, each estate could institute political and 
juridical sanctions. In the political field, they could 
first of all, exercise the right of petition. Should 
this prove unsuccessful, military service could be re• 
fused until the prince had redressed the wrongs. 
Should the prince go so far as to violate his faith 
with impunity, they could regard themselves as relea-
sed from their promises to him and could declare war 
against him, or elect another prince. 
In the estates there was·a hierarchy of mem~ 
bers similar to that in the corporations. We thus 
find in the working class "gens de lettres, de finance 
. ' 
de marchandise, de metier, de labour et de brae" in 
this order of rank. 
Among the yarious estates equality reigned~ 
theoretically, but the nature of their functions, the 
development of their liberties and their capacities of 
representation endowed them with an order of rank as 
follows: first the clergy, then the nobility foil:lowed 
by the third estate and the peasantry. 
After such a survey, one cannot but agree with 
Ruggiero that "liberty is an older thing than the abso ... 
lutism of modern monarchy, because it has its roots in 
feudal society ••• Feudal aristocracy, urban and rural 
communities, trade guilds, are privileged grou~s, that 
10) 
is to say, free each within its own sphere". These 
views are confirmed by Bowle when he states that "the 
tradition of governing bodies within a commonwealth was 
to prove one of the most important contributions of the 
11) 
Middle Ages". The investigations of such an acute ob-
server as de Tocqueville also revealed the fact that un~ 
til almost the end of the 17th century some French towns 
10) 
11) 
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12) 
were still small democratic republics. 
From the point of view of this study, the most 
important aspects of political life in the Middle Ages 
may be summarized as follows: The relation between in-
dividual and corporation, corporation and estate, estate 
and prince and corporation and prince rested on a con• 
tractual basis. The powers of the territorial prince 
were limited and the corporations enjoyed wide powers 
in their own spheres. The individual was not exposed 
to the power of the prince, but the corporation and es" 
tate stood between them to protect the individual. The 
corporation was recognized by the prince as a persona 
moralis with rights of its own. The individual did not 
lose his individuality and personality in the bosom of 
the corporation but used his membership to develop his 
potentialities and to work towards his salvation. This 
means that the group served an ethical purpose' conse• 
quently ethics and politics were closely associated. 
These are the very same principles which Rousseau de ... 
fends in his political doctrine as we shall show. 
The corporations could create their own laws 
and in this respect they were led qy the traditions and 
customs of their communities. 
The estates were entrusted with the duty to pro~ 
teet the rights of their members, both individuals and 
groups, and they could resist the territorial prince 
when he violated his trust. 
In short, the right of association, the idea of 
contract, the freedom and protection of the individual, 
wide local autonomy and the local community as the source 
of its own laws were "the roots of liberty" which we 
found in the Middle Ages. 
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The corporations were spontaneous aesocia~ 
tiona which grew up to provide in the needs of their 
associates. They were autonomous and were recognized 
as subjects of rights by the territorial prince who was 
obliged to enter into contractual agreements with them. 
In the modern state which arose in the six-
teenth century, just the opposite happened." The mo-
narch now claimed to be the sole source of authority 
and law and all corporations within his realm were not 
regarded as moral persons and subjects of rights, but 
were said to derive what power they might have, from 
the monarch. 
Here we find the absolute centre,lization of all 
power in the hands of the sovereign which is totally 
foreign to the tradition and historical development of 
the Middle Ages. And it is this situation which Hobbes 
tried to justifY by presenting man as egoistic and un~ 
able to overcome his selfishness and so to advocate 
the necessity of absolute rule. 
Rousseau, on the other hand, realized that such 
arbitrary absolutism goes against the grain of human 
nature, and consequently his doctrine constitutes the 
maintenance of the "roots of liberty" as found in the 
:Middle Ages. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN STATE. 
As we stated in the preceding chapter, the drive 
for centralization and absolutism b,y the French monarch 
led to the massacre of St.Bartholomew1 s night in 1572. 
As a result of this event writings by Beza and Hotoman 
and the important political pamphlet Vindiciae contra 
tyrannos appeared to protest against the power politics 
of the French court and to defend the rights of the 
peoples and the traditional corporations of the late 
Middle Ages. Time and again they appeal to the sound 
principles of sovereignty of law, of pluralism and of 
contract. 
As has been pointed out b,y Prof. A.H. Murray 
these Huguenot writers b,y no means advocated a revolu~ 
1) 
tionary doctrine. As faithful followers of Galvin, 
they took their stand on traditional political institu ... 
tiona and rights. Like Calvin himself, they fought for 
the maintenance of the real nature of everything as crea-
2) 
ted b,y God. The usurpation of the rights and powers 
of the peoples and the corporations b,y the monarch was 
the re~olutionary development at this stage and not the 
protests of the so~called Monarchomachi. 
To clear up the position a brief summary of Cal-
vin's political thought will be appropriate at this june• 
3) 
ture. Calvin believed that there was an order of na-
ture. The right of nature is what conforms to the order 
of nature, and the two words, right and order are 
synonymous •••••••• 21-. 
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synonymous. The order of nature gives birth to the 
right of nature. The world is the product of the com~ 
mand of God. The order of nature as created Qy God was 
~pset by the entry of sin into the world and as a result 
of this corruption that dwells in man, we have need.of 
some order and check which keep us tn our place. The 
state has thus been instituted by the grace of God be-
cause of man's need. It was not a product of human rea-
son and will. 
In Calvin t s political theory we find tha "Vthe 
moral law, which is the same as the law of God, is des~ 
cribed as "the true and eternal rule of righteousness, 
prescribed for men of all nations and times, who wish 
to conform their lives to God's will ••• every nation is 
left free to makeruch laws as it foresees to be profi~ 
table for itself. Yet this must be in conformity to 
that perpetual rule of love, so that they indeed vary 
in form but have the same purpose. For I do not think 
that those barbarous and savage laws such as gave honour 
to thieves, permitted promiscuous intercourse, and others 
both more filthy and more absurd, are to be regarded as 
laws. For they are abhorrent not only to justice, but 
. 4) 
also to all humanity and gentleness." 
Even in his perverted and degenerate nature, man 
still is a rational being who understands that every sort 
of human organization must be regulated by laws and who 
5) 
comprehends those laws. 
Calvin distinguishes between spiritual and civil 
government, but the latter has as its appointed end to 
cherish and protect the outward worship of God and to de-
fend the doctrine of piety and the position of the church. 
If, however, rulers should command anything against God, 
it •••••••••• 2.? 
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6) 
it should be left unesteemed. 
Ca.lvin clearly regards it as the duty of the 
magistrates to withstand kings who violate the free-
dom of the people. The following passage leaves us in 
no doubt as to his views on this matter: "For if there 
are now any magistrates of the people, appointed to re--
strain the willfulness of kings (as in ancient times 
the ephors were set against the Spartan kings, or the 
tribunes of the people against the Roman consuls, or the 
demarche against the senate of the AtheniansJ and per-
haps, as things now are, such power as the three estates 
exercise in every realm when they hold their chief 
assemblies), I am so far from forbidding them to with• 
sta.nd, in ace ordance with their duty, the fierce lie en-
tiousness of kings, that if they wink at kings who vio-
lently fall upon and assualt the lowly common folk, I 
declare that their dissimulation involves nefarious 
perfidy, because they dishonestly betray the freedom of 
the people, of which they know that they have been 
7) 
appointed protectors by God's ordinance". 
From these extractu it is clear that Calvin 
stood for the sovereignty of a moral law which he idenM 
tified with the law of God and which he regarded as 
8) 
"engraved upon the minds of men", thus as identical to 
reason. To this law all ruler:·s and nations are subject, 
although every nation may make its own laws. Here he 
allowed for pluralism in legislation. It must be remem~ 
bered, however, that he judged laws according to their 
actual content, and not according to the source whence 
they derived. The ethical end of civil government is 
emphasized in the duty of protecting the worship of God. 
Further.more subjects owe no obedience to a ruler whose 
commands violate the law of God. 
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These principles ha~e been elaborated by other 
9) 10) 
Huguenot writers such as Beza and Hotoman but as the 
majority of their arguments are also to be found in the 
11} 
Vindiciae contra tyrannos which can be regarded as an 
excellent summary of the Huguenot case against the emer-
gent absolute sovereign state, I shall concentrate on 
the political theory of the latter. 
According to the Vindiciae men, born rather to 
command, than to obey, have not willingly admitted to be 
governed by another. They will only submit themselves 
to the commands of others for some special and great 
profit that they expected from it. Kings are thus es"" 
tablished to maintain by justice, and to defend by force 
of arms, both the state)and particular persons from all 
12 
damages and outrages, 
The people are thus conceived as a. body consis ... 
ting of independent, freedom ... loving individuals who will 
not submit to authority unless they can reasonably ex~ 
pect some indispensible profit from such submission. 
Only ~Od has absolute sovereignty. He alone 
reigns by his proper authority; kings nnly reign by 
derivation. Kings are God's delegates and their juris ... 
13} 
diction is thus limited. In other words, kings rray 
not command anything which conflicts with God's law. 
At the inauguration of kings, we find two sorts 
of covenants or contracts: the first is between God, 
the king and the people, that the people might be the 
people of God. The second is between the king and the 
people, that the people shall obey faithfully and the 
14~~ 
king command justly. At .......... 2!7 
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At another place, the Vindiciae gives the fol• 
lowing description of the concluding of the contract: 
"the people by way of stipulation, require a performance 
of covenants. The king promises it. The people ask 
the king, whether he will govern justly and according 
to the laws? He promises he will. Then the people 
answer, and not before, that whilst he governs upright• 
ly, they will obey faithfully. In the first contract 
the king promises to serve God religiously, in the se-
15) 
cond, to rule the people justly". 
From both these versions of the relationship 
between the king and the people it is clear that the 
people are a corporate body and a subject of rights and 
that there is an acknowledgment of sovereignty of law 
to which both king and people have to submit. Both 
parties agree to do so by means of a reciprocal and 
binding contract. 
As the king receives his authority over the 
people by virtue of a contract, he is inferior to the 
whole company of the people, although he is superior 
to any individual member of it. 
Kings should further remember that after God, 
16) 
they hold their power and sovereignty from the people. 
All kings at first were elected and those who hold their 
crowns and. royal authority by inheritance, have or should 
have, first and principally their confirmation from the 
people. As people are able to choose and establish their 
kings, it follows that the whole body of the people is 
17) 
above the king. 
It should be noted at this stage that in the 
Vindiciae the people are regarded as a corporation and 
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that it is only in its corporate capacity that the 
people are above the king. Considered one qy one, the 
people are all under the king. On the other hand the 
subjects are neither the king's slaves or bondsmen, but 
each of them ought to be held as the king's brother. 
The conception of law as it appears in the 
Vindiciae shows the following characteristics: Law is 
first of all identified with justice. "Where there is 
18) 
no justice, there is no commonwealth". Next law is re ... 
garded as reason and wisdam itself and as something not 
19) 
subject to the emotions of persons. Then we find the 
same notion that we noticed in Calvin's doctrine above, 
namely that nothing is just only because the king has 
20) 
commanded it, but that it must be just in itself. In 
other words, laws should be judged according to their 
contents. Laws are received by the king from the people 
and it is his duty to maintain these laws. Under God, 
the people are thus the source of the laws and these 
laws the king may not amend without the consent of the 
assembly of the estates. The sovereignty of law is 
clearly asserted in the following passage: "It remains 
always certain, that it is the laws which have power 
over the lives and deaths of the inhabitants of a king-
dom, and not the king, who is but administrator and con• 
21) 
servator of the law. Finally, the law of God is bin-
22) 
ding on the authority of all princes. 
When we come to the jus resistendi as advocated 
in the Vindiciae, it at once becomes clear how closely 
the arguments follow the pluralistic set-up of the late 
Middle Ages. If the king follow after strange gods and 
seek also to attract his subjects, endeavouring b.Y all 
means to ruin the church, it is the duty of the people 
1~ Ibid., p.105. 
19 Ibid., p.l45. 
2 Ibid., p.l47. 
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to contain him within the limits of his obedience to God, 
otherwise they make the fault of their king their own 
23} 
transgression. However, only the whole body of the 
people, and under no circumstances individuals, ms~ pu• 
24} 
nish the king. ~ the whole body of the people is un~ 
derstood only those who hold their authority from the 
people and whom the people have elected to represent their 
whole body. They are the inferior magistrates, assembly 
25) 
of estates, judges and provosts of the town. 
As it is lawful for a whole people to resist and 
oppose tyranny, so it is also lawful that the principal 
persons of the kingdom may, for the good of the whole bo-
dy, confederate and associate themselves together to 
26) . 
offer resistance. 
Just as the king is responsible to God for his 
government of the people, so also the inferior magistrates 
are responsible to God to safeguard the rights of the 
people and to restrain the king who violates the law of 
God. If, however, the magistrates should fail to do 
their duty, the private person has no other option but 
27) 
to flee. 
The Vindiciae has not got much to say about the 
relation between church and civil government, probably 
because it did not visualize any serious conflict between 
them in the pluralistic set-up which it advocated. In 
this set~up the church, like any other corporation, was 
sovereign in its own sphere. The Vindiciae asserted, 
however, that "although the church be not increased by 
arms, notwithstanding it may justly be preserved by the 
"28} 
means of arms. It was thus the duty of the king to pre~ 
serve the established church and if he should fail in his 
duty, the inferior magistrates should act. 
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Kings have no right to take the property of the 
people, it is only their duty to protect it. They are 
29) 
not even absolute lords proprietors of the demesnes. 
If the king alienate the demesnes without the approba• 
tion of the estates, it is void. 
In pleading for the right of intervention, the 
Vindiciae asserted "the brothe_rhoo{i_p:t;_ ~ml, ~n the natu~ 
30) 
ral law of justice~ 
".uz .sx __ &£. .. _ 
Neighbour princes have the right, 
even the duty, to intervene in cases of manifestqppres-
sion, religious or otherwise. They should do so, not 
to invade and usurp another'' s authority, but to contain 
the other within the limits of justice and equity. 
As far as religious oppression is concerned, 
intervention is justified by the fact that the church 
is one and that its unity lays the duty of its defence 
on all its members. Territorial demarcation has no ef-
feet in this case. The same holds good in the case 
of tyrannical oppression which outrages human ideas of 
justice. Even the heathen admits principles of justice 
and in any case, it is only right and proper that the 
interests of all should be promoted. There are thus 
three grounds for intervention: the unity of~ church 
of God·J the brotherhood of m9· in the natural law of 
justice; and the duty to aid the inno~nt and to main-
tain justice. 
FTotesting vehemently against the tendency to 
centralize government powers and the claims to sovereign-
ty arising at this time, the Vindiciae forcefully 
stressed the internal autonomy of the peoples or corpo~ 
rations in the commonwealth and the sovereignty of law~ 
It showed that the king was subject to the whole body of 
the people, that he received the laws from the people 
and that the people ha.d the right to restrain and resist 
a tyrannical king through their elected magistrates. 
29) 
30) 
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These principles offer the best ~arantee for the deve-
lopment of free communities within a commonwealth and 
it is only in the bosom of such communities that the 
individual can come into his own. 
The Vindiciae upholds the principles of contract, 
pluralism, sovereignty of law and the right of revolt 
against tyranny by the inferior magistrates elected by 
the people. This stand was nothing more than a defence 
of the political situation that prevailed in Western 
Europe before an assualt was made on the rights and 
privileges of the peoples and corporations by self-see-
king monarchs. 
Hobbes, by defending the right of monarchs to 
absolute power, disregarded the historical freedoms 
and privileges of the peoples and corporations, while 
Rousseau, as we shall show later, pleaded a case in 
many ways similar to that of tre Vindiciae. 
In Rousseau's political doctrine the principles 
of freedom and good government defended in the Vindiciae 
are restored to·their former glory. There we find so-
vereignty of law in the concept of the ~olonte generale 
and the people as a corporate body, or persona moralis 1 
which creates its own laws. This corporate body is 
founded on the free consent of its members who are 
bound together by a mutual agreement. The prince in 
this case is only the executive official of the sove~ 
reign people, while the principle of pluralism is un-
derlined by Rousseau's insistence on the desirability 
of a small state. 
CF.:.A..PTER 4~ 
THE CHAMPIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN STATE. 
Shortly after the publication of Hotoman1s 
Franco-Gallia in 1573 and Beza's De jure magistra~~um 
in 1574, the first work defending the sovereign state 
saw the light of day under t:m title of Lee Six Livres 
t 
de la Republigue by Jean Bodin. This book appeared in 
1577, two years before the Vindiciae contra tyrannos, 
although the latter may have been written already in 
1574* In 1632 another important book in favour of the 
absolute sovereign state appeared, namely La Souverai• 
nete du Roi b,y Cardin le Bret. This book, for some or 
other inexplicabl~ reason, has been overlooked or ig-
nored by almost all writers on the history of political 
thought; and yet, it contains an extremely important 
statement of the case for the absolute soverej:gnty of 
the king as will be seen below. 
(a) Bodin. 
Jean Bodin became famous as the first political 
theorist to base his conception of the state squarely 
on the concept of sovereignty. This sovereignty was lo• 
cated in the prince. However, Bodin hereby did not im ... 
ply that the prince's sovereignty was arbitrary or un-
limited. 
"Sovereignty is that absolute and perpetual po-
wer vested in a corr~onwealth which in Latin is termed 1) . 
majestas~ Sovereignty implies, for Bodin, the absolute 
and only original competence ·for legis-lation within the 
2) 
territory of the state •.. In respect of his law-making 
capacity, the sovereign prince can tolerate no competi~ 
ti on within his terri tory._. 
When .......... 3J. 
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When Bodin says that sovereignty is perpetual, 
he means that the true sovereign always retains his po-
wer and that he does not receive it temporarily from the 
people or someone else. This sovereignty lasts as long 
as the person who exercises the sovereign power, lives. 
When he says that sovereignty is absolute, he· 
means that the sovereign power is not subject to the 
commmds of anybody, except to the law of God and the 
law of nature. The king is not bound by the laws of 
his predecessors or his own laws. As far as positive 
law is concerned, it can be said that, according to 
Bodin, the king is above the law. 
Apart from the law of God and the law of nature, 
Bodin says that the king is also bound to honour promi~ 
sea made b.Y him to his subjects, because this for.ms 
part of the law of nature. Also the constitutional laws 
of the realm, especially those that concern the kingts 
estate, such as the Salic law, cannot be infringed by 
the king. 
From all this, Bodin draws the conclusion that 
the principal mark of sovereign majesty and absolute 
power is the right to impose laws generally on all sub-
3) 
jects regardless of their consent. 
4) 
As we have seen above, laws affecting the sub-
jects could not be amended without the consent of the 
three estates of the whole of France. Now Bodin calm~ 
ly asserts that the king is not bound to accept the adM 
vice of the estates. He may even act in a way quite 
contrary to what they wish if his acts are based on jus~ 
tice and natural reason. Bodin pictures the sovereign 
as a powerful prince to whom the estates came as humble 
petitioners without any power of commanding or determining. 
3) Op.cit., p.32. 
4) Chap.~ supra. 
3 
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It need hardly be said that this state of' affairs is 
wholly incompatible with the conditions described and 
defended qy the Vindiciae. It is simply inconceivable 
to Bodin that the prince could be subject to the estates, 
as he would then be neither a prince nor a sovereign. 
The prince only consulted the estates to obtain their 
obedience to the laws and not because he was unable to 
legislate independently of them. 
The magistratus inf'eriores who, in the Vindiciae 
were elected by the people and were responsible to God 
to safeguard the rights of the people, only function as 
officials of' the prince from whom they derive all their 
power and authority in Bodin1 s set~up. They are not 
bound to obey orders of the prince which are contrary 
to the divine and natural law. If the magistrate is 
aware that the prince is setting aside a just and use~ 
ful provision of positive law for one that is less so, 
he can delay the execution of the edict till he has 
made representations. If, notwithstanm ng these remon~ 
strances, the prince insists on obedience, the magis~ 
5) 
trate has no choice but to obey. However, the prince 
will be well advised not to seek open conflict with his 
magistrates. 
Whereas in the Vindiciae the inferior magis• 
trates were chosen qy the people and were responsible 
to God, Bodin makes them subject to tiE prince and the 
laws. They do not hold their powers from the people, 
but from the prince. The magistrates could not under 
these circumstances, exercise the same right of rebel-
lion ascribed to them in the Vindiciae. 
The individual subject is never justified to 
attempt anything against his sovereign,prince, howev~ 
evi1 ......... 35 
5) Op.cit .• .,-· PP• 86 ... 87. 
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evil and tyrannical he may be. He may only refuse to 
obey comrrands that are contrary to the law of God and 
of nature, but then he must either flee, go into hiding 
or suffer death, rather than a,ttempt anything against 
6) 
his prince's life and honour. 
According to Bodin citizenship is purely derived 
from the submission of the individual to a prince, while 
in the Vindiciae the individual as a member of an auto• 
nomous corporate body, the people, is prior to any ru-
ler and does not derive his status in the community from 
a ruler. In return for the faith and obedience rendered 
to Bodin's prince, the latter was expected to maintain 
justice and to give counsel, assistance, encouragement 
and protection to the subject. The subm.ission and obe-
dience of a free subject to his prince, and the tuition, 
protection, and jurisdiction exercised qy the prince 
over his subject are the characteristics of a true 
7) 
citizen. 
Although Bodin, as we shall see below, recog-
nizes the place and usefulness of corporations in the 
commonwealth, he also seems to visualize a direct rela~ 
tion between individual subject and prince, so that in 
many cases there may be no corporate body between the 
two apart from the family. 
Bodin leaves space for corporations in his con~ 
ception of a commonwealth. They may establish such or-
dinances as they think in their best interests, provided 
they do not derogate from the statutes of the corpora ... 
tion, imposed or authorized qy the king, or run counter 
8) 
to the laws of the commonwealth. Here we see that al• 
though corporations are allowed a certain measure of 
autonomy, the scope of such autonomy must be authorized 
by the prince. It is a characteristic of Bodin's poli-
8
6
7
l Bodin, Op.cit., p.68. 
Ibid., p.21. 
Ibid., p.l03. 
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tical theory that, although he retains many of the in-
stitutions of the medieval period, he calmly undermines 
their independence Qy posing the sove~n's prior appro~ 
val as a condition for their activities and even exis-
tence. 
However, there are strong traces of pluralism 
in Bodin's theory. Thus he says that "the whole body· 
of the citizens ••• when subjected to the single sove-
reign power of one or more rulers, constitutes a common-
wealth, even if there is a diversity of laws, languages, 
9) 
customs, religions and racesV It is thus possible that 
a king can rule a number of peoples with different tra• 
ditions and laws in his realm. This was indeed the 
case in the Middle Ages. 
In addition to what we remarked about the posi• 
tion of corporations in Bodin's commonwealth above, it 
should be stressed that he regarded them as a legitimate 
means of social organization subject to the approval of 
the sovereign. The existence of corporations he regar• 
ded as essential to the welfare of the commonwealth, 
because such associations engender friendship between 
individuals and this is something that should be en ... 
eouraged in order to maintain a sound commonwealth. 
For Bodin the state originated in violence. 
The state is necessary because men are wicked and the 
sin of which they are guilty is the sin of injustice 
towards onets fellow-men. The development of those 
qualities by which one can distinguish between good 
and evil, true and false, pious and impious, is not 
only the sovereign good of the individual but also the 
true end of the state. The commonwealth "is ordained 
10) 
to the contemplative virtues as its final endU 
9) Op.cit., p.20. 
10) Ibid., p.5. 
Bodin •••••••• 3!7. 
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Bodin identifies the summum bonum of the individual 
with that of the state. However, for him the state is 
not the means to the good life because political acti-
vity is the highest exercise of virtue, for him the 
state alone can maintain those conditions under which 
subjects can individually live virtuous lives.. Here 
again it seems, that although corporations in the com-
monwealth may serve a useful purpose, it is actually 
the state itself and not these inter.mediate bodies whic.h 
enable citizens to achieve the virtuous life. 
Bodin ~akes a point of stressing the fact that 
the prince cannot ta.ke his subjects' property without 
just and reasonable cause. He seems to regard it as a 
11) 
law of nature that private property should be respected. 
This brings us to Bodin's notion of law. Edicts 
and ordinances do not bind the ruler except in so far 
as they embody the principles of natural justice. A 
distinction is made between right and law, for the one 
implies what is equitable and the other what is com• 
manded. Law is nothing else than the command of the 
12) 
sovereign in the exercise of his sovereign power. 
Although he agrees that custo~ law is as bin-
ding as statute law, there is a difference between law 
and custom. Custom is established over a long period 
of years and by common consent, whereas law is made 
on the instant and draws its force from the sovereign. 
Custom only has binding force by the sufferance and 
during the good pleasure of the sovereign prince, and 
so far as he is willing to authorize it. This is 
clearly just the reverse of the position stated in the 
Vindiciae that the king receives the laws from the 
people. The ••••••••• 3S 
11} Op.cit., p.35 
12) Ibid., pp.34-35. 
5 
- 36 -
The attributes of sovereignty are the following: 
(a) the power to make law binding on all subjects in 
general and on each in particular, 
(b) making of war and peaceJ 
(c) the power to institute the great officers of state, 
(d) the final resort of appeal from. all other courts; 
{e) the right of coinage, the right of levying taxes, 
13) 
of granting exemptions and privileges .. 
Bodin definitely favours a monarchy, and also 
the centralization of all sovereign power in one per-
son. It is interesting to recall that exactly the same 
powers which Bodin places in the hands of the sovereign, 
. 14) . 
were reserved by Hotoman for the general council. 
Sovereignty is thus not only absolute and perpetual, 
but also indivisible. Consequently the prince cannot 
15) 
share his sovereign power with anybody. 
It will only be fair to point out that, although 
Bodin tries to justify the absolute sovereign state 
with all power concentrated in the person of one prince, 
he does not advocate arbitrary rule. Time and again 
throughout his book, he warns the prince to practice 
moderation. He should act justly towards his subjects, 
he should consult the estates and. the councils although 
he is not bound to accept their advice, no abrupt chan~ 
ges in the law of the people should be made. In short, 
the prince should always act in such a way that his 
behaviour will automatically command the respect of 
his subjects. 
(b) Le Bret. 
Cardin le Bret in his La Souverainetf, du Roi 
which was publised in 1632, also attempted as Bodin 
before him, to justify the existence and growth of the 
absolute sovereign state. He is, however, not entirely 
convinced •••••••• 39 
13) Ibid., p.44. 
14) Franco~Gallia, p.?7. 
15) Op. cit., p.52. 
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convinced of absolutism. At times he regards the so-
vereign only as the depository of the power of the 
state; at other times he again identifies the state 
16) 
power with the will of the sovereign. 
The prince is subject to the law of God and the 
law of nature, but to no other law. His sovereignty is 
supreme, perpetual and indivisible. He has the right 
of absolute command and his sole purpose is the peace 
and public well•being of his subjects. 
The first people saw that they were exposed to 
attack by their enemies and that the strong suppressed 
the weak. God consequently inspired them to institute 
a king and to give him the sovereign authority over 
17) 
them. Here it should be recognized that it is the 
people who gave soveDignty to the kings. Similarly 
the king does not himself create the law, but he only 
gives expression to a legal power that exists outside 
him. 
The king should always exercise his powers in 
the interests of his subjects and not in his private 
interest. Because of their public character, it is 
necessary that the approval of the king be obtained 
for the establishment of any corporations in the com• 
monwealth. 
Perfect sovereignty can only be attributed to 
those who are subject to nobody except to God and his 
18) 
laws. · Laws, such as the Salic law by which succession 
is governed, and which ensure the perpetuation of royal 
authori~, are binding on both king and subjects, but 
they only serve to strengthen the royal authority. 
16) 
17) 
18) 
The power from which government over people 
derive~ ••••••• IQ 
G. Picot: Cardin le Br~l558-1655) et la Doc-
trine de la Souverainete. Nancy, 1948. p.lll. 
Picot, Op.cit., p.l04. 
Ibid., p.l34. 
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derives, is willed by God and it is God who transfers 
this power to kings who are responsible to nobody but 
Him. God inspires the king with good advice and so 
his human weaknesses can be overcome. He is thus in 
a position to promulgate laws without the advice of 
his council and the courts. 
All the attributes of sove;reignty which Bodin 
mentions, are also to be found in Le Bretts political 
Le Bret pays much more attention to the rela-
tion between state and church than Bodin. He dieting• 
uishes between temporal and spiritual_power and states 
that the king is independent of the pope. The church 
remains, however, within the commonwealth and like the 
other corporations it has a public charactet. It is 
thus under the protection of the king who, in his co~ 
ronation oath, promised to defend the church. This 
justifies a certain measure of intrusion by the king 
into the affairs of the church. It is not the duty 
of the king to define the faith and the doctrine of 
the church, but he has to take care that no schism 
19) 
occurs. 
All the land, also that of the church, comes 
under the jurisdiction of the king. The church for.ms 
part of the kingdom and has the same duties towards 
the king as the rest of the subjects. A distinction 
between ecclesiastic and royal jurisdiction is_no long~ 
er justified, because all judges are now Christians. 
Le Bret also reviews the relation of the king 
to various traditional institutions. The Conseil d'Etat 
is only an administrative and technical body. When the 
king delega.tes powers to his officials, he does not 
divest •••••••• 4g; 
19) Op.cit., pp .. l5Q.-.160. 
divest himself of those powers; it is always the king 
who acts~ The Etats ... Generaux may not assemble without 
the permission of the king. Even congregations and 
monasteries may not be established without the permis• 
sion of the king. The right of life and death, banning 
and confiscation belongs to the king; also the property 
of the condemned. 
The sovereign power of the king is limited by 
three kinds of law: the law of God, the law of nature 
and "lee loix fondamentales de 1 'Estat p:,>ur ce que le 
Prince doit user de la souverainete selon la propre 
nature en la forme et aux conditions qu'elle est etae 
20) . 
blie~ In othe~ words, the king should act like a 
king and not like a tyrant. 
Under the law of nature, Le Bret groupe such 
actions a.s to practise justice, to protect the weak 
against exploitation and suppression by the strong, 
and to maintain peace. The right to property is also 
a right of nature which should be respected by kings. 
21) 
Furthermore, one should keep your given word. 
A king can strengthen and promote hie sove~ 
reign power by always acting according to established 
tradition, by respecting rules and so to inculcate re~ 
spect for the law in his subjectsJ by allowing his 
officials to perform their duties to the best of their 
abilities and to bring to his attention flaws in the 
law and the inconveniences caused by them; by abiding 
by established customs and rules and so to enhance 
his prestigeJ by always acting in a wise and moderate 
manner, magnanimous towards the virtuous and austere 
- towards the mischievous. 
Old, established privileges should be tolera-
ted, such as those of the nobility, the clergy and the 
statutes ••••••• 4~ 
20) Picot, Op.cit., p.l84. 
21) Ibid., pp.l88-189. 
- 42 ... 
statutes of the provinces. ~ doing so, the king will 
exercise his powers in a just and legitimate way. In 
his own interest the king should uphold his dignity 
and good name by behaving himself in a decent way. 
The best way to respect the divine and. natural order, 
is to follow the advice of wise men. The king should 
be careful not always to ignore the advice of his offi-
cials, because they are also responsible to God for the 
advice they give him. 
Only slight signs of resistence to the king re ... 
main in the theory of Le Bret. The Chancellor and the 
Guardian of the Seals have the right to refuse to coun-
tersign any royal act which seems to them to be unjust. 
Le Bret admits that there may be a legitimate revolt 
if the king should command anything contrary to the 
law of God, for example unjust suppression and execu-
22) 
tion of innocent people. 
Le Bret also admits that the Etats"Generaux 
may intervene in certain matters. So, for instance, 
it is necessary to assemble the estates to ask for 
their assent to alter the currency. It is further-
more an established principle that the prince cannot 
place his subjects under the jurisdiction of another 
prince against their will. 
It is a characteristic of Le Bret's political 
theory that he tries to justify the centralization of 
all sovereign power in the person of the king but that 
he is hesitant to deprive the old, traditional insti-
tutions of all their rights and privileges. Therefore 
he counsels his king time and again to respect those 
institutions and customs, although it is in his power 
to rule without their consent or advice. 
Now •••••••••• 4;j5 
22) Picot, Op.cit., pp.208-209. 
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Now that we are coming to the end of this pre" 
liminary section and before proceeding to examine the 
doctrines of Hobbes and Rousseau in more detail, it is 
an appropriate moment to summarize the principles that 
have been discussed thus far. 
We have seen that in the late Middle Ages there 
existed in Europe a host of independent corporations 
and peoples within each commonwealth and that the terri .... 
torial prince recognized and respected the rights and 
freedoms of these corporat'ions. This is the position 
which the Huguenot theorists, and notably the Vindiciae, 
attempt to maintain. On the other hand the writings of 
Bodin and Le Bret seek to undermine the independent 
existence of corporations and peoples. They state clear-
ly that these corporations derived their authority from 
the prince. They are thus not prior to the prince and 
original subjects of rights. In this way the means to 
resist an unjust prince largely falls away and it is 
left to the conscience of the prince to justify his 
acts before God. In the Vindiciae the estates and the 
inferior magistrates were also responsible to God for 
the well-being of the people and they were thus fully 
entitled to restrain a prince who violated the law of 
God and nature. Bodin and Le Bret held that God wil-
led that people should be ruled by sovereign monarchs, 
and these monarchs are only responsible to God for the 
way in which they treat their subjects. It goes with-
out saying that the king is above the positive law. 
The elimination of the autonomous existence of 
corporations and peoples leads to the isolation of the 
individual. He now stands on his own against the su .... 
preme power of the absolute sovereign. 
The notion of contract also lost much of ita 
value in the hands of Bodin and Le Bret. Although they 
admit •••••••• 4~ 
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admit that the prince receives his authority from the 
people and that the prince should give expression to 
the laws of the people, they maintain that the consent 
of the people is not required for the laws he makes 
conce!ning the people. The prince is not responsible 
to the people for his actions, he is only responsible 
to God. 
Both Bodin and Le Bret state that the prince 
should not violate the law of God and the law of nature, 
but they refuse the inferior magistrates and the esta ... 
tes the right to rebel against a prince who openly vio~ 
. 
lates those laws. Under such circumstances sovenign~ 
ty of law has no meaning. 
The concentration of the sovereign power in the 
hands of a king who is the head of a powerful unitary 
state and the elimination of the spontaneou$ and inde-
pendent existence of corporations within the common~ 
wealth, constituted a grave threat to individual liber ... 
ty in the sixteenth century. Moreover, such a develop-
ment was totally in conflict with conditions and tra~ 
ditions of pluralism and corporate freedom prevailing 
at the time. 
Whereas the Vindici.ae emphasized the contrac,... 
tual connection between the king and the people where~ 
b,y the king promised to rule the people according to 
their own laws, Bodin and Le Bret put no such obliga ... 
tion on the king. The king, in their opinion, cannot 
bind. himself by a promise to the people. The idea of 
contract which implies maintenance of the rights of the 
people as a corporate body b.Y the ruler, thus falls 
away. The peopleate no longer recognized as a persona 
moralis and a subject of rights as in the Vindiciae. 
Hand in hand with this development goes the 
notion of pluralism. Both Bodin and Le Bret recognized 
the necessary functions that corporations may play in a 
sound •••••••• 4S 
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sound commonwealth, but none of them would allow full 
autonomy or legal personality to these bodies. They 
held that these bodies could not be legitimately esta@ 
blished without the authority of the sovereign and con~ 
sequently their powers and jurisdiction are derived 
from the sovereign. Another logical result of this 
view, is that the jus resistendi has no place in such 
a set ... up. 
Also sovereignty of law as defended by the 
Vindiciae loses its meaning. It is good and well to 
say that the king is subject to the law of God and of 
nature, but once those institutions, such as the 
magistratus inferiores, whose duty it was to see that 
the king always observed the law of God and of nature, 
were denied the power to restrain a tyrannous ruler, 
the safeguard of the sovereignty of law was effectively 
removed .• 
It is thus clear that both Bodin and Le Bret 
successfully undermined also those cardinal principles 
upon which the Vindiciae built its case for the main~ 
tenance of the freedom and rights of the people, name~ 
ly the people as a corporate body, the notion of a 
reciprocal contract between people and ruler, plura• 
lism within the commonwealth and the sovereignty of 
law. In the history of political philosophy Hobbes 
was the main exponent of the current of thought ini .... 
tiated by Bodin and Le Bret-
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CHAPTER 5. 
'THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY ___ OF THOMAS HOBBES. 
The argument in favour of the absolute sovereign 
state that we found in the writings of Bodin and Le Bret 
was developed to its logical conclusion in the political 
philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. This does not mean that 
Hobbes was influenced by these two political theorists. 
As far as we know, Hobbes might ha.ve been totally unaware 
of their existence. He was a far more profound philoso~ 
pher than either of them and he prided himself on his 
originality. They must merely be regarded as forerunners 
of Hobbes, because they were trying to justify an histoe 
rical situation which had already developed at the time 
when they were writing.· Hobbes wrote in the same vein 
to remedy a position which was threatening the supreme 
authority of the sovereign in his own countr.y. 
Although Hobbes was conscious of the originality 
of his thought, it is noneetheeless evident that he read 
much an.d widely. He became acquainted with the ideas 
of both Plato and Aristotle, but these he soon rejected 
when he read the writings of Kepler and Galileo. Later 
he was also profoundly influenced by the method developed 
by Rene Descartes. This is thus the appropriate place 
1) 
to give a brief resume of Descartes' method. 
Descartes renounced empiricism as a method 
because of the illusiveness of the senses. Only mo ... 
tion and extension are essential properties of the 
physical world. All other sense impressions he called 
secondary qualities which he located not in the things, 
but •••••••••••• $47 
1) cr. Burtt: The metaphysical foundations of modern 
science. Rev.ed. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1950. pp.96 ... 125. 
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accomplishments in science. Hobbes distinguished be-
tween experience which gives rise to historical know~ 
ledge, and reason which gives rise to scientific know-
ledge.. For him scientific knowledge was the product of 
reason rather than of sense and it permitted knowledge 
of causes and not simply of effects. In this connec~ 
tion Hobbes stressed the fact that true knowledge in-
volved correct speech in accordance with definitions. 
Because he regarded the state as an artificial, man~made 
body, he thought that one could come to know with cer• 
tainty the formula of its construction by means of the 
mathematical method. "Hobbes claimed that his origi ... 
nality consisted in trying to do for civil philos~)hy 
what Galile:O had done for natural philosophy ••• " He 
did not attempt to explain the existence of actual 
states, he tried to demonstrate how a rational state 
ought to be constructed. 
According to Hobbes there can be no cause of 
motion, except in a body contiguous and moved. This 
prd:nciple he applied both to nature and man, and by 
doing so, he rejected Aristotle's final cause, poin .... 
ting out that a final cause could only have a place 
in such things as have sense and will in which case 
it was also an efficient cause. 
Armed with this new 'scientific' approach, 
Hobbes challenged many of the political ideas which 
were generally accepted at the time when he started 
writing. He rejected outright the Divine Right of 
Kings and held that the sovereign embodied the wills 
of his subjects but interpreted his social contract 
in such a way that it resulted in an absolute sovereign. 
As far as the right to resist was concerned, he main~ 
tained that the subject was bound to obey the 
government ••••••• 4~ 
2) R. Peters, Hobbes. Penguin books. 1956. p.74. 
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government only so long as it was fulfilling its func~ 
and 
tion of safeguarding the subject/of :preserving :peace~ 
•,. 
Sir Edward Coke defended the traditional view that there 
\ 
was a fundamental law binding on king and subjects alik~ 
and that it was there to be discovered. Parliament was 
regarded as a kinp of court and its statutes were deemed 
to be declarations of what the law was. This tradition~ 
al view was rejected by Hobbes who w~intained that laws 
were being made, that they were the commands of the so-
vereign. He also feared any religion which afforded 
the individual an authority other than the sovereign. 
In his view the church should be subordinate to the 
state and the sovereign should be responsible for 
ecclesiastical affairs. This was the stand taken by 
Hobbes on four burning issues of his time. How he came 
to this view will be e~mined presently. 
It is important to examine Hobbes' conception 
of man in order to understand his political philosopy 
correctly. According to him the thoughts of man are 
"representations" or "appearances" of some quality, 
or other accident of a body without us, called an 
"object". This object works on the eyes, ears or other 
parts of a man's body and so produces a diversity of 
appearances. 
The cause of sense is thus the external body, 
or object, which presses the organ proper to each sense, 
either immediately or mediately and this pressure, by 
the mediation of the naves, and other strings and mem~ 
branes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and 
heart where it causes a resistance or endeavour which 
being outward, seems to be some external matter. The 
sensations caused in us by external objects, do not 
belong to those objects, but is nothing else but ori-
ginal fancy. In other words, the so-called secondary 
qualities •••••••• .0.0 
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qualities are only phantasms in our heads caused by the 
motions of external objects interacting with our sense-
-organs but representing nothing outside us. 
Hobbes thus accepted the assumption that bodies 
in motion exist independently of our perception of them, 
and that mathematical thinking about them represented 
their real properties. He simply developed a casual 
theory of sensation and saw no need for a theory of 
representation. 
He may have thought that as a motion can only 
produce another motion, such a motion can never repre-
sent a colour unless it was also a motion. His expla• 
nation of sense is thus purely mechanical,. 
It is clear that according to Hobbes, scientific 
knowledge was the product of reason rather than that 
of sense and that it permitted knowledge of causes and 
not simply of effects. All actions have causes and are 
thus necessitated, and all human actions are caused by 
motions ·external to them. Hobbes thus regarded an ac-
tion as determined when it is causally explicable. 
However, he even went further and implied that if a 
causal expla~ation can be given of an action then it 
could not have happened otherwise than it did. 
'Deter.mined 1 thus meant for him inevitable as well as 
causally explicable. From this attitude it follows 
logically that Hobbes would take an unhistorical view 
of politicsJ that he regarded the state as an artificial 
creation of human reason. And as he regarded the ac8 
tiona of men as being determined and inevitable, these 
actions can also be said to be predictable. The task 
of the artificial Leviathan was thus simply to control 
the actions of its subjects in such a way that desirable 
effects may result. Hobbes' state was thus squarely 
based on the principles of natural science as he under-
stood them. 
In •••••••• 51 
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In order to discover the true foundations of a 
conmJ.onwealth, Hobbes attempts to picture man in a state 
of nature which is prior to civil society. Unlike Aris-
totle, Hobbes does not believe that man is by nature a 
'political animal'. "We do not by nature seek socie ... 
ty for ita gyn sake but that we may receive some honour 
or profit". We do not form a. society for love of our 
fellow-men, but for the love of ourselves. Although 
his rationality distinguishes man from animal, yet manta 
actions are not solely motivated by his r~ason but also 
by his passions. The small beginnings of motion within 
the body of man, before they appear in visible actions~ 
are called "endeavour" by Hobbes. When this endeavour 
moves towards something that causes it, it is called 
appetite or desire. When the endeavour is away fram 
something, it is called aversion. Now whatever io the 
object of any uan's appetite or desire, he calls good, 
and the object of his hate or aversion, he calls evil. 
There is nothing that is absolutely good or evil. 
These qualities do not belong to the nature of objects, 
but originate from the passions of man. 
Men are so equal by nature that even the weak-
est are strong enough to kill the strongest, either by 
secret machination, or with the help of others. If 
any two men therefore desire the same thing, they be ... 
come enemies. Com.peti tion among men for the objects 
of their desire leads to a war of every man against 
every man. In this state of nature man lives in con .... 
tinual fear and danger of violent death and his life 
4) 
is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". In 
this state of war there ean. be no question of just or 
unjust. In the state of nature there is no comn.on 
power •••••••••• 52 
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:power and consequently no law and where there is no 
law there can be no injustice. Men therefore live in 
a state of perpetual insecurity and fear. The passion 
which lies at the root of all the strife, is pride, a 
desire for power and even greater power. Only the fear 
of violent death which encompasses all the aversions, 
can counteract this passion for power. It is fear of 
death which eventually brings man to his reason and 
impels him to come to a mutual agreement with his fel-
low~men so that arrangements may be made for the peace 
and security of all~ It need hardly be said that the 
law of nature is silent in the state of nature. 
According to Hobbes, civil society and conse~ 
quently the state, is an artificial creation which 
originates from the nature of man. We have seen that 
in the state of nature, man lives in a miserable con ... 
di tion of war. Fea.r of violent death, however, forces 
man to act reasonably and thus we see a great m.ultit~de · 
of men assemble to institute a comm.onweal th in which 
there will be a visible power to keep all the indivi ... 
duals in awe and force them by fear of punishm.ent to 
perform their covenants and to observe the laws of 
nature. It is the foresight of their own preserva~ 
tion and peace which persuades men to introduce that 
restraint on their natural freedom·which enables them 
to live harmoniously in commonwealths. A commonwealth 
whtch comes about by mutual agreement among individuals, 
Hobbes calls a commonwealth by institution. A common-
wealth can, however, also come into being by acquisi~ 
tion, that is, where the sovereign power is acquired 
by force when men for fear of death or bonds authorize 
all the actions of that man (or assembly) that has 
. 
their lives and liberty in his power. 
However •••••••••• 5! 
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However, it is the commonwealth Qy institution 
that brings us to Hobbes' theory of contract. As 
Mabbott pointed out "the paradox of politics is the re-
conciliation of liberty and obligation, and a free en~ 
quiry might naturally light on contract as a parallel. 
A contract is freely made but binds its maker, it gives 
5) 
him something of value but at a stated cost". 
At the time when Hobbes wrote, there were two 
kinds of contract current in political theory: a Eactum 
unionis and a Eactum subjectionis. The first can be 
regarded as a contract of association which can account 
for the institution of a civil society. The second is 
an agreement on the part of a civil body to submit to 
a particular form of government.. A covenant between 
king and people whereby the people submit to the govern~ 
ment of the king under certain agreed conditions, is an 
example of a Eactum sub,iectionis .. 
Hobbes' version of contract is a Eactum union~. 
A number of individuals, driven to their right senses 
by fear of violent death, decide mutually to give up 
their right of governing themselves to a certain man 
(or assembly of men) and to authorize him to act on 
their behalf. In the state of nature every man had an 
absolute right to do everything that he thought neces-
sary to preserve his life and well~being. This led to 
a state of war of every man against every man. Hobbes 
thought that the only effective way to put an end to 
this miserable state of war, was to transfer the right 
of every man to a single authority who shall have the 
power to exercise that right on behalf of the citizens 
and to take such punitive measures as may be necessary 
to preserve the safety of the individuals and to 
maintain •••••••• 54 
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me.intain peace among them. 
A few characteristics of Hobbes' contract 
theory should be stressed. It should be clearly under-
stpod that, according to Hobbes, the individuals agree 
of their own free will to transfer their natural right 
to a sovereign. As the individual had an absolute right 
in the state of nature, the transfer should also be ab~ 
solute and consequently the resulting power of the so-
vereign is absolute as well. A sovereign is thus insti-
tuted with the consent of his subjects and in his per~ 
son he is the representative of everyone of them. It 
should, however, always be remembered that the sovereign 
is no party to the contract. He has no obligation to~ 
wards his subjects. Hobbes could not visualize an 
effective sovereign authority in society other than in 
the person of an absolute monarch, i.e. in a real, phy~ 
sical person. This was the only way to ensure the unity 
of the body politic. 
Hobbes' notion of sovereignty flows logically 
from his contract theory. The power of the sovereign 
is absolute, because he is the bearer of the absolute 
natural rights of the citizens. The sovereign power 
is indivisible. "For what is it to divide the power 
of a commonwealth, but to dissolve itJ for powers di ... 
6) 
vided mutually destroy each other". The authority of 
the sovereign is unlimited, because if there is any 
other power in a commonwealth which can limit in any 
way the authority of the sovereign, that power will in-
deed be the true sovereign. 
As the sovereign was created to provide for the 
safety of the people, it was his work to make and inter~ 
pret the laws of the commonwealth and to punish breaches 
of •••••••• 55 
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of the law~ In this case it was clear that the sovereign 
had to be above the law and that he could not be im-
peached in his own courts or put to death for actions in 
his capacity as sovereign. The sovereign was the soul 
of an artificial monster, the commonwealth, or Leviathan. 
And it is because of this artificiality that Hobbes 
thought that the use of the mathematical method was appro-
priate in this respect. 
7) 
The sovereign is subject to the laws of nature 
because such laws are divine and cannot be abrogated by 
any man or commonwealth. Only to God need the sovereign 
render an account of how he maintains the laws of nature. 
Other attributes of sovereignty as understood by 
Hobbes, can be summarized as follows: to make and abro-
gate laws; to determine war and peace, to judge all con ... 
troversiest to choose all counsellors, ministers, magis-
trates and officers, to teward with riches or honour and 
to punish with corporal or pecuniary punishment every 
subject according to the law made b.v him, to give titles 
of honour. These rights of sovereignty are incommuni• 
cable and inseparable. The power to coin money and to 
dispose of the estate and persons of infant heirs and 
all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by 
the sovereign. 
It is clear that a tremendous am.ount of power 
is concentrated in the person of Hobbes' sovereign. Not 
only is he the representative of everyone of the sub-
jects of his commonwealth, but he also holds both the 
legislative and executive powers,. In other words, the 
sovereign is the people, the legislator and the govern-
ment combined in one physical person. 
"The people is something that is one, having one 
will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of 
these ••••••••• 56 
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these can properly be said of a multitude. The people 
rules in all governments. For even in monarc~the 
people commandst for the people wills by the will of one 
man, but the multitude are citizens, that is to say, sub-
jects ••• And in a monarchy the subjects are the multi-
tude, and (however it seem a paradox) the king is the 
9) 
people". This is the way in which Hobbes identifies the 
king with the people. 
We have seen that Hobbes favours an unlimited 
sovereign authority. At the same time it must be borne 
in mind that the main duty of Hobbes 1 sovereign is to 
provide for the peace and safety of the people. As soon 
as the sovereign fails to preserve the peace, the sub-
ject is no longer bound to obey him. If a monarch sur-
render to a victor, his subjects are also delivered from 
their obligation and become obliged to the victor. 
We should also remember that there is one natu~ 
ral right which no individual ever transferred to the 
sovereign and that is the right to defend one 1 s own body. 
Therefore no subject is bound to obey a king who com ... 
mands him to kill or har.m himself. No man can be obliged 
to accuse himself. The subject is also entitled to dis• 
obey the sovereign's corr~and to kill somebody else and 
he also has the right to resist efforts by the sovereign 
to arrest him and to attempt to escape when held in pri-
son. 
If a subject have a controversy with his sove-
reign, he has the same liberty to sue for his right as 
if it were against a subject before such judges as are 
appointed by the sovereign. 
For the rest the liberty of the subject depends 
on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign 
has prescribed no rule, the subject has the liberty to 
do or forbear according to his ovm discretion. Thus the 
subject ••••••• 5? 
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subject has the liberty to buy and sell, and otherwise 
to contract with one another, to choose their own abode, 
their own diet, their own trade of life, and the like. 
We may not resist princes who command us to do 
things which are contrary to God's laws. The only thing 
that a subject may do under such circumstances is to 
10) 
"go to Christ by martyrdom". 
It should also be noted that no man has the li~ 
11) 
berty to resist the sovereign in defence of another man. 
The subject can apparently, according to Hobbes, only 
act as an individual vis~a-vis the sovereign. Here it 
is interesting to compare the position of Hobbes with 
that of the Vindiciae. According to the latter the 
people as a corporate body and an object of rights con~ 
fronts the ruler. The individuaa is not allowed to re-
sist the ruler as an individual, only the inferior ma-
gistrates ttay do so on behalf of the people. Whereas 
Hobbes visualizes the relationship between subjects and 
ruler as a relationship between physical individuals, 
the Vindiciae sees the relationship as one existing be• 
tween a group, the people, and. the ruler. Here the in.., 
dividual is not exposed to the arbitrary power of a ruler; 
no, he is shielded ~ the corporate power of the commu~ 
ni ty of which he is a member. 
Hobbes is one of the political theorists who 
d6.!0l.l t at considerable length with the subject of the law 
of nature. Both in De Cive and Leviathan he enumerated 
a great number of laws of nature. It will take too much 
space to enumerate them all here. Hobbes himself called 
them the dictates of right reason for the constant pre-
servation of our life and members. They inc·lude such 
virtues as peacefulness, helpfulness, gra.ti tude, equality, 
humility ••••••• 58 
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humility and equity. One of the laws of nature which 
Hobbes em-phasized, is "that men perform their cove-
. 12) 
nants ma,de 11 • In this way he gave a natural law foun• 
dation to his social contract. He summarized the laws 
of nature in the following words: "Do not that to ano-
ther, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done qy 
13) 
another to thyself11 • 
The laws of nature are reasonable, immutable, 
eternal, moral and divine. They need not be published 
or proclaimed~ The laws of nature always oblige us 
in foro interno, that is, they bind us to a desire 
that they should take place; but in foro extern.o not 
always. In the state of nature, for instance, where 
nobody has sufficient security that others will o~ 
serve the laws towards him, they are not binding in 
foro externo. One thus feels obliged to agree with 
Strauss "that there is no natural law prior to the es-
tablishment of civil society or independent of the 
»14) . 15) 
command of the sovereign, although Warrender has some 
a 
reservations on this score. Perhaps it would be/more 
fair statement of Hobbest theory of natural law, to say 
that natural law existed even in the state of nature, 
but that it could only be enforced and could only give 
rise to obligation under circumstances of civil society 
where there is a sovereign authority to ensure the ob-
servance of the law of nature by everybody. 
The sovereign should not contravene the laws of 
nature, but Hobbes provides no institution which will 
be competent to force the sovereign actually to observe 
these laws. It is thus left to the discretion of the 
sovereign himself. 
12) 
13) 
14) 
15) 
Hobbes distinguishes between ,jus naturale, the 
Ibid., p.?l. 
Ibid., p.l26. 
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right of nature, the liberty that every man has to use 
his own power as he thinks fit, to preserve his own 
life; and lex naturalis, or law of nature, which is a 
general rule based on reason, by which man is forbidden 
16) 
to do anything that is destructive of his life. Jus 
mna:turale is thus a liberty and lex naturalis an obli ... 
gati on. 
When we come to positive, or civil law, we see 
that they are simply defined by Hobbes as the commands 
of the sovereign. The sovereign is the only one who 
makes laws in a commonwealth, consequently he is not 
subject to the civil laws, because the person who can 
make the laws, can also repeal them. 
The law of nature and the civil law contain each 
other. It is the sovereign power that obliges men to 
obey the laws of nature. As every subject in a common~ 
wealth has covenanted with another to obey the civil 
law, obedience to the civil law is part also of the law 
of nature. The purpose of all law is to limit the li-
berty of particular men so that tb.ey do not hurt, but 
assist one another. 
Except for the law of nature, it belongs to the 
essence of all other laws that they should be made known 
to everyone who shall be obliged to obey them, by word 
or writing, or some or other act known to proceed from 
the sovereign authority. In other words, the law should 
not only be written and published but it should also 
bear signs that it proceeds from the will of the sove-
reign. All law, including the law of nature, may only 
be interpreted by the sovereign or by people appointed 
by him. 
17) 
Mabbott says that one of his main objections to 
Hobbes •••••••• 60 
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Hobbes, is that he makes society and law precede mo-
rality. This is indeed the case, for it is quite clear 
that Hobbes bases morality on law. Accorcting to him the 
civil laws are the rules by which the subjects can ms-
ti:nguish right and wrong. Right is what is in accor-
dance with the law and wrong that which is contrary to 
the law. Laws are also the rules of just and unjust, 
18) 
only things contrary to the law are unjust. Thus the 
king, as the law-maker, is also the person who provides 
the basis for morality in society. Where there is no 
civil power to restrain men, there would be no right or 
wrong, justice or injustice. 
Hobbes ·ahows that the power of interpreting the 
word of God and the supreme civil power were united in 
Moses while he lived. Thereafter they were united in 
the high ... priests until King Saults time. By the elec .. 
tion of Saul as King of Israel, the direct kingdom of 
God on earth was interrupted, but it is to be restored 
at the Second Coming. Until then, there exists no 
kingdom of God on earth, but just as in the time of 
Saul, the civil and spiritual authorities are united 
in the ·king. 
Hobbes defines a church as "a company of men pro-
fessing Christian religion, united in the person of one 
sovereign, without whose corrJD.and they ought not to assem-. 
19) . 
ble". And as there is no power on earth to which all 
commonwealths are subject, there cannot be a universal 
church which all Christians are bound to obey. 
The time between the Ascension of Jesus and the 
Second Coming, Hobbes divides into two periods: before 
and after civil sovereigns adopted the Christian reli~ 
gion. During the former of these two periods ecclesias-
tical power was with the apostles and those to whom the 
Holy •••••••••• 61 
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Holy Spirit was transmitted by the laying on of hands. 
They had, however, no coercive power, but they could. 
teach and persuade people to believe in Jesus Christ 
and to prepare themselves for His Second Coming. 
Under a Christian sovereign civil and religious 
authority could easily be reconciled, because the so• 
vereign required obedience to civil law which contained 
all the laws of nature or of God. In a Christian Com-
monwealth, therefore, the church and religion are clear~ 
ly subordinated to the sovereign. Hobbes could not 
tolerate a religion which afforded the subject direct 
access to an authority other than the lawful sovereign. 
When one comes to tm vi tal issue in political 
theory, namely the relation of the individual to the 
state, it may be fair to say that Hobbes regarded in~ 
dividuals as a multitude of colliding atoms, each of 
which could only be kept in its proper place b,y a su-
perior power. Each individual stands in direct rela~ 
tion to the sovereign and no corporation or body poli-
tic may, without the express permission of the sove-
reign, stand between the individual and the sovereign. 
However, Hobbes did not at all like corporations in a 
commonwealth. "Another infirmity of a commonwealthV 
he said, "is .... the great number of corporations, which 
are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels 
of a greater, like vvorms in the entrails of a natural 
20) 
man" .. 
The sovereign in any commonwealth is the abso-
lute representative of all the subjects and therefore 
somebody else can be a representative of any part of 
them, only in so far as the sovereign allows it. 
We encounter the same attitude in connection with 
private ••••••• 62 
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private property. All the land and its resources be-
long to the sovereign and private property was only 
that which the sovereign had declared to belong to an 
individual. The individual has the right to exclude 
others from his property, but not the sovereign. And 
in this regard, Hobbes ma'k:es a highly significant con-
fession. "It is true~ he remarks, "that a sovereign 
monarch, or the greater part of a sovereign assembly, 
may ordain the doing of many things in persuit of their 
passions, contrary to their own consciences., which is a 
breabh of trust and of the law of nature; but this is 
not enough to authorize any subject, either to make war 
upon, or so much as to accuse of injustice, or any way 
to speak evil of their sovereign, because they have 
authorized all his actions, and in bestowing the sove-
21) 
reign power, made them their own". From this passage 
it is abundantly clear that the individual is absolute-
ly helpless in the presence of the sovereign. The sove• 
reign is supposed to observe the law of nature in his 
dealings with the individual, but if he should fail to 
do so, the individual may not even complain. 
Another aspect of the relation between indivi~ 
dual and state in Hobbes' philosophy, is noted by Wolin, 
namely that the individuals are never fused into a real 
corporate unity. "Calculating, egoistic and alone even 
in society, Hobbesian man was poor political matter from 
22) 
which to generate the dynamics of power". Individuals 
are only kept in a social state qy the powerful presence 
of the sovereign. If he is removed, they relapse into 
a state of nature with war of all against all. 
All the natural rights of the individual are 
a.bsorbed in the artificial Leviathan.. To allow the 
individual •••••• 63 
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individual to act on his ov1rn as the judge of good and 
evil, is a doctrine repugnant to civil society. For 
a man living in a commonwealth, the law is the public 
conscience by which he has already undertaken to be 
guided. 
Hobbest conception of the nature of man which 
was based on his mechanical view, made it impossible 
for him to visualize that a people or group, could be 
formed spontaneously. The existence of the people as 
an autonomous corporate body was inconceivable to him. 
His contract is consequently nothing more than 
an act of submission by every individual to an absolute 
ruler who undertakes no obligations towards his sub-
jects. These subjects had neither the corporate cohe-
sion, nor the bargaining power to keep the rulerrto the 
limits of reasonable and just conduct. The magistratus 
inferiores of the Vindiciae chosen by the people and 
responsible to God to safeguard the laws and rights of 
the people, have no place in Hobbes' doctrine. Here it 
is up to the conscience of the monarch to observe the 
law of God and of nature. Nobody can tell him that he 
failed to do his duty. 
Also the idea of sovereignty of law disappears 
from the ;· iSCene;o Hobbes' sovereign is the sole source 
of the law and is, as such, above law. The content of 
the law is not the most important aspect, but its source, 
the man who has the legitimate authority to make the laws, 
the monarch .. 
Finally all traces of pluralism are thoroughly re-
moved from Hobbes 1 doctrine. No corporations may operate 
without the express consent of the sovereign. The result 
is that the individual stands isolated against an 
absolute •••••• 64 
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absolute and arbitrary sovereign whose word is law 
and whose authority nobody can question. 
That such a political doctrine was absolute-
ly foreign to the atmosphere of the Vindiciae need 
hardly be said. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
/ 
TEE :POLITICAL PHILOSO:PHY OF JEAN-JACQ,UES ROUSSEAU. 
We have seen how, in the late Middle Ages, there 
existed in Europe many corporations and peoples each of 
whom enjoyed local autonomy. We have also seen how the 
Huguenot writers of the sixteenth century fought for the 
maintenance of this state of affairs by stressing the 
contractual arrangements between people and ruler, the 
sovereignty of law to which both parties were subject 
and the notion of pluralism whereby the various groups 
were recognized as subje~ts of rights. 
These political conditions were gradually cleared 
away by the emergent sovereign state which sought to 
centralize all powers in the hands of a monarch who was 
regarded as the source of all positive law and conse-
quently stood above the law. This position was increa-
singly justified by Bodin, Le Bret and Hobbes. 
We have said that the ultimate validity of any 
political theory, depended on the conception of the 
nature of man,. It'is because Hobbes based his politi ... 
cal doctrine on man as an egoistic, atomistic indivi~ 
dual who has no compassion for his fellow-men, that we 
have to reject his solution for the relation between 
man and state however logical his argument may be. 
We shall attempt to show that Rousseau had a 
much more adequate conception of man. Consequently 
he was able to restore to their former glory those prin-
ciples of freedom which were characteristic of the late 
Middle Ages. Men in society were able to govern them-
selves and Rousseau rejected the idea of a personal 
sovereign. Instead of a personal sovereign, sovereign~ 
ty of law should rule supremely in an orderly community. 
"Ca.r 1' impulsion du seul appeti t est 1' esc lavage et 
l'obeissance ••••••• 66 
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ltobeissance a la loi qu'on s'est prescrite est liber-
1) 
te~ writes Rousseau. In short, Rousseau attempted to 
revive all those enduring principles for which the 
Huguenot theorists fought. 
In contrast to Hobbes, Rousseau was very much 
dismayed by the absolute sovereign state ·which displayed 
some of its worst features during his life-time. The 
actual state of affairs under which people lived, es-
pecially in France, was totally unacceptable to him 
and he sought a political theory which could serve as 
a sound basis for a form. of state in which man will be 
able to enci oy as much freedom as possible. 
Before dealing with the details of Rousseau's 
political theory, we should first have a look at the 
sources of his thought and mention the writers who in-. 
fluenced him. It need hardly be emphasized that Reus-
seau is a controversial figure in political philosophy 
and even about his antecedents there is some difference 
of opinion. One encounters one such difference of opi-
nion when one considers the influence of Geneva on Rous ... 
seau's political thought. On the one hand Jules Vuij 
states that "the central thought of Rousseau is, with .... 
out any possibility of doubt, borrowed from the Liber-
ties promulgated at Geneva by the Prince-Bishop, Adhe-
2) 3) 
mar Fabri, in 1387 11 • V~ughan is also of the opinion 
that the free institutions and the keen civic life of 
Geneva as a whole must have made a deep impression upon 
the thought and imagination of Rousseau. With this opi-
4} 
nion Derathe agrees, but he also says that it is 
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elsewhere that we must look for the sources of Rous-
seau's political thought. He quotes Spink as saying 
that the most that one can say is that Rousseau believed 
at a certa.in time, that he found in the institutions of 
Geneva the realization of his ideal. However, if one 
puts his theory in its rightful place in the great cur-
rent of speculative thought of the 18th century, one 
5) 
does not see a Genevan brochure anymore. Vaughan agrees 
6) 
with Spink that the real masters of Rousseau are Hobbes., 
Grotius, Pufendorf and Barbeyrac and, above all, Locke, 
Montesquieu and .Plato. To this list should be added 
the names of Althusius, Barlamaqui, Malebranche and the 
Encyc lopaedi s ts .• 
In our next chapter we shall compare the politi-
cal philosophy of Rousseau with that of Hobbes. We shall 
therefore not discuss the influence of Hobbes on Rousseau 
at this stage. Suffice it to say that it is known that 
Rousseau was well-acquainted with De Cive, although no 
7) 
evidence could be found that he ever read Leviathan. 
The influence of Pufendorf is very important. 
Pufendorf was the writer who countered Hobbes' 'civil' 
or 'public person' in the form of a physical person, 
with the doctrine that the state itself is a public per-
son constituted by the wills of natural persons. A na.-
tion is just as much a person as one man or a council 
of men and such a moral person may be sovereign. This 
moral person .... the whole body of the people - :b..as to 
transfer ita sovereignty to some particular person or 
persona who are to exercise the right of rule. Reus-
, , , 1 
seau thus got the notion of his "volonte genera e" from 
Pufendorf although he did not follow him as far as his 
second contract is concerned. He only went as far as 
6
5 ) Op. c it • , 
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Pufendorf's first contract, i.e. that of establishing 
a sovereignty and could not agree that that sovereignty 
should be transferred to anybody. In other words he 
denied that there should be a contract of government. 
That Rousseau was acquainted with the :political 
theory of Althusius is evident from a passage in 
8) 
Lettre vi of his Lettres ecrites de la Montagne. Many 
of the most important features of the political philo~ 
sophy of Rousseau we also find in the Politica methodice 
digesta of Althusius. Derathe said that "Althusius neue 
parait n'avoir ete seulement le precurseur de Rousseau, 
9) 
mais aussi son maitre". For Althusius soven:ignty was 
an inalienable right which the people could no more 
cede than an individual could cede his own life. Any 
regime in which the people did not exercise the sove-
reignty he regarded as tyrannical. He also said that 
the government of a people is only the mandatory of the 
people to whom. it owes its power and from whom the pe-
ople ca.n withdraw their power whenever they think fit. 
He emphasized the sovereignty of law and stated that 
the law of nature should be embodied in fundamental 
law. Law is created by homogeneous communities. Al~ 
though his opinion of the nature of man is not as 
idyllic as that of Rousseau, he had nevertheless a 
strong belief in the force of sympathetic emotions 
among men, which is also a character is tic of the phi-
losophy of Rousseau. The state of Althusius is made 
up of a number of corporations which existed prior to 
it and it is in connection with this aspect of his doc~ 
10) 
trine that Vaughan doubted that he could have had much 
influence on Rousseau. Vaughan forgot, however, that, 
although Rousseau said that he dealt with a state, 
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what he actually described is a very small state, in-
deed a city-state, and that the formula of his social 
contract could be applied equally well to the formation 
of a small unit like the clan, the village or the city. 
To me it seems that there is no essential discrepancy 
between Althusius 1 and Rousseau's notion of contract~ 
When we consider that Rousseau did not complete his 
projected treatise on political institutions, it would 
not be unfair to regard his "state" as described in his 
Contrat Social as a corporation and his confederation, 
which he just mentioned briefly, as analogous to what 
Althusius called a "state". However, this is an inter-
pretation that will be discussed at greater length 
later. I rather feel inclined to agree with Derathe 
that Rousseau owed much to Althusius. 
The influence of Plato and Malebranche can be 
discerned clearly where Rousseau in his Discourse on 
political economy identified virtue with the conformity 
of the particular wills with the general will, and the 
11) 
general will with the will of God. The influence of 
other writers will be dealt with in the course of our 
examination of the various aspects of the political 
theory of Rousseau. 
For a good understanding of Rousseau's doctrine, 
it is essential to pay some attention to his method. 
We have already seen that Hobbes rejected the histori-
cs.l method and applied the mathematical method to po-
litical problems. The result was that his treatment 
of political t.heory was utterly mechanistic, ma terialis,.. 
tic and rationalistic. The commonwealth was conceived 
as a huge machine and human individuals as colliding 
atoms. 
Although Rousseau also rejected the historical 
method, he did not relapse into the barren mechanism of 
Hobbes .•••••••• 70 
11) Vaughan: Op.cit., vol.l, pp.243 and 248 .• 
- 70 ... 
Hobbes. Like Plato he realized tha:t man 1 s nature only 
becomes intelligible when we consider his social life, 
when he is considered in his totality and not as an 
isolated individual. He also realized that b,y means 
of a purely mathematical approach one will never be 
able to penetrate to the real nature of man who is a 
free and complex being,. totally different from physical 
objects and animals. Man's environment, the political 
framework in which he lives, should be of such a nature 
that man will be able to develop his best qualities. 
Already in his Discours sur ltinegalite Rousseau 
writes: 11 11 ne faut pas prendre les recherches, dans 
lesquelles on peut entrer SU:tT ce sujet, pour des veri-
tea historiquesJ mais seulement pour des raissonements 
hypothetiques et conditionnels; plus propres a eclair-
cir la nature des choses qu'a en montrer la veritable 
12) 
origine ..... 11 His method is also rational but not me-
chanistic and mathematical. He is not concerned with 
what is, or was, but only with what ought to be. Man 
is able to find the knowledge of what ought to be by 
13) 
genuine self-examination. This approach is particu-
larly noticeable in the Contrat Social which should be 
regarded a,s an abstract description of an ideal state. 
For Rousseau the true method is 'to test the fact b,y 
the principles of Right 1 and not, like Grotius, accor-
ding to him, invariably does, to infer Right from the 
14) 
fact. This hard core of abstraction in the theory of 
15) 
Rousseau, Vaughan ascribes to the influence of Hobbes 
and Locke. In his later writings such as his Pro,jet 
de Constitution pour la Corse (1765) and Considerations 
~r le Gouvernement de Pologne (1772), he made use of 
the historical method. Here he showed a determination 
12) 
13) 
14) 
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to m.aster all the known facts of the case and to inter-
pret them in the light not of any preconceived theory 
but of expediency and practical possibility. This change 
of approach was due to the influence of Montesquieu who 
taught that the state is a natural and largely uncon.-
scious product and that not ideas, but circumsta.nces are 
the dominant factor in its growth. However, as far as 
his purely political theory is concerned, we should al-
ways bee,r in mind that his approach is abstract but not 
mathematical .. 
In other words, he did not describe a concrete, 
historical political system, but he enunciated in a r~-
tional way the principles on which a legitimate state 
should be erected. His approach was not mathematical, 
because he realized that men were creatures of flesh and 
blood with both intelligence and feeling and not mere 
mechanical atoms. Ernst Cassirer has put this position 
of Rousseau very neatly. "The mathematical-logical spi ... 
rit of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries~ he 
writes, "had converted nature into a mere mechanism: 
16) 
Rousseau once again discovered the soul of nature". 
Indeed, in our opinion not only his approach to politics 
but also his method constitute a reply to the barren ab-
solutism of Hobbes and the principles on which it was 
based. In our next chapter we shall deal with this ques~ 
tion in more detail. 
In his Discours sur l'inegalite and in a fragment, 
L'~tat de guerre, Rousseau gives us a fairly complete 
picture of what he considers to be the state of nature. 
Right at the beginning of the Discours, he makes it per-
fectly clear that he does not necessarily regard the 
state of nature as a historical epoch in the develop-
ment of man, it may never have existed. Nevertheless, 
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it is necessary to have an accurate notion of such a 
state in order to judge the present state of man proper-
ly. 
Man in the state of nature has two natural pro-
pensities which are prior to reason, namely one which 
interests us deeply in our own welfare and preservation, 
and the other which excites a natural repugnance at see~ 
ing any other sensible being, and particularly one of 
our own species, suffer pain or death. Comparing man 
with anire.a.l, Rousseau points out that whereas the animal 
is governed solely by nature a.nd its instinct, man can 
act as a free agent. Man has the power to will, or rae 
ther to choose and these spiritual acts of man cannot 
be explained by means of mechanical laws. Moreover the 
whole human species has the capacity to perfect itself. 
Human understanding owes much to the passions 
which in turn have their origin in our wants. The sa-
vage man only experiences ph,ysical needs, such as a de-
sire for food, a female and rest. The only evils that 
he fears are pain and hunger. The savage has no fear 
of death, for in the state of nature he cannot know 
what it is to die. It is only after he has left the 
state of nature, that man acquires a knowledge of death 
and its terrors. It is wrong to assume that families 
lived under one roof in the state of nature, for in 
that state men had neither houses, nor any kind of pro ... 
perty whatever. The sexes united as accident, oppor~ 
tunity or inclination brought them together and they 
parted with the same indifference. 
It is also wrong to conclude with Hobbes, that 
because man has no idea of goodness in the state of na-
ture, he must be .wicked. On the contrary, the desire 
of self-preservation in n~n is tempered by compassion 
which precedes any kind of reflection. From this 
quality •••••• ~.73 
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quality alone flow all the social virtues. Compassion 
is a natural feeling and in the state of nature it takes 
the place of laws, morals and virtues. 
As far as love is concerned, it consists of phy-
sical and moral ingredients and man, in the state of na ... 
ture, is only capable of the physical part of love and 
is thus subject to fewer and less violent fits of pas-
sion than in society. Rousseau comes to the conclusion 
that the majority of the passions has a social origin 
and does not exist in the state of nature. In conclu-
sion, he summarizes his view of the state of nature as 
follows:-
"Concluons qu 1 errant dans les forets, sans indus ... 
trie, sans parole, sans domicile, sans guerre et sans 
liaison, sans nul besoin de sea semblables, co~me sans 
nul desir de leur nuire, peut-etre meme sans jamaia en 
reconnaitre aucun individuellement, lfhomme sauvage, 
sujet ~ peu de passions, et se suffisant ~ lui-meme, 
n'avait que les sentiments et lea lumieres propres a 
cet etat; qu'il ne sentait que ses vrais besoins, ne 
regardait que ce qu 1 il croyait avoir interet de voir, 
et que son intelligence ne faisait pas plus de progres 
17) 
que sa. vani te". 
In "L'Etat de guerre", Rousseau shows that a 
state of war can only come about in a civil state and 
he reproaches Hobbes for importing the vtces of civi-
lization into the state of nature. The state of war 
is not at all natural to the human species. War ac~ 
tually originates from peace, or at least from the pre ... 
cautions which men take in order to ensure a durable 
peace. Man would indeed be a strange animal, exclaims 
Rousseau, if he believed that his good existed in the 
destruction of his species. Just as little as a state 
of •.•..••• 74 
17) Discours sur l'inegalite. (In Vaughan, vol.l,pp.l65-
166.) 
- 74 ... 
of war is natural to man, is a feeling of sociability 
natural to man.. Rousseau rejects the Aristotelian doc .... 
18) 
trine that man is by nature a social being. He also 
rejects the notion of a general society of mankind. If 
sociability is inherent to human nature, all the socie-
ties which history offers, are also natural and their 
condemnation will be a condemnation of nature itself 
19} 
and the human ill will be without remedy. 
The natural inequality of man which is hardly 
noticeable in the state of nature, increases tremendous-
ly in the social state,. In the state of nature, man 
lived a solitary life and there was thus no common ba-
sis of comparison of the abilities of individuals. It 
is only in a social state that man can compare his own 
power and abilities with those of others and that in~ 
equality becomes pronounced. 
20) 
Hubert indicates that the state of nature has 
many features in common with the doctrine of a primi~ 
tive EdenJ the fall of man having its counterpart in 
the depravation caused by society, but there is an im-
portant difference: the Church says that by the fall 
man becomes naturally and inevitably bad, incapable to 
escape from his state of depravation, except by a super-
natural act of divine grace. Rousseau, on the other 
hand, says that man is bad, hehas fallen but not qy di-
vine decree~ God created him and God desires that he 
should remain as he was in the Eden of the state of na-
ture. From this state man has fallen as a result of the 
error he committed in allowing himself to be organized 
in an artificial state of society. 
How did society originate? Rousseau gives various 
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answers to this question. In his Discours sur l'in~ga~ 
lite he says clearly: "le premier qui ayant enclos un 
terrain s 1avisa de dire, Ceci est a moi, et trouva des 
gens assez simples pour le croire, fut le vrai fondateur 
21) 
de la societe civile". Here he ascribes the origin of 
civil society to the institution of private property. 
However, in an Essay on the origin of languages, he of ... 
fers, to :my- mind, a more plausible explanation. He says 
that not physical needs, but moral needs, i.e. what men 
want of each other, the satisfactions which they cannot 
obtain without living together, make a people out of a 
scattered population. Finally in the Contrat social 
(1,6) he says: "Je suppose les hom..mes parvenus a ce point 
ou les obstacles qui nuisent a leur conservation dans 
l'etat de nature l'emportent, par leur r~sistance, sur 
les forces qui chaque individu peut employer pour main..-
22) 
tenir dans cet etat". These various explanations are 
not necessarily contradictory, they should, I think, 
rather be regarded as complementary. 
One thing should, however, be clearly understood 
and that is that Rousseau allows for a long development 
of men from the state of nature to an unorganized state 
of society which eventually led to a state of war. This 
interval of 'a multi tude of ages' between the ste,te of 
n~ture and the inception of the state of Rousseau, is 
often ignored by commentators on his political philoso ... 
p~~. Most of the second part of the Discours sur l'in~­
galite is devoted to a description of how man emerged 
from the state of nature into a state of society prior 
to the establishment of the state@ Commentators com-
plain that no mention is made of this interval in the 
Contrat social. They forget that whereas Rousseau tries 
in •••••.•••• ?6 
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in the Discours to explain how the present situation of 
human inequality and bondage came about, in the Contrat 
social he is simply trying in an abstract way to indi-
cate how an ideal state should be established. In this 
case he is thus not concerned with possible historical 
or logical antecedents of an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs; he is constructing a new ideal state. 
Apart from a description of the emergence of the 
state of society, the second part of the Discours also 
contains criticism by Rousseau of the contract theories 
that were held by earlier writers. He rejects uncondi~ 
tional surrender to an absolute ruler. Such voluntary 
subjection he regards as slavery and asserts that savage 
man would prefer the most turbulent state of liberty to 
the most peaceful slavery. Paternal authority from which 
some authors have derived absolute government, is far too 
mild to give rise to the ferocious spirit of despotism. 
He also disagrees with Pufendorf who said that we may 
divest ourselves of our liberty in favour of other men, 
just as we transfer our property from one to another. 
Rousseau easily demolishes this argument by pointing out 
that the property one alienates becomes quite foreign to 
one and one cannot suffer from the abuse of it. This, 
of course, does not hold for one's liberty. Moreover, 
the right of property being only a convention of human 
institution, men may dispose of what they possess as 
they please. This, however, is not the case with such 
essential gifts of nature as life and liberty. It would 
be an offence against both reason and nature to renounce 
our life and liberty at any price whatsoever. In other 
words, Rousseau here is convinced that the individual 
cannot alienate his liberty without betraying his hu-
man nature. 
Without going into much detail, Rousseau then 
briefly outlines what he regards as a proper contract of 
government ••••••• ,. 77 
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government, namely a reciprocal contract between the 
people and the rulers chosen by them. ~ this contract 
both parties bind themselves to observe the laws therein 
expressed. This is for him the only acceptable explana-
tion of the establisriment of government, but he does not 
waste any time to point out the unavoidable abuses of such 
a constitution. Gradually legitimate power was converted 
into arbitrary power and things deteriorated to such an 
extent that all private persons returned to their first 
equality, because they were nothing and had no law but 
the will of their master, and their master no restraint 
23) 
but his passions. The contract of government was thus 
• 
completely dissolved by despotism. 
Not satisfied with this version of the contract 
theory, Rousseau attempts in his Contrat social to base 
civil society on a more secure foundation. What he was 
looking for, he formulates as follows: "Trouver une forme 
de association qui d6fende et prot~ge de toute la force 
commune la personne et les biens de chaque associe, et 
par laquelle chacun, s'unissant a tous, n'obeisse pour~ 
tant que a lui-meme, et reste aussi libre qu'auparavant? 
Tel est le probleme fondamental dont le Contrat social 
24) 
donne la solution 11 .. 
Once more he rejects paternal authority, pointing 
out that this authority only lasts as long as the chil.-
dren need the father for their ~reservation. As soon as 
the child reaches years of discretion he is the sole 
judge of the proper means of preserving himself, and 
thus becomes his own master. Next he makes it perfect~ 
ly clear that force can never create right and that we 
are obliged to obey only legitimate powers. His main 
objection against the doctrine that might is right, 
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seems to be directed against the relativity of the con~ 
cept of right in such an assumption. He thus seems to 
assume that right ought to be an immutable and univer-
sal concept and in this light his position can be in-
terpretated as a defence of the law of nature. 
Cassirer conf:i.rms this view where he writes that 
Rousseau "never renounced the idea of "objective" truth 
25) 
and the demands of an "objective" morality". 
He deals in considerable detail with the subjec~ 
tion of individuals to a king. He rejects the idea that 
a people can alienate itself. A man who sells himselfl~ 
as a slave, does so at least for his subsistence, but 
for what does a people sell itselff Far fram furnishing 
his subjects with their subsistence, a king gets his own 
from them. To say that a people gives itself gratuitous-
ly to a ruler, is to say what is absurd and inconceivable; 
such an act is the act of madmen and consequently null 
and void. Even if a man could alienate himself, he could 
not alienate his children. It would therefore be neces-
sary, in order to legitimize arbitrary government, that 
in every generation the people should be in a position 
to accept or reject it. He comes to the inescapable con-
clusion once more that renunciation of liberty is incom" 
patible with the nature of man and that to remove all 
liberty from man's will is to remove all morality from 
his acts. Any convention which sets up, on the one side, 
absolute authority, and, on the other, unlimited obe• 
dience, is empty and contradictory. 
From the foregoing, it should b.Y now be clear 
that Rousseau would tolerate neither a contract of sub~ 
mission, nor one of government. His contract is simply 
one of association. In this respect Rousseau undoubted-
ly learned much from Hobbes and Pufendorf. The latter 
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advocated two types of contract: one for establishing 
sovereignty andanother for government. Rousseau's con-
tra.ct approximates the first contract of Pufendorf. He 
also seems to agree with Pufendorf that a people does 
not exhaust itself completely after concluding a con-
tract but continues to exist as such. However, he could 
not agree with Pufendorf that a people can transfer its 
sovereignty to a particular person or body of persons~ 
The general will of the community can never be identi~ 
fied with the will of any particular man, or any part 
of the entire society~ Rousseau rejects unequivocally 
any idea of representation. This doctrine, according 
to him., can too easily be used as a cover for the usur-
pation of sovereignty by a government. Rousseau 1 s con-
tract is thus a pact between individuals for the forma-
tion of an association. Derathe suggests that it could 
also be interpreted as "une prom~sse r~ciproque entre 
le corps du peuple, considere comme une personne morale, 
et les particuliers, autrement dit d 1 un engagement mu~ 
26) 
tuel entre le souverain et ses sujets". With this in-
terpreta tion, a.l though it must be admitted that it brings 
the contract theory of the Contrat social into line with 
that mooted in the Discours, I cannot agree. It must be 
remembered that the people is only constituted as a mo-
ral person as a result of the social contract. It does 
not exist in that capacity prior to the pact of asso-
ciation. What is more, Rousseau never contemplated any 
antitheses between individual and society as is suggested 
by Derathe's interpretation. The individual is part and 
parcel of the people and can only exercise his liberty 
as a member of a community. There is thus no essential 
conflict between the sovereignty of the people seen as 
a moral person, and the freedom of the individual .. 
'l'he ........... 80 
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The clauses of RousseaU~s contract are reduced 
by himself to a single one: "l'alienation totale de cha .... 
27) 
que associE~ avec tous ses droi ts a toute la communaut~". 
This is necessary in order to establish a condition of 
equality before the law. As each gives himself absolute~ 
ly, the conditions are the same for all. Each indivi-
dual, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody 
and as there is no fellow citizen over whom he does not 
a,cquire the same right as he yields others over himself, 
he gains an equivalent for everything he loses and in 
addition the force of the whole community for the pre-
servation of what he has. The social pact thus substi-
tutes for the relation between man and man, the rela ... 
tion between citizen and the law-l' Although man now has 
to live in society with his fellow~men, he runs no risk 
of falling under the domination of another man.. The so-
cial pact safeguards him against all personal dependence. 
The individual is only subject to the law and to no 
human being. 
According to Rousseau a free man does not, and 
need not, obey any other will but his own. It follows 
thus that the general will, the will of the moral per-
son which results from the pact of association, the acts 
of which are the laws, cannot be foreign to any citizen, 
but should be his own proper will. This is the way in 
which Rousseau thinks that he has solved the problem of 
finding a form of association in which each person in 
uniting himself with others, obeys nobody but himself. 
The act of association performed qy individuals, 
creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many 
members as the assembly contains voters and receiving 
from this act its unity, its corr~on identity, its life 
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and its will. This public person is the sovereign. 
As this sovereign owes its existence to the sanctity of 
the contract of association, it can never do anything 
derogatory to the original contract, for instance, to 
alienate any part of itself, or to submit to another 
sovereign. On the other hand, as the sovereign is being 
formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, it can ... 
not have any interest contrary to theirs. Consequently 
the sovereign power need not give any guarantee to its 
subjects, because it is inconceivable that the body po-
litic should wish to hurt all its members. It is, how,.. 
ever, possible that an individual may have a particular 
will as a man, contrary to the general will which he has 
as a citizen. It is therefore necessary that whoever 
refuses to obey the general will, shall be compelled to 
do so by the whole body. To use Rousseau 1 s own words: 
"ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu'on le forcera 
d'etre libre". By compelling the individual to obey 
the general will, the body politic only forces him to 
be free, to act as a free citizen. This is indeed one 
of the key phrases in Rousseau's political theory and 
we shall come back to it in a later chapter. Here we 
just want to state that according to Rousseau the indi-
vidual can only enjoy freedom in a social set~up where-
in the general will of the people is sovereign and that 
anybody who, for selfish reasons, refuses to conform to 
the general will, destroys the conditions under which 
he can be free. 
Rousseau's sovereignty is inalienable and the 
sovereign cannot be represented except by himself. The 
sovereign power, however, may be transmitted, but not 
the will. The general will alone can direct the state 
according to the object for which it was instituted, 
namely the common good. For the same reason sovereignty 
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is also indivisible~~ The sovereign power is also ab-
solute. "Cornme la nature donne a chaque honnne un pouvoir 
absolu sur tous ses membres~ says Rousseau, "le pacte 
social donne au corps politique un pouvoir absolu sur 
II 28) 
tousles siens... What this phrase actually means, 
is that the authority of the body politic over its mem ... 
bers cannot be challenged by any other authority. 
Rousseau acknowledges some limits, or rather some 
conditions on his sovereign power. These conditions can 
be interpreted as attempts by Rousseau to subject the 
ultimate authority in his state to the precepts of the 
law of nature. Although the subject is obliged to ren~ 
der such services to the state as the sovereign demands, 
the sovereign is obliged on his part to observe the law 
of reason and the law of nature and he cannot demand 
anything from his subjects that is useless to the com~ 
munity. Each man alienates by the social pact only such 
part of his powers, goods and liberty as is important 
for the community to control, the sovereign, however, 
being the sole judge of what is important. The general 
will to be true to itself, must be general both in its 
essence and object, it must come from all and apply to 
all. Wben it has a particular object it is no longer 
the general will and consequen~ly ceases to be sovereign. 
Derathe is of opinion that the law by virtue of 
the equality which it establishes among all the citizens, 
"n'a pas uniquement pour but de les mettre ~ l'abri des 
violences et des injures qu'ils (les citoyens) peuvent 
se faire mutuellement, mais son role veritable, sa fone-
tion primordiale, c'est de mettre des bornes au pouvoir 
souverain •••• Sans doute le souverain est superieur 
aux lois, puisqu'il en est et reste toujours maitre de 
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les abroger, quand il lui plait. Mais si le souverain 
29) 
fait des lois, il ne peut par contre faire que des lois". 
This simply means that the laws of the sovereign are by 
nature general and that the sovereign is thus not in a 
position to discriminate between its individual subjects. 
We have seen that Rousseau regards sovereignty as 
indivisible. The oo vereign :power may, however, be trans-
mitted. The legislative power belongs only to, and can 
be exercised only by the people. The government is an 
intermediate body set up between the subjects and the 
sovereign, charged with the execution of the laws. 
There is no contract of government, it is simply a com-
mission, an employment in which the rulers, mere offi-
cials of the sovereign, exercise in their own name the 
power transmitted to them by the sovereign. It stands 
to reason that the sovereign is free to limit, modify 
and recover the power at any time it pleases. The go-
vernm.ent is thus at all times subordinate to the sove-
reign. 
To us it seems to be clear that Rousseau also 
intends the sovereign to be subject to the law of na-
ture. We have seen above that he says that the sove~ 
reign cannot demand from its subjects anything that is 
useless to the community, for it is against the law of 
nature that anything can occur without a cause. Obser-
vance of the law of nature is thus tacitly implied.!' The 
following passage clearly indicates that the general 
will is bound to observe the law of nature in its ac~ 
tiona: "Ce qui est bien et conforme a l•ordre est tel 
par la nature des choses et indep~ndamment des conven-
tions hurnaines. Toute justice vient de Dieu, lui seul 
en est la source; mais si nous savions la recevoir de si 
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haut, nous n'aurions besoin ni de gouvernement ni des 
lois. Sans doute, il est une justice universelle emanee 
de la raison seule; mais cette justice, pour etre admise 
entre nous, doit etre reciproque ••• Il faut done des con~ 
ventions et des lois pour unir les droits aux devoirs et 
30). 
ramener la justice a son objet". In other words, Rous-
seau accepts the existence of a divine and rational jus-
tice which is nothing else but natural law, but that 
justice, he contends, can only become effective among 
m.en when it is embodied in conventions and laws. The 
general will which has an ethical end, cannot fail to 
incorporate the precepts of the law of nature in its 
laws. 
In his Lettre a d'Alembert Rousseau writes in con-
• nection with authority which is superior to the sove~ 
reign authority: "J'en adm.et trois seulement. Premiere-
ment l'autorite de Dieu, et puis celle de la loi natu-
relle qui derive de la constitution de l'homme, et puis 
celle de 1 1honneur plus forte sur un coeur honnete que 
31) 
tous les Rois de la terre"~ The social contract may 
no more violate the law of nature than particular con-
tracts may infringe the positive laws. 
32) 
It is wrong to say, as Vaughan does, that Rous-
seau rejects the idea of the law of nature. If he in~ 
deed did this, he would have deprived his social con ... 
tract of every moral sanction. "On the other hand~ 
writes Cassirer, "where a truly legitimate constitution 
rules ... that is, where law and law alone is recognized 
as sovereign- a limitation on sovereignty is self~con~ 
tradictory. For here the question of quantity, of the 
mere extent of power, loses its significance; only its 
content matters, and this content admits of no 11more" 
or .......... 85 
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or "less". The law as such possesses not limited but 
3:3) 
absolute power; it commands and demands unconditibnallyu. 
If the general will thus embody the law of nature as we 
think it does, !~sovereignty is indeed unlimited. 
Rousseau's conception of the law of nature as ex-
pressed at various places throughout his writings can be 
reconstructed as follows: Although man is reasonable by 
nature, he only possesses this gift as a potentiality in 
the state of nature.. As the law of nature is rational, 
man is thus not capable of observing it in the state of 
nature. However, even in the state of nature, Rousseau 
believes that man has two sentiments prior to reason, 
namely self-preservation and compassion or pity. These 
two sentiments form the roots of the precepts of the law 
of nature. In the long interval which Rousseau places 
between the state of nature and the conclusion of the 
social pact, man gradually loses "la stupide des brutes" 
and acquires some rudimentary idea of mutual .engagements 
and the advantage of fulfilling them. At the conclusion 
of the social pact, the law of nature which in the state 
of nature was only instinct and compassion, becomes jus-
tice and reason. The law of nature thus only becomes of 
force in the civil state. In this sense it is not ante-
rior to the civil law, but this does not prevent it from 
being superior to the civil laws. 
This interpretation explains why Rousseau can say 
in L':Etat de guerre that the law of nature is not only 
written in human reason but that it is also "gravee dans 
34) 
le coeur de l'homme en caracteres ineffacables". He is 
referring to the two innate sentiments of man mentioned 
above. He sees natural law both as a rational and moral 
force. 
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Coming to civil law, we see in the 6th letter 
of Lettres ecrites de la Montagne that Rousseau defines 
it as 11 une declaration publique et solennelle de la 
35) 
volonte generale .aur un objet d'interet commun", This 
is only a restatement of the concept of law that we find 
in the Contrat social. An essential characteristic of 
civil law must be emphasized here, i.e. that it must be 
general. The law should consider subjects en masse and 
actions in the abstract and never a particular person 
or action. The law, in modern parlance, only lays down 
broad principles of policy affecting the whole body po-
litic and leaves the details of the execution of these 
principles to the government who, however, is not en-
titled to do anything repugnant to these principles. 
Law also has a moral content in Rousseau's poli-
tical theory. It isl~aw alone that men owe justice and 
liberty. It is law which appeals to man to behave accor-
ding to the dictates of his own right reason and not to 
be inconsistent with his own better self. A man is free 
though subject to the laws since they are but the regis~ 
ter of his own will. 
Rousseau definitely advocates the sovereignty of 
law. In his Lettre a Mirabeau (1767) he openly confesses 
to this ideal when he writes: "Voici, dans mes vieilles 
idees, le grand probleme en politique ••• Trouver une for-
me de Gouvernement qui mette la Loi au-dessus de l'hom-
36) 
me". This was also one of the main principles of the 
Vindiciae, namely that law is just not because it de-
rived from a certain source, but because its content is 
just. This view was foreign to the philosophy of Hobbes. 
According to him law was just because it came from the 
right source, namely the will of the sovereign. 
37) 
As Ernst Cassirer rightly points out the essen-
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tial purpose of Rousseau's political theory is to place 
the individual under a law that is universally bindingt 
but this law is to be shaped in such a manner that every 
shadow of caprice and arbitrariness disappears from it. 
He virtually subordinates politics to an ethical impe-
rative. 
Vaughan confirms this view when he says that Rous-
seau abandoned the effort of many of his predecessors to 
38) 
make politics wholly independent of ethics. It is Reus-
seau 1 s conviction that without an organized society there 
can be no such thing as morality for man. For him the 
moral sense, the sense of duty and obligation, is the 
creation of the general will. The moral sense, the sense 
of duty to others, begins only with the foundation of the 
state. For Rousseau the state definitely has an ethical 
purpose. In his Confessions he asks himself: "which is 
the form of government fitted to shape the most virtuous, 
the most enlightened, the wisest, and, in short, the 
39) 
'best' people, taking that 'IJi.rord in its noblest meaning?" 
Cassirer also points out that Rousseau "did not inquire 
into happiness or utility, he was concerned with the dig-
nity of man and with the means of securing and realizing 
40) 
it" 
Rousseau states quite definitely in Economie po-
litigue that every man is virtuo~s when his particular 
41) 
will is in all things conformable to the general will. 
During the earlier part of his career, when he 
was still under the influence of the Encyclopaedists, 
Rousseau seemed to agree with Bayle that morality was 
a sufficient power in its own right to hold men to their 
duties. He thought that men in association could do all 
that is required for the common good. Meanwhile both 
38l 9 
40 
41 
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Vaughan: Op.cit,, vol.l, p.41. 
Confessioni, Livre ix (near the beginning). 
qp.cit., p.71. 
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Pufendorf and Montesquieu, following in the footsteps 
of Plato, were of the opinion that no civil society could 
be maintained without religion. It was under the in ... 
fluence of these writers that Rousseau in his first ver-
sion of the Contrat social admits in his chapter entit-
led The Legislator that religion has some use in giving 
to the moral bond an internal force. Remembering what 
he learned from Hobbes, he fears that if religion is not 
taken under the state, its devotees may make themselves 
a separate power in the society and cause disunion and 
war. This opinion is expressed in the first of the 
Lettres ecrites de la Montagne. In the Contrat social 
he also expresses the opinion that "le Christianisme est 
une religion toute spirituelle, occupee uniquement des 
choses de cielJ la patrie du chretien n'est pas de ce 
42) 
monde 11 • He has a poor view of Christians as citizens 
and says that they are made to be slaves and that they 
do not mind, because this short life counts for too 
little in their eyes. 
The subjects in a state established qy the social 
contract, owe the sovereign an account of their opinions 
only in so far as they matter to the community. Now, 
Rousseau is convinced that it matters very much to the 
community that each citizen should have a religion, be~ 
cause that will make him love his duty. It is there-
fore expedient that the sovereign should fix the mini-
mum content of a purely civil religion which will sim~ 
ply include "l'existence de la Divinite puissante, in--
telligente, bienfaisante, prevoyante et pourvoyante, la 
vie a venir, le bonheur des justes, le chatiment des 
mechants, la saintete du Contrat social et des lois: 
voila les dogmes positifs. Quant aux dogmes negatifs, 
43) je ne les borne a un seul: c'est l'intolerance". 
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Rousseau has simply extracted the essentials from the 
Christian religion and added to it the sanctity of the 
social contract and the laws. He does not concern him-
self with the Christianity of the churches for which he 
has little sympathy, but with the Christianity of the 
Gospels. 
Over and above the articles of the civil religion, 
the citizen may have what opinions he pleases and it is 
not the business of the sovereign to take any notice of 
them.. All religions should be tolerated so long as their 
dogmas contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizen-
ship. Anyone, however, who has publicly recognized the 
dogmas of the civil religion, and behaves as if he does 
not believe them, shall be punished by death, because 
he has committed the worst of all crimes, that of lying 
before the law. Rousseau does not here advocate the 
suppression of freedom of opinion as Vaughan wrongly 
44) 
alleges. The citizen is only punished because he acts 
contrary to the duties to which he has openly subscribed~ 
he is only punished for disloyalty. 
Just as the Vindiciae contra tvrannos visualized 
no open conflict between the state and religion because 
both should help man to attain his salvation, so also 
Rousseau realized that the state cannot be indifferent 
to religion. Although it should at all times be tole-
rant as far as religious matters are concerned, it should 
at the same time, as an institution with an essentially 
ethical purpose, see to it that those tenets of religion 
which are conducive to the good conduct of the citizens 
are maintained in the state. In other words, he did not 
put up the state as God, but regarded it as an instru-
ment which man should use to attain the destination for 
which God created him. 
Although ••••••• ~90 
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Although there are many traces of pluralism in 
the writings of Rousseau his attitude to the existence 
of corporations in the state remains problematic. In 
Contrat social he says clearly that the same laws do not 
suit various provinces with diverse customs and situated 
in various climates and which cannot endure the same 
45) 
forn. of government. In other words, all laws of human 
society must have a reference to the needs, wants, and 
will of the people for whom they are valid. 
As far as corporations are concerned, Rousseau 
admits in the Economie politigue that every political 
society is composed of smaller societies of different 
kinds, each of which has its own interests and rules of 
conduct. All individuals who are united by a common in ... 
tere.:s.t whether transitory or permanent,also form socie-
46) 
ties which exist in the state. For its individual mem ... 
bers the will of these particular societies is a general 
will, but in relation to the great society it is a par~ 
ticular will. When a conflict between such a particu,._ 
lar will and the general will of the society occurs, the 
most general will is always the most just~ 
In the Contrat social he takes the opposite point 
of view. "Il importe done", he writes, 11 pour avoir bien 
l'enonce de la volonte generale, qu'il n'y ait pas de 
societe part4.elle dans l'Etat, et que chaque citoyen 
47) 
n'opine que d'apres lui".. The only way in which one can 
:reconcile these two conflicting attitudes, is to assume 
that in his Economie politigue Rousseau was thinking of 
one of the large nation ~states of his day, while in the 
Contrat social he was describing an ideal city-state. 
Tb.ere is a lot of evidence that he had only a small 
city-state in mind throughout his Contrat social. It is 
45l Vaughan, vol.2, p.57. 
46 Ibid., vol.l, pp.242•243. 
47 ~., vol.2, p.43~ 
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48) 
thu@zwr~ng to decide with Vaughan that he destroys the 
freedom of association by excluding partial associations 
from his sw~ll state in the Contrat social. \Vhen all the 
citizens have a voice in the legislative assembly and if 
the state is so small that this is practically possible, 
I see no need for partial associations in the state. 
The individual citizen has every opportunity to represent 
his own interest in the highest legislative body of the 
state. Why should he want to associate with his fellow~ 
-citizens in a smaller, subordinate corporationi 
Rousseau is very definitely in favour of a small 
state. "Another truth which our political philosophers 
seem not to have perceived at all", he says, "is that 
it is impossible for a state of great extent to be well-
-governed. I would say even more than this: a govern-
ment could not possibly be good unless he in whom the 
sovereign power resides knows the name, the station, and 
the condition in life of every last one of the inhabi-
tants of the State; for to be sovereign and to be char~ 
49) 
ged with the happiness of others are synonymous". In 
the first version of the Contrat social Rousseau lays 
down as fundamental rule for every well-constit~d and 
lawfully governed society that all the members could be 
easily assembled every time it was necessary. It fol-
lows from this that the State ought to be limited to 
50) 
one city at the most. In the final version of the 
Contrat social he stresses time and again the fact that 
the state should be small. 
The type of state that Rousseau describes in his 
Contrat social is nothing more or less than a model cor-
poration similar to those autonomous corporations that 
48) 
49) 
50) 
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flourished in the late Middle Ages, or to be more pre~ 
cise an independent city-state. His frequent references 
to the Greek city-states of Sparta and Athens bear wit• 
ness of his admiration for the political organization 
of the polis. The closely ... ltni t community which display ... 
ed an almost organic unity and where authority and law 
grew spontaneously from the general will of the body po-
litic, seems to have been his ideal. 
In every body politic there is a maximum strength 
which it cannot exceed and which it only loses by increa ... 
sing in size. A small state is thus proportionally 
51) 
stronger than a great one. Discussing what people is a 
fit subject for legislation, he mentions, among other 
things, that it should be one in which every member is 
52) 
known by every other. The same insistence on a small 
state recurs later in the same treatise when he also pro" 
mises that he will show how the external strength of a 
great people may be combined with the convenient polity 
53} 
and good order of a small State. He had intended to do 
this in a sequel to the Contrat social when he came to 
the subject of confederations, but this work was unfor ... 
tunately never completed. 
It may be said that Rousseau envisaged a free 
association of small autonomous states. In this set-up 
the central body formed by the states would only exer ... 
cise such powers as the states decided to delegate to 
it. Each member of such an association will be free to 
withdraw from it if it should so desire. It is thus a 
pluralistic set"up. 
There are, however, some indications of what 
Rousseau had in mind when he talked about confederations. 
6ne .......... 93 
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One such indication we find in Emile in which Rousseau 
writes as follows: "Nous exa.minerons enfin 1 t espece .. de 
remedes qu'on a cherches a ses inconvenients par les 
ligues et confederations, qui, laissant cha.que J!.:tat son 
ma.i tre au dedans, 1 1 a.rm.ent au dehors centre tout agres-
seur injuste. 1Tous recherchons comment on :peut etablir 
une bonne association federative, ce qui peut la rendre 
durable, et jusqu'a quel point on peut etendre le droit 
de la confederation, sans nuire a celui de la souve-
54} 
raineten. What Rousseau had in mind, seems to be the 
following: In order to safeguard the small state against 
aggression of the large, some form of confederation is 
necessary. This can come about in the same way as the 
individual state,t Just as individua,ls united to form a 
state without losing their individual freedom, so states 
can federate without giving up their internal sovereign ... 
ty. In other words, he envisB.ges an international con-
tract more or less similar to his social contract~ 
In the writings of Abbe de St .. Pierre which Reus-
seau edited and in which we find some of his ovm. ideas, 
the idea of confederation recurs. This time the idea 
is to establish a power of restrain.t amongst the States 
any 
without setting up/particular sovereign or dominating 
power. This project is rather similar to the Dorian 
league described by Plato in his Laws. An essential 
condition imposed by such a pact is that the government 
of each participating state shall always be according 
to the public law, for one cannot guarantee the princes 
against revolt from their subjects without at the same 
time guaranteeing the subjects against the tyranny of 
their princes. Here we thus have sovereignty of law 
enforced by an international compact. 
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As we have seen, Rousseau regarded private pro ... 
perty as the foundation of a state of society which exis-
ted prior to the establishment of the state. In the 
Economie politigue he qualified this concept of pro;pe:t;y 
by stating that before the foundation of the civil state 
the individual could claim no more than possession foun-
ded on the right of the first occupant. With his entry 
into the civil state, i.e. by taking part in the pact of 
.association, the individual surrenders such possession 
together with all his other powers to the community. The 
community, respecting the right of the existing occupant, 
converts that imperfect and precarious right into a com-
plete right, into legitimate ownership.. Finally in ·his 
Projet de Constitution pour la Corse (1765) he summarizes 
his position by writing that it is not his intention "de 
detruire absolument la propriete particuliere, parceque 
cela est impossible, mais de la renformer dans les plus 
55) 
etroites bornes ••• " 
It is thus clear that although Rousseau regarded 
private property as "le plus sacre de tous les droits des 
56) 
citoyens~ he was not prepared to allow this right to 
interfere with the common good of the community. It is 
accordingly a right that has to be controlled and defined 
by law so that its abuse does not lead to disharmony and 
unrest in the co:imnuni ty. Moreover, the sovereign has a 
perfect right to appropriate to itself some portion of the 
property of individuals whenever they fail on their own 
account to make a voluntary contribution to the state. 
The relation of the individual to the state and 
the community in the political theory of Rousseau, remains 
a controversial issue. There are mainly two schools of 
thought on this issue: one which contends that the indi-
vidual ••••••• 95 
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vidual loses all his freedom and independence as soon 
as he becomes a member of Rousseau's state or community; 
another holds that far from losing his freedom, the in-
dividual is enabled by his membership of the community 
to become really free and to develop his better self to 
the highest possible level. 
To be able to discuss this question properly, one 
must first of all understand what Rousseau means by li~ 
berty. In the Contrat social, he defines libert~ as 
57} 
"l'ob~issance A la loi qu'on s'est prescrite". This is 
moral liberty which alone makes a man truly master of 
himself. To yield to the mere impulse of appetite is 
slavery. This concept of liberty contains an element 
of restraint; to be really free, man has to restrain his 
own baser passions, he has to act as a rational and mo-
ral being and as such he has to consider the interests 
and feelings of his fellow-citizens. In the eighth of 
58) 
his Lettres de la Montagne, Rousseau states that liberty 
consists less in doing onets will than in not being sub-
ject to that of another. Liberty that is without jus~ 
tice is a veritable contradiction. There is no liberty 
where there are no laws or where any one is above the 
laws. From this statement we may legitimately conclude 
that according to Rousseau liberty can only survive where 
sovereignty of law is acknowledged. Liberty thus con-
sists in the opportunity to participate in the creation 
of the law to which one is sub,ject and to exercise one's 
rights as citizen in such a way that the laws are always 
respected,. 
"To him", Casairer writes, "freedom did not mean 
arbitrariness but the overcoming and elimination of all 
arbitrariness, the submission to a strict and inviolable 
law which the individual erects over himself. Not re-
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nunciation of and release from this law but free con-
sent to it d·etermines the genuine and true character of 
.freedom". It was also of this kind of freedom that 
Goethe wrote the following lines: 
"Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Lebenj. 
Der tttglich sie erobern muss". 
It is obvious that this interpretation of liber-
ty enables us to reconcile it with obedience to a pop-
ular sovereign such as Rousseau envisaged. 
To see the relation of the individual to the 
corr~unity in the right perspective, we should take note 
of Rousseau's conception of Providence as expressed in 
the Lettre a Voltaire (1756). All beings have their 
appointed place and good within the Whole whose benefi--
cence devolves upon each and ew:ery one in so far as it 
holds to the order oriHaw of the general good.. In the 
physical order everything must be conceived in terms of 
its relationship to the Whole, but man's existence is 
not limited to the physicalJ he has also moral needs. 
The most complete and finest conception of Providence 
would thus be this: that every material being'is dis-
posed in the best possible way with regard to the whole 
and every moral being in the best possible way with re-
gard to himself. This implies an abselute worth in the 
individual, notwithstanding the superior value of the 
Whole in the other aspect.. If we keep this view in mind, 
we cannot describe Rousseau's theory of the state as 
merely organic where the part has no independent exis~ 
tence apart from the Whole. The individual remains a 
concrete unit with its own unique personality, but in a 
state of civil society, the individual cannot fulfil his 
human destiny in isolation, outside society. 
This view is fully subscribed by Rousseau in 
L'Etat de guerre: "La difference de l'art humain a 
l'ouvrage ••••••• 97 
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l'ouvrage de la nature se fait sentir dans ses effets. 
Les citoyens ont beau s'appeler membres de l'Etat, ils 
ne sauraient s 1 unir a lui comme de vrais membres le sont 
au corps, il est impossible de faire que chacun d'eux 
n'ait pas une existence individuelle et separee, par 
59) 
laquelle il peut seul suffire a sa propre conservation" ••• 
Those who hold a pessimistic view of individual 
liberty in Rousseau's political theory, rely heavily on 
"l'alienation totale de chaque associe avec tous ses 
droits a toute la communaute" at the conclusion of the 
social contra:t. They forget that Rousseau requires a~ 
solute unanimous consent on the part of the participants 
to the social compact. Without unanimous consent it 
simply cannot come into existence. Then it must also 
be remembered that in order that man may be rescued 
from the chaotic state of society into which the state 
of nature has gradually degenerated over the ages, he 
must be willing freely to surrender himself with all his 
rights and possessions to the civil community created by 
the social compact so that he can be regenerated and as 
much as possible of the equality and other advantages of 
the state of nature can be restored to him. Seen in this 
light, I am inclined to agree with Derathe who contends 
that "l'alienation totale n'est qu'un artifice pour ga-
rantir l'homme vivant en societe de "toute dependence 
personnelle" et lui permettre d'etre aussi libre que dans 
60) 
l'etat de nature ••• " ],ar from destroying the rights of 
individuals, the social contract re-establishes them on 
a reasonable and legitimate basis. 
Two other features of Rousseau's political theory 
may be regarded as safeguards of individual liberty. 
The first is the fact that he does not advocate an un~ 
limited sovereignty as we have indicated above. Equality 
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before the law is consistently maintained. The second 
feature is his continuous insistence on a small state so 
that the individual will be in a position to take a per-
sonal part in the deliberations of the sovereign assem-
bly. In the highest legislative body of the community 
the individual citizen is entitled to put his views and 
to plead his case. This privilege, together with the 
oft-repeated sovereignty of law, are to my mind the best 
guarantees for individual liberty that are humanly possible 
From the above it is clear that, according to 
Rousseau, a community or a people can only come about 
legitimately by the free consent of each constituent mem-
ber. After a community has been formed in this way, it 
is a ]ersona moralis with a will of its own. 
Rousseau's social contract is thus a mutual agree-
ment to form a corporate body, freely entered into by 
individuals, but once a community is formed, every in-
dividual has to recognize the authority of its general 
will,. 
This general will is not the will of a physical 
person (as advocated by Hobbes), or of a part, or even 
the majority of the members of the community. It is no-
thing less than an ethical law which the members of the 
cow~unity erect over themselves voluntarily, because 
they realize that only by obeying such an ethical im-
perative, can individual freedom be maintained in a 
community. 
Those who allege that Rousseau sacrifices indi-
vidual freedom on the altar of the will of the majority, 
forget that he clings uncompromisingly to the notion of' 
sovereignty of law and an ethical law at that~ 
The purpose of the state is indeed to create the 
circumstances necessary for a free and virtuous life. 
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On the other hand the citizen will realize that such a 
life is only possible if he is prepared to put the com-
mon good of the community as a whole above his own petty 
predispositions and selfish interests. Only in working 
towards a common good, can the individual fulfil his own 
true destiny. 
In this connection it should never be forgotten 
that Rousseau realized that such a free interplay between 
the individual and general point of view can only be ac-
hieved in a small cornm.unity, not in a large nation-state. 
His state is therefore equivalent to an autonomous cor~ 
poration in a pluralistic confederation. In this way 
his political theory may be regarded as pluralistic. 
When one considers the main principles of Rousseau's 
political theory carefully in their historical setting, 
one is justified to state that they constitute a distinct 
return to the position of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos. 
Like the latter, he acknowledges the people as a corpo-
rate body who is the real seat of sovereignty. This cor-
porate body of Rousseau comes about as a result of a con-
tra.ct of association between the individuals making up 
the body politic. In the Vindiciae we are simply :faced 
with the people as a corporate body who contracts with 
a :prince who is nothing more than the executive organ of 
the body politic. Similarly Rousseau's government is 
simply the servant of the sovereign people. To guard 
against the abuse of power by the government the assem-
bly of the people meets regularly. 
Both Rousseau c:md the Vindicie.e employ a concept 
of sovereignty absolutely different from that of Hobbes. 
According to them sovereign bodies or monarchs are not 
entitled to do anything they think fit. Both of them 
acknowledges the absolute authority of a just and 
reasonable •••••••• lOO 
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reasonable universal law which cannot be violated by 
any state. In this way they are able to justify inter~ 
vention in the affairs of sovereign states who violate 
this universal law. 
In opposition to Hobbes, they both defend the 
. right of private property and they both believe that a 
religious basis is indispensable to a sound comm.uni ty 
life. This belief, however, goes hand in hand with a 
spirit of toleration. 
Rousseau with his insistence on small states, 
and the Vindiciae with its eloquent defence of the 
rights and liberties of all peoples and corporations in a 
commonwealth, bo~h favour political pluralism according 
to which not the ruler, but the people, creates the laws. 
Even the content of these laws should, however, conform 
to the irr~utable principles of justice and reasonable-
ness in which both theorists firmly believe. 
In a later chapter we shall deal with the simi-
larities between the political doctrines of Rousseau 
and the Yindiciae in more detail. 
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CHAPTER 7 .. 
~OMPARISOU OF THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF HOBBES 
:AND ROUSSEAU. 
Before we compare the political doctrines of Hob~ 
bes and Rousseau point by point, it will be necessary to 
say a few words about the position that these two philo~ 
sophers occupy in the general history of philosophy. 
What is known as modern philosophy is usually said to 
start in the seventeenth century and especially with the 
writings of Rene Descartes. Between the medieval period 
and the seventeenth century, from 1400 to 1600, we find 
the philosop~y of the Renaissanc~ which mainly consis-
ted in a humanistic renewal of Greek philosophy which 
gradually led to a natural science world view. 
Hobbes grew up at a time when this new scienti ... 
fie view was gaining ground rapidly and he was, as we 
have pointed out previously, intensely influenced by it. 
The main character is tic of this philosophy was a rej ec-
tion of the traditions of the medieval period including 
the in~allible authority of the church. The philoso-
phers displayed an attitude of severe scepticism toward 
all current traditions and ideas and they had a great 
confidence in the power of human reason and held that 
it could solve all problems. These characteristics are 
clearly reflected in the thought of Hobbes. His works 
breathe a spirit of conscious confidence in the power 
of human reason and in the efficiency of mathematical 
method. On the other hand he dismisses with disdain 
any believe in incorporeal spirits, in hell, the divine 
right of kings and that the essence and existence of 
God can be proved rationally. Both his method. and 
thought eonstitute a distinct break with medieval tra-
ditions and believes. 
The ••••••••• l02 
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The spirit of modern philosophy grew and spread 
and reached a culmination in the eighteenth century in 
the so-called Aufkl~.rlhlg. The confidence in the power 
of the human mind to understand and render human life 
and all its phenomena and institutions intelligible was 
as high as never before. In the vanguard of this intel-
lectualistic movement we find the Encyclopaedists with 
whom Rousseau was closely associated at first. These 
people glorified the achievements of the human race and 
boasted of its arts, sciences, civilization and progress. 
At the height of the age of enlightenment, however, Rous-
seau struck a singularly discordant note by characteri~ 
zing the arts and sciences as sources of moral decay and 
injustice. He rudely shocked those who believed in the 
supremacy of the human mind, qy stressing the importance 
of the sentiments of the heart. :Man's worth depends not 
on his intelligence, but on his moral nature which con-
sists essentially of feeling. His attitude can be re-
garded as a reaction against the over-confident belief 
in the power of the human mind and as a defence of the 
importance of the irrational forces in the human perso-
nality. Rousseau was possibly the first to realize that 
his contemporaries had gone too far in their enthusiasm 
for the potentialities of human reason and that their 
view of human nature was one~sided and unbalanced. He 
tried to redress the balance by stressing the neglected 
characteristics of man, namely his feelings and sentiments. 
So we find Hobbes at the beginning of modern phi-
losophy with plenty of enthusiasm for the new natural 
science view of man and the world, while Rousseau, rough-
ly a hundred years later, has no confidence in this new-
-found wisdom and easily points ~ut its one-sidedness 
and fallacies. 
When we come to the narrower field of political 
philosophy •••••• l03 
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-philosophy we find a development which ran ~ore ~r ~ess 
parallel to that of general philosophy. Here we also 
find a break with medieval tradition as a result of the 
revival of humanism, and a return to Greek ideas in con-
nection with state and society. These features were 
first manifested in the writings of Ilfuchiavelli. He re-
garded the temporal sovereignty of the Papacy as an ob-
stacle to the development of an Italian national sta.te 
and advocated the complete separation of the spiritual 
from the secular·power. He no longer conceived the state 
teleologically as was the custom, but in a purely natura-
listic fashion as a product of the needs and interests 
of individuals. 
After the Reformation the Protestants regarded 
the state as an instrument of expediency in the service 
of the divine order, while the Catholics regarded it as 
a human arrangement which needed the sanction of the 
church in order to be valid. In time these oppositions 
yielded to the view that the relation of man to God fell 
outside the sphere of the state. In other words, an 
attitude of religious tolerance on the part of the state 
prevailed. This attitude was clearly reflected in Thomas 
Morets Utopi~. Hugo Grotius finally completely separated 
divine and human right'j,' basing the first on relevation 
and the second on reason. 
Associated with this interest in the relation be-
tween church and state was the social interest. Already 
in the writings of Campanella and More we find the asser-
tion that the state should be an artificial creation of 
human insight for the removal of social injuries. How• 
ever, the main tendency of the time was to seek a right 
founded in nature which will be valid for all times and 
places and to be recognized by reason alone: a rational, 
universal ........ ·~. 104 
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universal right. Inst:ead of just nature, Grotius took 
human~nature as his starting-point and he found the fun-
damental principle of natural right in the social need 
of man, and the method for its development in logical 
deduction~ Private rights became an authoritative pre-
supposition of political right. In a like manner Hobbes 
regarded the body politic as a machine capable of being 
deduced from the conception of its end qy pure intellec-
tual activity and the phiiosophical doctrine of rights 
as a perfect demonstrable science. Pufendorf, combining 
the doctrines of Grotius and Hobbes and introducing mathe-
matical method, developed his whole system synthetically 
from the assumption that the individual's instinct toward 
self-preservation could be rationally and successfully 
fulfilled b.Y only satisfying his social need. The ulti-
mate ground of public life and social coherence was thus 
placed in the interests of individuals and the principle 
of the origin of the state was conceived as a contract. 
Pufendorf still continues the tradition of Althusius and 
Grotius. His contract is not one of surrender, but one 
of consent based on pre-society property-relations. 
Further.more, law is still for him the dictate of reason 
and he regards it as incumbent on the state to maintain 
1) 
the law of nature. 
In connection with the contract theory, we can 
discern a difference of opinion. Theorists like Bodin, 
Le Bret and Hobbes contended that the subjection of in-
dividuals to a sovereign did not constitute a reciprocal 
agreement. Should the sovereign thus violate his part 
of the contract his subjects had no means of redress. 
In sharp opposition to this view the Vindiciae contra 
t:y_rannos and Althusius hf:1i that the people who, as a 
corporate ••••••• l05 
1) Cf. Prof. A.H.Murray: The political theory of J.A.de 
Mist. H.A.U.M., 1962. p.46. 
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corporate body, is the true bearer of sovereignty, never 
alienated its sovereignty unconditionally to any ruler. 
They are thus convinced that the people had a perfect 
right to eject a ruler who did not keep his part of the 
contract. Although this current of thought suffered an 
eclipse in the seventeenth and major part of the eigh-
teenth century, its most important principles were re~ 
suscitated in the political doctrine of Rousseau. 
The new sovereign state which emerged in the se-
venteenth century was a power phenomenon and the ethi-
cal nature of man was ignored. The mec~~nistic view of 
man, as examplified in the philosophy of Hobbes, envi-
saged politics as a play of irreconcilable powers. Con• 
flict among individual interests and among the interests 
of groups necessitated a strong central authority to 
maintain the peace. The purpose of the state was thus 
to maintain peace and order by restraining its recalci• 
trant constituents by means of superior power. In the 
exercise of this power no ethical principles and no fee-
ling for the spiritual needs and nature of man carried 
any weight. 
Even in the age of Rousseau, most of the thinkers 
of the Enlightenment had a gloomy conception of the na-
tura.l meanness of man and they thought that man's edu-
cation to ethical action had to appeal to his lower im-
pulses. The Encyclopaedists were convinced that man as 
a genus was never to be determ.ined by anything else than 
by his own personal interests. This view of man as being 
by nature essentially egoistic, led to the belief that 
he could only be compelled by the strong arm of the state 
to keep the social compact. It was against this attitude 
that Rousseau revolted with his doctrine of the natural 
goodness and tnnocence of man. The egoistic man described 
by ••••••••• 106 
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by his contemporaries, was regarded by Rousseau as a man 
corrupted by unjust social conditions. It was not the 
true natural man, but a suppressed ca.rica ture. 
In this respect Cassirer rightly points out: 
"Against mere feeling Rousseau affirmed the primacy of 
reason 1 against the omnipotence of nature, he appealed to 
the idea of freedom. He did not wish to abandon the high-
est form of the human community to the naked domination 
of natural forces and instincts; rather, this form was 
to grow out of the force, and to exist in accordance 
with the demands, of the ethical will ••• Rousseau- in 
opposition to the predominent opinion of the century ~ 
2) 
eliminated feeling from the foundation of ethics". 
In his Zaharoff lecture for 1953 Professor Georges 
3) 
Davy draws quite a few parallels between the doctrines of 
Hobbes and Rousseau. He shows that Rousseau learnt much 
from Hobbes as far as the notions of contract and sove-
r'eignty are concerned. He also points out that both of 
them admitted the democratic creation of the state be-
cause the unanimous consent of the subjects was required, 
both rege,rded the people as the true original sovereign 
and both had a more or less similar conception of the 
law of nature. They used fairly similar analyses for 
different ends: Hobbes, "le philosophe de la securite a 
tout prix" and Rousseau, "le philosophe de la liberte, 
4) 
qui ne saurait s'aliener a aucun prix". Davy does, how-
ever, admit the essential difference between the two theo-
rists when he says that Rousseau never consented to the 
alienation of that sovereignty of which Hobbes had taught 
him to recognize the popular roots. 
The whole structure of Hobbes' political theory 
rests ••••••• l07 
2) Op.cit., p.99. 
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rests on his conception of the nature of man and the 
state of nature. He conceives the state of nature as a 
condition of war of all against all. This state of war 
is a result of the relentless competition between inde-
pendent individuals each of whom is continuously striving 
after his own interests without any consideration for his 
fellow-men. Men in the state of nature are utterly de~ 
void of any social or moral sense and are essentially 
egoistic. As men are more or less equal in the state of 
n.ature, nobody can enjoy any security and safety and 
thus fear of violent death possesses one and all of them. 
Fear of death is one of the two basic human passions, the 
other being pride, a desire for ever greater power. It 
is only when fear of death becomes such an overwhelming 
passion that it can no longer be suppressed that man is 
forced to use his reason and to come to an agreement with 
his fellow~men whereb,y a civil state can be instituted in 
which a sovereign will can be authorized b,y all of them 
to maintain the peace and security in the society. 
Rousseau rejects Hobbes' view of the state of na~ 
ture and of the nature of man. He points out that the 
strife and competition which are the main features of 
Hobbes' state of nature, can only develop in a state of 
society. Rousseau places his own state of nature much 
further back in the past of mankind. At that stage man 
was a lonely, innocent individual. There was thus no 
opportunity for fighting and conflict. As the world be-
came more densely populated in the course of thousands 
of centuries, there developed a kind of rudimentary state 
of society among men. It is only to resolve complica-
tions arising in the state of society that men eventually 
conclude a social contract. 
W~n is by nature good and innocent. He is main~ 
ly motivated b.Y two sentiments, namely self-preservation 
or ............. l08 
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or self"tnterest and compassion or pity. Although a fee• 
ling of sociability is not natural to man, he has none-
•the-less an innate feeling of aversion to see anyone of 
his own species suffer and it is thus impossible that a 
state of war can come about in the state of nature as 
conceived by Rousseau. Apart from self~preservation and 
compassion, all the other passions are of a social origin 
and do not exist in the state of nature. Although men 
are not naturally.equal, this is hardly noticeable in the 
state of nature owing to the isolation of the individual. 
However, as soon as a state of society comes about, the 
stronger and more intelligent individuals rapidly enslave 
the less fortunate ones and that is how the unjust state 
of affairs as reflected in the absolute sovereign state 
in which Rousseau lived, originated. 
Another characteristic of Rousseau's view of man, 
is man's capacity to perfect himself. In the state of 
nature man had no home, no language, few passions and 
almost no intelligence. Yet he was a free agent and had 
the potentiality to develop himself. He was thus capable 
to rise to great heights over the years. 
There is thus no resemblance between Rousseau's 
state of nature and that of Hobbes. Rousseau's state of 
nature lies so far back in the past that it cannot possi~ 
bly coincide with that of Hobbes. As far as the nature 
of man is concerned, Rousseau's view is much more balanced 
than that of Hobbes. We find the selfish, egoistic Hob• 
besian man replaced b,y a human being who experiences fee-
lings of both self-interest and compassion. Rousseau's 
view of man is evolutionary: man has the ability to per-
fect himself and does so. Hobbes' view of man is sta-
tionary: man is and always remains selfish and brutish 
and can only be restrained from violence b,y a superior 
power. It is also clear that Rousseau rejects the 
conviction •••••• l09 
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conviction of Hobbes that the conduct of man in society 
can be explained and analysed in a purely mechanical way. 
As far as the notion of contract is con~erned, it 
is quite true that there are superficial similarities 
5) 
Von Gierke between the-:Positions of Hobbes and Rousseau. 
distinguishes two types of contract:a contract of ruler" 
ship and social contract. The first type of contract 
assumes that the people is the source of right and sove• 
reignty which it transfers to a ruler. In this type of 
contract we thus have two parties: the people conceived 
as a corporate body and the ruler who may be a physical 
person. This view cannot escape a dualism in the overall 
State personality and it is this dualism that the keen 
eyes of Hobbes detected and eliminated b.Y his version of 
contract. He replaced the contract between people and 
ruler b.Y a covenant of every man with ever,y man. This 
covenant is, however, only concluded between individuals 
in order to institute a sovereign to which all indivi" 
duals subject themselves unconditionally. To my mind 
Hobbes never conceived the people as a corporate body 
6) 
prior to the institution of the sovereign. There is thus 
no contract between people and ruler, but only a contract 
between individuals who agreed mutually totransfer their 
rights to a ruler and only in the physical personality 
of the ruler do we find the unit,y of the body politic. 
As soon as the ruler is removed, the body politic imme• 
diately disintegrates into a warring multitude. Hobbes' 
notion of contract is thus merely a pact of association 
combined with an act of unconditional surrender to a ru-
ler. Hobbes prefers to conceive this ruler as a physi-
cal person in whom the natural rights of each individual 
subject •••••••• llO 
5) The development of political theory. Tr. B.Freyd. 
London, Allen & Unwin, 1939. 
6) Leviathan, p.ao. 
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subject find themselves represented, and who exercises 
all the powers of a state, legislative, executive and 
judicial. 
Rousseau eliminates the contract of rulership from 
his contract theory. According to him there neither is, 
nor can be a contract of rulership. The institution of 
a government is not a contract but merely a commdssion. 
Rousseau's social contract is a compact of association 
between free, independent individuals. So far Rousseau's 
contract is similar to that of Hobbes, but whereas Hobbes' 
subjects alienate their rights to a third party, those of 
Rousseau alienate theirs to the whole community formed by 
the self-same individuals. B.y means of Rousseau's con~ 
tract the people thus become a corporate body, a nersona 
moralis with a will of its own. The unity of the body 
politic exists in the fact that all individuals are now 
members of this persona moralis. Rousseau rejects empha• 
tically the idea that the sovereignty of the people can 
be represented by anybody except itself. It is wrong to 
state that Rousseau contemplates the complete absorption 
7) 
of the individual in the community. Such an assumption 
presupposes a passivity on the part of the individual 
which cannot be reconciled with.his active participation 
in the actions of the general assembly of the people 
where he is required to help in forming the general will. 
What Rousseau might well have contemplated, was that the 
individual, once he has left the state of nature, can on-
ly exercise his rights and liberties in a legally orga-
nized community. Freedom outside the community is a 
barren abstraction. 
Many comm.entators failed to understand the d:i:f'fe ... 
renee between the "will of all" and the "general will" in 
Rousseau's doctrine. The "will of all" is clearly only 
the ••••••••• lll 
7) Cf. Otto von Gierke: Op.cit., p.llO. 
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the will of an aggregate of individuals of whom the in-
terests happen to coincide. This is what happens when 
individuals, according to Hobbes' contract theor,y, agree 
to transfer their rights to an absolute sovereign. 
The "general will", on the other hand, is the will 
of the corporate bo~, or Rersona morali~ resulting fram 
Rousseau's social contract. The wills of the individual 
members of the body politic are here fused into one which 
is focused on the common good. Furthermore the "general 
will" embodies the universal law of nature, which cannot 
be said of the "will of all". 
Whereas in Hobbes' notion of contract everything 
is taken over by the ruler and exercised on behalf of 
the subject, the subjects' rights are re-established and 
legalized by means of Rousseau's contract and returned 
to them so that they can exercise them on their own be~ 
half in conjunction with their fellow~citizens. We must 
remember that Rousseau's view of the nature of men dif,.. 
fers from that of Hobbes and consequently his citizen 
does not need the compulsion of a third party to honour 
the social contract. • 
It remains to be pointed out that the relation 
between the general will and the executive government as 
envisaged by Rousseau, allows for a great measure of 
adaptibility in legislation and policy. Every time the 
people assembles, the government may be suspended and 
thus there is scope for permanent bloodless revolution. 
This can be regarded as one of the advantages of Rous• 
seau's contract theory. In Hobbes' case the people can 
only affect a change if they so desire by violently dis• 
posing the ruler, because he is under no obligation to 
give effect to the wishes of the people. 
As in the case of the contract theory, there are 
quite a few superficial similarities between the theories 
of •••••••••• ll2 
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of sovereignty of Hobbes and Rousseau. Commentators who 
took an un.favourable view of Rousseau's political doc-
trine, never failed to stress these similarities which 
mainly exist in the attributes assigned b,y both theorists 
to their conceptions of sovereignty. Both of them des• 
cribe sovereignty as being absolute, indivisible and in-
alienable. In addition Hobbes says that sovereignty is 
unlimited. This is not the opinion of Rousseau, in spite 
of what same commentators wrote about him, he definitely 
admits that there are some lim.i ts on sovereign power. 
When he says that sovereignty is absolute, he only means 
that the authority of the sovereign over the members of 
the body politic cannot be challenged b.Y any other autho-
rity. Only such part of the rights and powers of the in• 
dividual which is useful to the community should be given 
by him to the community. There is thus not an absolute 
transfer as in the case of Hobbes. Furthermore the ca• 
pacity for action of the sovereign, the general will of 
the community, is severely limited by the fact that such 
actions should be strictly general. The acts of the ge-
neral will may thus not be arbitrary, but must apply to 
all members of the community equally. As all the mem-
bers of the community participate in the formation of 
the general will and its acts, it is highly unlikely 
that they will be unjust to themselves. These arguments 
do not hold for Hobbes' sovereign who may make any law 
he thinks fit and may even discriminate among his sub-
jects, as he stands outside the body politic. 
It is in the location of sovereignty that there 
is a fundamental difference between Hobbes and Rousseau. 
While in the case of Hobbes, the sovereign individuals 
transfer all their rights to one person who exercises 
the supreme power on behalf of each of his subjects, 
Rousseau ••••••• ll3 
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Rousseau locates the sovereign power in the general will 
of the community. In other words, Hobbes locates sove-
reignty in a personal ruler, while Rousseau locates it 
in the people conceived as a corporation with its own 
:persona moralis. 
All powers, legislative, executive and judicial, 
temporal as well as spiritual, are concentrated in the 
person of Hobbes' sovereign. Rousseau, although he main" 
tains that the sovereign will is indivisible, admits that 
the sovereign power may be transmitted. Accordingly we 
find a certain measure of decentralization: the general 
will should restrict its activities to general legisla-
tion, it should delegate the executive power to a govern-
ment which is subordinate to it. Further it seems that 
Rousseau contemplates a third body which he calls the 
tribunate whose duty will be that of the judiciary, some-
what similar to the role of the Ephors in ancient Sparta. 
Both the executive and judicial powers are subject to, 
and operative on a commission from, the real sovereign. 
Hobbes openly declares that the sovereign is sub• 
I 
ject to the law of God and nature. Rousseau subscribes 
to the smme view b.Y implication. Hobbes does not, how~ 
ever, provide anybody with authority to restrain the so" 
vereign from violating laws. So it remains purely a 
matter for the sovereign's own conscience. As Rousseau's 
sovereign is the community as a whole, I think that there 
is less chanee that the law of God and nature will be 
violated in the deliberations of a corporate body where 
individuals are at liberty to attempt to restrain one 
another from unjust action. There is, of course no water-
~tight safeguard against such possible violation, but 
then at least a majority of the community must agree to 
do so, which although possible, is unlikely. The only 
real safeguard against injustice in a democracy is strict 
adherence ••••••• ll4 
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adherence to the eternal precepts of natural law b,y the 
maj~rit,y. This,to our mind, is also the position of Roue~ 
seau. 
One can thus say that once Hobbes' sovereign is in-
stituted the people~ or rather the individual subjects, 
lose all control over him and simply have to condone 
ever.ything he does because he is acting on their behalf; 
his will is merely an extension of their wills. Hobbes 
did not see that the will of one man, his sovereign, and 
the will of the people may not always coincide. On the 
contrary, he denies that the people may have a will diffe• 
rent or separate from the sovereign. In Rousseau's con• 
ception of sovereignt.y the individual, b,y virtue of Rous• 
seau's rejection of any idea of representation, always 
retains a foothold in the sovereign bo~ where he is en~ 
titled to put hie views. This privilege of the indivi-
dual to state his views and to try to persuade his fel~ 
low ... citizene to support his point of view, constitutes 
the maximum safeguard to personal freedom that can pos-
sibly be found in political theory apart from natura~ law. 
As far as the law of nature is concerned, I agree 
8) 
with .Davy that there is indeed agreement between the 
doctrines of Hobbes and Rousseau. Both regard the law 
of nature as eternal, immutable, universal, reasonable 
and divine. In the state of nature, however, conditions 
do not exist to enable men to observe the law of nature 
without endangering their safety. It is for this reason 
that the law of nature needs the backing of the civil 
laws so that its observance by men may be reciprocal. 
Both Hobbes and Rousseau seem to intend that the civil 
laws of the sovereign should incorporate, or at least 
not violate, the precepts of the law of nature.. For both 
of them the law of nature epitomizes all justice, 
reasonableness •••• -.115 
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safeguard to individual inviolability does not exist in 
the doctrine of Hobbes. 
Characteristic of their diametrically opposed 
points of view are the conceptions of liberty of Hobbes 
and Rousseau. Hobbes, true to his mechanistic and mate8 
rialistie disposition, defines liberty as "the absence 
of all the impediments to action that are not contained 
9} 
in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent". 
This conception is purely mechanical and has no ethical 
content whatever. Rousseau, on the other band, defines 
liberty as the submission to a strict and inviolable law 
which the individual erects over himself and which he 
10) 
recognises as valid and necessary. Liberty has thus an 
ethical content and implies self~diseipline and self~re-
straint. 
Taking all these points into consideration, it 
does not surprise one that Rousseau attributes a moral 
content to the law and that he expresses the opinion 
that it is to law alone that men owe justice and liberty. 
Hobbes, on the other hand, holds up the law as the cri" 
terium of right and wrong. What the law commands, the 
subject should accept as right and what the law forbids, 
the subject should accept as wrong. The command of the 
sovereign is thus the final word on right and wrong what~ 
ever the content of that command may be. Rousseau, how~ 
ever, states in his Lettre a Mirabeau as we have indica~ 
ted in the previous chapter, that his great ideal was to 
find a form of government which puts the Law above man. 
By 11 Law" he must have meant the law of nature with all 
that it stands for and if seen in this light, the passage 
can only mean that he favoured the sovereignty of law. 
The acknowledgment of sovereignty of law is of course 
another •••••••• l17 
9) ~uoted qy Peters: Op.cit., pp.l78-179. 
10) Cf. Cassirer: Op.cit., p.55. 
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another, and a powerful, guarantee for individual rights 
and liberties. In Hobbes' doctrine the civil, as well 
as the natural law are at the mercy of the monarch. 
According to Hobbes all the rights of the citizens 
are completely and irrevocably absorbed into the sove~ 
~ 
reignty of the ruler; it is thus to be expe_c ted that he 
does not favour the existence of spontaneous corporations 
in the commonwealth. Such corporations can only be tole-
rated with the approval of the sovereign. It is abun-
dantly clear from the whole tenor of his argument that he 
favours a direct relationship between sovereign and sub-
ject. Superficially the doctrine of Rousseau on this 
issue has much in common with that of Hobbes and commen-
ta tors who regard Rousseau a.s an incorrigible state a b-ot 
. -
solutist, never fail to point out that he has no place 
for any partial associations in his state. This, they 
complain, is clearly a violation of the principle of free• 
.. 
dom of association~ These people forget that it is a 
small city-state that Rousseau is describing and not a 
large commonwealth such as Hobbes had in mind. Without 
expressing myself about the practicability of Rousseau's 
~ 
project, I cannot find anything wrong with its principle. 
It allows all citizens free access to, and participation 
in, the proceedings of the legislative assembly so that 
it can be said that their freedom of assembly are catered 
for quite well. The formation of associations outside 
the sovereign assembly may only lead to the emergence of 
cliques who may try to usurp the powers of the sovereign. 
It is important that ·in Rousseau's sovereign assembly 
every man should speak for himself and that no groupe or 
parties should be formed to try and capture the sovereign 
. power. 
However, the ideal state described Qy Rousseau in 
his •••••••••• ll8 
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It is thus clear that Rousseau is convinced that 
in a successful political community the moral base of a 
belief in God is indispensable. He would thus not tole~ 
rate manifest atheism or blasphemy in his state. For the 
rest, however, he advocates tolerance and allows any 
church that tolerates others, so long as its dogmas do 
not conflict with the duties of citizenship. 
Whereas Hobbes' sovereign has full control of all 
religious matters in the commonwealth, Rousseau's sovereign 
requires its subjects to subscribe to a limited basic fa.i th 
and for the rest they may have their own opinions provi" 
ded that they practise no religious intolerance towards 
their fellow~citizens. It should further be stressed 
that whereas Hobbes requires his citizens meekly to obey 
their sovereign in religious matters, Rousseau requires 
his citizens to bel~in an omnipotent God who rewards 
the just and punishes the wicked. Hobbes thus relies on 
the fallible will of a human sovereign, whereas Rousseau 
relies on ultimate and objective ethical values. Once 
again we find arbitrariness opposed to the principles of 
eternal and universal justice. 
The general relation of the individual to the so~ 
vereign differs widely in the theories of Hobbes and 
Rousseau. Taking private property as an example, we find 
that the land and all its resources belong to Hobbes' so" 
vereign and that the subject may only call such land his 
own as the sovereign deter.mines. Rousseau's subject 
also surrenders his property to the sovereign. who, how-
ever, restores it to him with proper legal backing. Pri" 
vate property is thus only rendered legal b.Y the social 
contract and neither diminished nor enlarged. 
Rousseau's sovereign made up of the particular mem~ 
bers of the community concerned, cannot conceivably have any 
interest contrary to the general interest of its members. 
It ••••••••••••• l21 
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It is also unreasonable to accept that the sovereign will 
do anything to hurt or injure its members as such action 
will apply to all equally. It is patently absurd that 
anybody will do anything to hurt himself wilfully. 
Whereas Rousseau realizes that man can only find 
his happiness and fulfilment in the bosom of a community 
in the activities of which he can freely partake, the 
subjects of Hobbes' commonwealth never seem to develop 
any social coherence and return to a state of war as soon 
as the sovereign with his irresistible power of coercion 
is removed_. 
The subjects of Hobbes' commonwealth have no par-
ticipation in legislation. The sovereign does everything 
on their behalf. However, should the sovereign threaten 
their lives, they may resist individually. The rest of 
the liberty of the individuals depends on the silence of 
the law, in other words, they may do such things as the 
laws do not prohibit. 
In the light of Rousseau's conception of the role 
of the individual in the civil community, one can appre-
ciate his opinion that the subject has no need to resist 
his sovereign. If he should have any complaint or ob~ 
jection he is perfectly at liberty to air his views in 
the legislative assembly. If his views are so much at 
variance with the general will that he feels bound to 
refuse to submit, he simply has to withdraw from the 
community. 
The main difference then between Hobbes and Rous-
seau, is that while the individual subject is more or 
less helpless against the will and whims of the mighty 
Leviathan, he does have an opportunity to vindicate him• 
self before Rousseau's sovereign although his success 
cannot be guaranteed. 
As ••••••••••• l22 
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As a true child of the philosophic atmosphere of 
his time with its mechanism, subjectivism and nominalism, 
Hobbes led the prodigious effort of modern philosophy to 
reduce both natural and human phenomena to extension and 
motion. If this assumption is accepted, the procedure 
of the mathematical natural sciences can be applied to 
all situations. This is exactly what Hobbes did: he 
used the specific notions and methods of the new physical 
sciences and generalized them to cover man whom he viewed 
as part of the mechanical system of nature. That the 
rights and liberties of ro.a.n, his spiritual and ethical 
nature and his belief in universal and objective values 
have no place in such a system is obvious. It is also 
clear that a system of government based on such princi-
ples will ignore all those qualities which distinguish 
human beings from the physical things of nature. 
This great confidence in the power of human rea-
son had reached its zenith when Rousseau made his appea-
rance. He vehemently rebelled against this mechanistic 
conception of man and asserted with all the eloquence at 
his disposal the emotional and ethical nature of man and 
his inalienable heritage of freedom. In general one may 
even say that Rousseau was an early precursor of the 
life~philosophers of the twentieth century. 
Rousseau's political philosophy thus deals with 
a concept of man that is totally different to that of 
Hobbes. Instead of a self-propelled atomistic indivi ... 
dual who consistently collides with other similar indi-
viduals and who can only be kept in peace and order b,y 
a superior coercive power, we find in Rousseau's doctrine 
a man who realizes that, in order to achieve happiness 
and to reach his destination, he simply must be prepared 
to ••••••••••• l23 
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to life in a community with his fellow~men in such a 
way that the general good of the community as a whole 
is advanced. Man, according to Rousseau, is able to 
submit freely to a universal moral law which he recog" 
nizes as valid and necessary for its sake as well as 
for his own. The state should thus not be conceived 
as an instrument of coercion but as. a means to secure 
sovereignty of law and so to realize the dignity of 
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A COMPARISON OF ROUSSEAU WITH TEE 
VINDIC IAE CONTRA TYRANNOS. 
In our preceding chapter we have detailed the fun" 
damental differences between the political doctrines of 
1) 
Hobbes and Rousseau.'5( Writers like Sir Henry Maine, 
2) 3) 
Emile Faguet, and TRine who regard Rousseau as an advo-
cate of collectivism, totalitarianism and despotism, are 
clearly mistaken. In our last chapter we shall deal with 
these interpretations of Rousseau in more detail. Suf• 
fice it to say that to our mind it is precisely the pre-
mises on which Hobbes based his doctrine that may lead 
to totalitarianism and despotism. If the nature of man 
is seen in the light of atomistic individualism, a case 
may be made out for totalitarian control by an absolute 
central state. If, on the other hand, one believes with 
Rousseau that human communities can be formed and main~ 
tained by the free consent of their constituents, the 
coercive power of an arbitrary authority standing out-
side and above the people is unwanted and unnecessary. 
To us it seems that Rousseau's position is much 
nearer to that of the Huguenot writers of the sixteenth 
century than most people realize. To indicate the nume-
rous points of Rousseau's doctrine which coincide with 
those held by the Huguenot theorists, we propose to com~ 
pare his political theory with that propounded in the 
Vindiciae contra tyrannos of which we gave a summary in 
chapter l. 
The ••••••••••• l25 
2
1
3
l Popular government. New York, Holt, 1886, pp.l57,160. 
DiE-huitieme siecle, 43d ed. p.345. 
Lea origines de ia France contemporaine, vol.l. 
Paris, 1896. p.521. 
All these references are quoted in Introduction to 
Cassirer: The question of Jean•Jacgues Rousseau. 
New York, Columbia U.P., 1956. pp.4-8. 
... 125 ... 
The Vindiciae was a vehement protest against the 
absolute sovereign state which appropriated to itself all 
the rights previously held by the people and the s.ponta ... 
neous corporations. Pufendorf has shown us that a people 
can come into being as a result of a reciprocal contract 
between individuals and that such a union is a persona 
moralis and thus a subject of rights. Such a persona mo~ 
ralis can then conclude a contract of government with a 
personal ruler on certain conditions. The theorists of 
the new sovereign state, however, and notably Hobbes, de-
ny the corporate character of the people and only recog• 
nize the sovereign state, as personified in an absolute 
ruler, as the only subject of rights and authority. In 
other words, the sovereign state invades and eliminates 
the corporate personality of the people and interposes a 
personal monarch vis-a-vis atomistic individuals. 
It must be acknowledged by every impartial commen• 
tator that Rousseau's political writings also constitute 
a strong protest against the absolute sovereign state of 
his time and all the corruption which flowed from it. 
Looking first at the concept 'people' as it occurs 
in the Vindiciae, one at once notices that it is used in 
the sense of a corporation, not in the sense of an inco ... 
herent number of individuals or a multitude, but of a 
persona moralis who is entitled to be recognized as a sub-
ject of rights. Only the whole body of the people may 
4) 
punish a ruler who violates his contract. So also the 
magistratus inferiores are not entitled to act on behalf 
of individuals, but only on behalf of the whole body of 
5) 
the people. Of the king it is said that he is a person 
who derives his authority from the community as a whole 
and that he is thus subject to the community, although 
he •••••••••••• l26 
4) Vindiciae contra tyrannos. Ed.H.J.Laski.London,Bell, 
5) Ibid., p.97. 1924.p.92. 
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he is superior to any of the particular members of the 
6) 
community. Individuals are constantly warned that it is 
not their duty to resist a king who commands his subjects 
to break the law of God, because the contract between God 
and the people as a whole does not require of individuals 
to restrain godless rulers, because this is the duty of 
the whole universal body of the people which individuals 
7) 
should not take upon themselves. 
8) 
Similarly Rousseau, criticizing Grotius for saying 
that a people can give itself to a king, says that it will 
be more profitable to examine the act by which a people 
has become a people. Before a people can thus appoint a 
ruler or government, it must first be a corporate body. 
9) 
To the people as a whole, according to Rousseau, belongs 
the legislative power and not to individuals. 
Both in the Vindiciae and in the political writings 
of Rousseau the people thus has the status of a corporate 
body, a persona moralis, and l0tfi. a subject of rights, there-
fore it can be the seat of sovereignty. 
The position and functions of the ruler as des-
cribed in the Vindiciae is very similar to that attributed 
by Rousseau to the executive officials in his Contrat so-
~· According to the Vin.dicia.e kings derive their power 
10) 
and sovereignty from the people. Kings are being elected 
by the people and the whole body of the people is thus 
11) 
superior to the king. If the king can be regarded as the 
pilot of the ship of state, the people can be regarded as 
the owners. The king is appointed to maintain justice 
and to protect the civil state and the individuals against 
12) 
dangers and menaces. The king is the organ and the body 
through •••••••• l27 
6 Ibid., p.98. 
7 Ibid., p.l09. 
8 Contrat social. (In Vaughan, vol.2, p.31.) 
9 Ibid.,p.64. 
10 Vindiciae., p.l4. 
11 Vindiciae_, p.l24. 
12 Ibid., p.l40. 
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through which the law manifests its power, fulfils its 
13) 
functions and expresses its conceptions. 
The position of the king in the Vindiciae is par• 
alleled bw that of the executive government in Rousseau's 
Contrat social. He simply refuses to admit that a sove-
reign people can ever part with its sovereignty as was 
envisaged b,y Pufendorf. His government is appointed b.Y 
the people to fulfil the executive duties in the state 
under commission. If a valid contract can only be con• 
eluded between equals, this commission cannot be regar-
ded as a contract because the government is clearly the 
servanVof the people. It may be ter.med a contract between 
master and servant. This is of course also the case with 
the Vindiciae 1 s king, but Rousseau's government may be 
said to have even a more modest status and it can perhaps 
be said that in this respect Rousseau goes back to the 
constitution of a medieval city which was governed by a 
council who got its instructions from a regular town 
meeting. 
However, it is clear that both the Vindiciae and 
Rousseau regard the people as the source of sovereignty 
and law and that the people as a whole is above the king 
or government which holds its office on such conditions 
as the people may impose. It exercises its functions not fer 
its own benefit, but for that of the people. 
In contrast to this position of king and govern-
ment, it may be recalled that Hobbes 1 monarch is the abso" 
lute seat of sovereignty and thus the wielder of unlimited 
power over all his subjects by virtue of the feJct that 
every individual in the state transferred all his rights 
unconditionally to the sovereign. Because he did not en-
tertain the concept of the people as a corporate body ex-
isting prior to the advent of the sovereign state, it was 
inconceivable for Hobbes to locate sovereignty in such a 
non-existing ••••••• l28 
13) Ibid., p.l45. 
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non~existing body. True to his materialistic view, he 
could only locate sovereignty in a physical person. 
The Vindiciae defines law as reason and wisdom 
14) 
which remained unaffected b,y the passions of persons. 
Nothing is just only because it has been decreed by the 
king, but only that king is just who decrees as just that 
15) 
which is just in itself. This means that as far a.s laws 
are concerned, it is not the will of the king that is im~ 
portant, but the content of the law. The king receives 
the laws from the people and it is his duty to maintain 
16) 
them with the utmost care. It is indeed the law that has 
the power of life and death over the inhabitants of the 
commonwealth and not the king who may only administer and 
1?) . 
maintain the law. This is undoubtedly a plea for sove~ 
reignty of law, free from the whims of any ruler. 
Although many commentators on Rousseau assert that 
18) 
he does not uphold natural law, it is nevertheless evi-
dent from an important passage in the Contrat social that 
he is fully aware of the precepts of natural law and that 
he definitely implies that these precepts should prevail 
in civil legislation. He admits that there is a univer-
sal justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice 
to be admitted among us, must be mutual. It is thus one 
of the functions of civil law to provide sanctions so 
19) 
that justice may become effective among men. 
Both the Vindiciae and Rousseau do not regard law 
simply as the command of a king as Hobbes does. On the 
contrary, they both acknowledge the people as the crea-
tors of law and they both agree that the content of the 
law is even more important than its source or form be-
cause it should uphold justice among men. 
14 
15 
16 
1? 
18 
19 
Vindiciae, 
Ibid., 
VTridic iae, 
Ibid., 
Cf.Gough: 
Vaughan. 
p.l45. 
p.l4?. 
p.l48. 
p.l55. 
Rousseau ••••••••• l29 
The social contract. Oxford,Clarendon press, 
Op.cit., vol.2, p.48. 1936,pl156-
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Rousseau also contends that the civil laws, the 
acts of the volonte generale, should always be general 
and should apply equally to all subjects in the republic. 
He readily admits that the same laws do not suit diverse 
20) 
provinces with various climates. As both the Vindiciae 
and Rousseau regard the people as the source of its law, 
it is just natural that they have to admit plurality of 
laws. 
How should it be decided what the law is and how 
can the people be safeguarded against abuse of power by 
the ruler? In the Vindiciae it is the duty of the magis~ 
tratus inferiores, elected by the people, to guard the 
interests of the people as against the prince. If, how-
ever, an unusual event reguires such action, the whole 
. 21J 
people can be assembled. Further.more, it is the duty of 
the prince to call a meeting of the Estates-General to 
advise him and to take decisions, should it become neces• 
22) 
sary to amend the laws. In the case of Rousseau only the 
whole body of the people may decide on any legislation. 
Apart from extraordinary meetings necessitated by unfore-
seen circumstances, Rousseau demands that there should be 
fixed periodical assemblies so that on the proper day the 
people is legitimately callea together by law, without 
23) 
the need of any formal summoning. The purpose of these 
automatic periodical assemblies is to prevent the govern-
ment or executive body from attempting to usurp the sove• 
reign authority. 
Hobbes 1 sovereign is free to consult counsellors 
appointed by himself, but he is not bound to accept their 
advice. The people does not come into the picture at all. 
In the case of the Vindiciae and Rousseau, however, the 
20) Ibid., p.57. 
21l Vindiciae, p.l27. 
22 Ibid., p;l53. 
23 Vaughan: 9E.cit., vo1.2, p.93. 
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people assembles from time to time to exercise its legis-
lative function and to guard against any for.m of tyranny 
on the part of the government. 
On the.question of slavery the Vindiciae and Rous-
seau see eye to eye. The Vindiciae states clearly that 
the subjects are not the slaves of the king but that each 
24) 
of them should be regarded as his brother. Rousseau has 
just as little sympathy for the idea of slavery. Someone 
who becomes a slave, sells himself' at least for his own 
subsistence. But for what reason can a people possibly 
sell itself? A king never provides subsistence to his 
subjectsJ on the contrary, he receives his subsistence 
only from them. The idea of the enslaving of a people 
25) 
is thus absurd and inconceivable .• 
Coming to the question of private property which 
formed such a vital notion in the political doctrine of 
Locke, we see that, accordi-ng to the Vindiciae, the people 
never surrender their property to the prince, but in their 
contract with him it is stipulated that he is required to 
protect their property. The prince is not even the abso~ 
lute possessor of the royal demesnes and may not alienate 
26) 
any part of it without the approval of the Estates-General. 
In the Contrat social each member of the community gives 
himself to it, at the moment of its foundation, just as 
he is, with all the resources at his disposal, including 
27) 
the goods he possesses. The peculiar fact about this 
alienation is that, in taking over the goods of the indi-
, 
vidual, the community, so t!a.r from despoiling them, only 
assures the individual legitimate possession, and changes 
usurpation into a true right and enjoyment into proprietor~ 
28) 
ship. The position is summed up succinctly ~ Ernst 
Cassirer •••••••• l31 
25 Contrat social. (In Vaughan, vo1.2, p.28.) 
26 Vindic iae, p.l?O .• 
241 Vindiciae, p.l56~ 
2 7 Vaughan, vol.2 (~ '"5',.,JL. ~) p. 33. 
28 Ibid., p.38. 
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Cassirer: "The state is therefore entitled and qualified 
to interfere with property insofar as the inequality of 
property endangers the moral equality of the subjects 
29) 
under the law ••• " 
In both theories private property is thus recog-
nized as a legitimate right of the individual, while, 
according to Hobbes, the subject m.ay only call such pro-
perty his own as is allowed to him by the sovereign. 
As far as the question of contract is concerned, 
we find apparent differences between the versions of the 
Vindiciae and Rousseau, but there is still a great m.ea .... 
sure of basic agreement. The Vindiciae mentions two con.-
tracts at the inauguration of kings: the first between 
God, the king and the people in which the people promises 
to be a people of GodJ the second between the king and the 
people that the people will faithfully obey the king and 
30} 
that the king will reign justly. The people asks the 
king whether he will reign justly and according to their 
la.ws. This he promises. Only then does the people reply 
that, on condition that he reigns justly, they will faith~ 
fully obey him. In the first contract the king promises 
to serve God faithfully, in the second to rule justly 
over the people. 
We see thus that the people as a whole promises to 
obey the king only on condition that he rules justly and 
according to their laws. ~ requiring the king to submit 
to certain conditions, the people proves that it holds 
the sovereignty and not the king. 
Whereas the conception of contract in the Vindiciae 
may be described as a contract of government, Rousseau's 
notion of contract may be regarded as purely social. Indi• 
viduals conclude a mutual compact from which a corporate 
body ••••••••• l32 
29) The question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. p.60. 
30) Vindiciae, p.71. 
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body arises whose will is sovereign. Each member of the 
com.muni ty thus acquires a double capacity: he is sim.ul-
taneously a participant in the sovereignty of the people 
and a subject to the sovereign who is the people as a 
31) 
whole. Apart from the social contract there is also a 
trace here of a contract of submission, i.e. the submis-
• 
sion of the individual to the whole people of whom he 
forms a part. Sovereignty rests with the people as a 
whole and it is the people who appoints a government to 
act as executive organ of the general will. It may thus 
be said that Rousseau does not visualize a contract of 
govermrre.nt as a reciprocal· agreement between equals. 
Both in the Vindiciae and Rousseau the prince or 
government is not the law-maker as is the case with Robbes 1 
sovereign monarch~ The prince has to abide by the laws of 
the people and has simply to act as executive organ. The 
people does not trans~er its sovereignty to the prince, 
but retains it. In the Vindiciaerthe inferior magistrates 
elected by the people had an obligation to God to safe• 
guard the rights of the people against usurpation by the 
prince. According to Rousseau the people as a whole in 
its legislative capacity delegates certain powers and du-
ties to the government but maintains strict control of 
the executive branch by means of frequent assemblies and 
reviews. This state of affairs forms a sharp contrast to 
Hobbes' doctrine in terms of which each subject transfers 
all his rights absolutely to a personal sovereign. This 
transfer is so final that the subject, or the subjects 
acting in concert, may not question the acts of the king. 
There is simply no human control over the king: he is 
both the legislative and executive organ. 
Just as the Vindiciae, Rousseau acknowledges tr~t 
all justice comes from God, but this justice has to be 
incorporated ••••••• l33 
31) Vaughan: Op.cit., vol.2, p.34. 
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incorporated in the laws and the laws are made by the 
32) 
general will of the people. Recognition is thus given by 
Rousseau to the universal law of God which should be mani-. 
fested in the general will. 
Both the Vindiciae and Rousseau require the unani-
mous consent of all individuals who submit to a ruler or 
join an association. According to the Vindiciae man is 
by nature free and hates slavery. He is born rather to 
command than to obey. He will thus not voluntarily allow 
anybody else to rule him unless he expects some great 
33) . 
benefit from it. Rousseau describes man 1 s love of free-
dom in alm.ostidentical words: every man is born free and 
is his own master and no one, under any pretext whatso~ 
. . 34) 
ever, can make any man subject without his consent. By 
\ 
means of his theory of the social contract whereby each 
member of the con>Jnunity en~oys a perpetual right to par.-
ticipate in the deliberations of the sovereign body, Roue• 
seau attempts to satisfy the inborn love of freedom of 
the individual. 
It should be remembered that in Rousseau's time 
individualism, after the doctrines of Hobbes and Locke, 
was well advanced. Rousseau thus had to take the indivi ... 
·'dual as the point of departure in his political theory. 
In'the Vindiciae the existence of the individual is ad-
m.itted, but he was no public force; the emphasis is on 
I' 
the people as a corporate body in which the individual 
has his appropriate place and status. 
As already stated, the people elected the magis-
tratus inferiores and vested in them a tribunal authori-
, 35} 
ty tq guard against violations of his trust by the ruler~ 
If the prince should infringe the powers granted by the -
32l 3 
34 
35 
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people to him, it is the duty of these officials to re~ 
strain him. This is indeed the safeguard against ltyrane 
ny which is missing from the political theory of Hobbes. 
While Rousseau leaves the sovereign legislative power 
solely in the hands of the community as a whole, and the 
people is thus in a position effectively to control the 
executive branch, he also talks about a tribunate whose 
duty it is to protect the rights of the legislative power 
36) 
against the executive government. This tribunate he com ... 
pares with the Ephors of Sparta. 
It is interesting to recall at this point the view 
of Calvin on the role of the inferior magistrates. His 
view coincides with both that of the Vindiciae and Rouse 
seau. As shown before, Calvin writes as follows: "For if 
there are now any magistrates of the people, appointed to 
restrain the willfulness of kings (as in ancient times 
the ephors were set against the Spartan kings, or the tri ... 
bunes of the people against the Roman Consuls, or the de-
marche against the senate of the Athenians• and perhaps, 
as things now are, such power as the three estates exer ... 
cise in every realm when they hold their chief assemblies), 
I am so far from forbidding them to withstand, in accor-
dance with their duty, the fierce licentiousness of kings 
who violently fall upon and assualt the lowly common folk; 
I declare that their dissimulation involves nefarious per~ 
fidy, because they dishonestly betray the freedom of the 
people, of which they know that they have been appointed 
37) 
protectors by God's ordinance",. 
It is clear that the magistratus inferiores stood 
between the ruler or government and the people to prevent 
the for.mer from violating the rights of the latter. In 
Hobbes" theory of the absolute sovereign state, such a 
restraining institution has no place. 
The ••••••••• l35 
36) Contrat social. (In Vaughan, vol.2, p.ll8.) 
37) Institutes, iv. xx. 31. 
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The Vindiciae advocates intervention in no uncer-
tain terms when a ruler openly and cruelly oppresses his 
.. 38) 
subjects for religious or other reasons. Not only are 
neighbouring princes justified to intervene in such a case, 
but they will indeed neglect their duties if they do not 
intervene. Here we thus encounter the notion of justice 
as something universal to which all people are entitled. 
In his political writings which he had to leave incomplete, 
Rousseau never reached the stage where the relations be .... 
tween peoples would have been described. His Contrat so~ 
cial is only a fragment from a more comprehensive project 
on political institutions. In his ·.tidi tion of the wri-
tings of the Abbe St.Pierre, however, he subscribed to 
ideas similar to those expressed in the Vindiciae. IM 
In these writings a federation between peoples is advo-
cated and one of the results that is envisaged of such a 
federation, is that the rulers of the people can only be 
protected against revolt of their subjects if the subjects 
are also in their turn safeguarded against tyranny on the 
part of their rulers.. law thus has to be maintained in 
39) 
all the states. 
One should realize that in this regard the question 
of sovereignty is involved. The modern conception of so~ 
vereignty will never tolerate interference by a foreign 
state in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. It 
must be remembered, however, that in the time of the 
Vindiciae, sovereignty did not have the same meaning as 
today. Its conception of sovereignty, in the sense of 
sovereignty of the people, did not mean absolute, arbi-
trary power to do anything whatsoever. Even the sovereign 
people had to recognize and submit to the superior autho-
rity of an immutable, reasonable and universal law. This 
was ••••••••••• l36 
38) Vindiciae, p.22?. 
39) Cf. Hendel: Op.cit., vol.l, p.213. 
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was &lao the position of Rousseau, although in his time 
absolute sovereign~ was already a fact. No sovereign 
people was entitled to violate this law and should it do 
so, other peoples could interfere to establish sovereign~ 
ty of law. The idea that sovereignty recognizes no law 
superior to itself, is modern and is not one that is held 
qy either the Vindiciae or Rousseau. 
Although the whole of the droit divin- theory was 
swept away in the period between the Vindiciae and Rous-
,,_ . ··-
seau, the latter is nevertheless just as convinced as the 
Vindiciae that the body politic should have a religious 
basis. He realizes that the sub,jects have to subscribe 
to an agreed religious dogma so that they may feel moral• 
ly obliged to obey the sovereign. At the same time he 
does not favour a religion in which an intolerant cleri-
cal class predominates. The religious convictions of the 
subject is no concern of the sovereign, but in so far as. 
such convictions affect the interests of the people, they 
are subjects of public concern. It is absolutely neces-
sary that subjects should have a religion which will en-
courage them to do their duty. For this reason Rousseauts 
civil religion only contains those dogmas which form a 
necessary basis to m.oral behaviour, i.e. the existence 
of an omnipotent, intelligent and benevolent God, the 
immortality of the soul, the happiness of the just and 
the punishment of the wicked and the sanctity of the so~ 
cial contract and the laws. 
He could not tolerate the exclusiveness and into~ 
lerance of the churches of his time in his ideal commu-
nity. Only conflict among citizens can result from such 
a state of affairs. The civil religion of Rousseau vahould 
not be regarded as a deification of the state, because he 
explicitly requires faith in the existence of God. It 
should. only be regarded as an attempt to rid the community 
of religious intolerance and strife and to retain a 
religious~··•••••••l37 
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religious basis in society. The argument of the Vindiciae 
also advocates tolerance. 
In the few preceding chapters we have attempted to 
show that Rousseau's political doctrine constitutes a dis-
tinct return to the position of the Vindiciae and that 
Hobbes' glorification of state absolutism seems to be a 
hideous aberration in the development of political thought 1 
a break in the historical development of those principles 
of freedom and justice on which our Western tradition 
rightly prides itself. 
Like the Vindiciae, Rousseau maintains the notion 
of reciprocal contract between sovereign and subject. 
Hobbes denies that the sovereign has any obligation to~ 
wards his subjects. Both the Vindiciae and Rousseau re-
cognize the people as a corporate body who creates its 
own laws and who is a subject of rights. Hobbes,on the 
other hand 1 regards the people as a multitude who has no 
coherence and cannot therefore be a corporate subject of 
rights. Only the monarch is a subject of rights and the 
sole law~maker in his state. Hobbes rejects the notion 
of sovereignty of law. His sovereign stands above the 
law and is the source of the law and all laws emanating 
from this source are legitimate whatever their content 
may be. The Vindiciae and Rousseau advocate sovereignty 
of law: only such laws are valid which have a just con~ 
tent and both the sovereign people and their government 
and rulers are subject to a moral and universal law which 
nobody may violate. 'Whereas Hobbes has no sympathy and 
place for corporations in his commonwealth, the Vindiciae 
defends the autonomy of corporations and peoples while 
Rousseau by his insistence on the desirability of a small 
city~state of which all the voters should be able to sit 
in the legislative assembly, can also be regarded as an 
advocate •••••••• 138 
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advocate of pluralism in stark opposition to the poli-
tical monism of Eobbes. Diffusion and devolution of 
political power as envisaged b,y the doctrine of plura~ 
lism are always conducive to the freedom of the indivi-
dual. 
In Hobbesr commonwealth there is no effective 
safeguard against abuse of power by the monarch. Apart 
from the fact that he does not subscribe to the doctrine 
of sovereignty of law, he does not provide for an insti-
tution sim.ilar to Rousseau's tribunate and the magistra-
tus inferiores of the Vindiciae who were entitled to 
restrain all forms of tyranny. Whereas Hobbes places 
the church firmly under the control of the monarch, 
both the Vindiciae and Rousseau breathe a spirit of to~ 
lerance. With them we find religion reconciled with 
politics, because they do not regard the state simply as 
a~ power instrument to be used even indiscriminately by 
Hobbes' sovereign to achieve his own ends, but as a 
means to obtain an ethical end, namely to enable indi-
viduals to lead a free and virtuous life and to achieve 
their true destiny as human beings. 
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CHAPTER 9. 
TEE POLITICAL DOCTRINE OF ALTHUSIUS .. 
We have shown that there is a great measure of 
agreement between the political principles of the Vindi-
ciae and Rousseau in spite of the fact that a period of 
almost two hundred years during which the so-called 
11Natural Law" school of thought held sway, lies between 
them. We are thus faced with the problem of how these 
principles came to influence Rousseau. 
It is true that Rousseau was born at Geneva and 
that he grew up in a Calvinistic tradition. It is also 
1) 
true that in the Contrat social, he went out of his way 
to pay tribute to Calvin'1 s wisdom as a statesman, while 
in the dedication of the Discours sur lfinegalite he ex-
pressed genuine admiration for the constitution of the 
Republic of Geneva. All these references indicate Rous~ 
seaufs links with Calvinism but cannot be accepted as a 
satisfactory explanation of Calvinistic influence on his 
political ideas, because the dominant feature of Calvi-
nism, its religious doctrine, does not seem to have made 
a lasting impression on Rousseau. 
I believe that the Politica methodice digeJ3ta of 
) 
Johannes Althusius that was first published in 1603, pro• 
vides an answer to our problem. To my mind this remark-
able work is the link between Rousseau and the ideas of 
the Huguenot theorists of the sixteenth century and late 
medieval political concepts. As we have shown in Chap-
ter \,6?, there is positive evidence that Rousseau was at 
least aware of the existence of Althusius which is quite 
remarkable because during the eighteenth century his name 
and reputation had already sunken into oblivion. As 
Otto •••••••• 140 
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Otto von Gierke has pointed out, there is such a remark-
able agreement between the Politica methodice digesta 
and the Q.ontrat social_~,~h-~1· despite the fact that a 
strict proof can hardly be given, it is reasonable to 
accept that Rousseau actually read and made use of the 
book of Althusius. This assumption is strengthened by 
the fact that several of the fundamental ideas of lA.lthu-
sius' treatise which did not occur in such precise terms 
in any of Rousseau's predecessors are to be found in the 
Contrat social .. 
Another feature of Althusiue' doctrine which con ... 
tributes to the assum.ption that he, rather than Rousseau's 
early relations with Geneva, Influenced the political 
thought of RousseauJ is that, in spite of its stern Cal~ 
vinistic spirit, the treatise of Althusius shakes off 
3) 
the whole theocratic conception of the state which cha-
racterizes the politics of Calvin and his followers, the 
so-called Monarchomachi. In most other aspects, however, 
Althusius' thought resembles that of the Huguenot writers 
whose views he was the first to systematize. 
The agreement of the political doctrine of Althu-
sius with that of Rousseau will be evident if we consider 
the following brief summary of the main principles of his 
4) 
politics. 
He maintains that the rights of sovereignty do not 
belong to a ruler but necessarily and exclusively to the 
social body of the people, or corpus symbioticum. These 
rights are indeed administered by a chief magistrat<e,but 
the ownership thereof belongs inseparably to the people 
as a whole and the people can no more renounce these 
rights and alienate them to another than a man can trans~ 
fer his own life to another person. Necessity leads to 
the ••••••••••• l4l 
2) The development of political theory, tr.Bernard Freyd. 
Allen & Unwin, 1939. p.l8. 
3
4
) ~.cit., p.?l. ) 1d., chapter 2. 
- 141 -
the association of individuals and the association it-
self is the product of a tacit or explicit contract. 
The parties to this contract become members of society 
or symbiotic!. Althusius believed that he had found in 
the idea of living together the necessary condition of 
human existence. The efficient cause of all association 
and all government is the consent of all the associates 
and its final cause is the general welfare. lie recog-
nizes the existence of a number of spontaneous bodies 
which he calls consociatio publica particularis or local 
communities. He always derives the larger and higher 
associations from the smaller and lower and insists that 
this is the only method which corresponds to their natu~ 
ral and. historical relation. The governing body of a 
local community is chosen by its members and is removable 
by them at any time. Like Rou1seaUS, his sovereignty is 
limited and the sovereign body is subject to God and the 
law. The authority of the executive officers is purely 
derivative. They have to recognize the people as their 
masters and serve them. He calls his state or republic 
a universalis publica consociatio and it consists of 
the cities and provinces which have agreed to unite and 
incorporate themselves into one body. He sees a micro-
cosmos of the structure of the state in the nature of 
the communal association. As he regards the provincial 
cow~unity as a comprehensive religious, political, eco-
nomic and social unit, it is clear that his conception 
of his universalis publica consociatio is definitely 
federal. Two types of officers are responsible for the 
administration namely the Ephors who are chosen by the 
whole people to exercise its rights as against the ruler 
who is the second type of officer, called the summus 
magistratus. The latter is the chief executive and is 
chosen on behalf of the people by the Ephors. However, 
he •••••••••••• l42 
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I 
""t 142 ... 
he is bound to the people by means of a reciprocal con ... 
tract of government whereby a limited authority is dele" 
gated to him.. He is thus more or less in the same posi ... 
tion as Rousseau's government, while the Ephors coincide 
with Rousseau's tribunate. 
Although Althusius describes a contract of govern~ 
ment between the whole people and the Chief magistrata or 
ruler just as is done b.Y the Vindiciae, he also acknow" 
ledges the possibility of a purely democratic form of 
state as envisaged qy Rousseau. In such a case his 
'chief magistracy' remains in the public assembly in which 
the people as a whole exercises the rights of soventgn~ 
ty directly, while the governing officers are elected 
and changed from time to time and the representatives of 
the provinces, commune and other corporations play the 
part of Ephors. 
From this short summary it is evident that there 
are even more points of agreement between Althusius and 
Rousseau than between the Vindiciae and Rousseau. Althu-
sins' contract of association does not occur in the Vin~ 
diciae but is one of the main features of Rousseau's doc@ 
trine. Like Rousseau, Althusius also takes the indivi~ 
dual as his point of departure for the formation of his 
consociatio publica narticularis or local community. The 
Vindiciae, as we have seen, starts off with the people as 
a corpora.te body. 
5) 
It has been pointed out qy Vaughan that while 
Althusius contemplates a hierarchical political structure 
growing up spontaneously from the bottom where indivi~ 
duals associate to form simple corporations to the fede-
ral state which consists of various corporations at the 
top, Rousseau shows no signs of such a pluralistic set~up 
in his Contrat social and is rather advocating a unitary 
state. This objection must be rejected on the following 
grounds ••••••••••• l43 
5) Op.cit., vo1.2, pp.?-8. 
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grounds: Rousseau is only describing a small city~state 
and he is trying to find a sound basic formula which will 
obviate the necessity to transfer the sovereignty of the 
people to a ruler, furthermore his Oontrat social only 
forms part of a larger project he had in mind, and jud• 
ging by his allusions to federations, I would venture to 
suggest that if he had the opportunity to complete his 
treatise, it would have looked very much like that of 
Althusius. In the latterrs consociatio universalis which, 
by the way, is very similar to the Vindiciae's common-
wealth which consists of many peoples, each member re-
tains its sovereignty (in its sixteenth century meaning) 
and under the terms of the contract of association is 
obligated only for mutual defence and submission to the 
court of arbitration. 
Althusius' political doctrine may be regarded as 
a systerr~tic attempt to establish a reconciliation be-
tween the large nation-states and the pluralistic prin• 
ciples of the late Middle Ages in order to save these 
principles from total eclipse. In the light of develop-
ments in the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth 
century, this effort seemed to have been vain. But if 
it is true that Althusius influenced Rousseau, and we are 
convinced that it is true, then he did not write in vain~ 
As a result then of the points &f·agreement between 
Rousseau's political doctrine and that of Althusiua and 
the Monarchomachi, one is justified, I think, to regard 
his thought as a return to the sound political principles 
of the late Middle Ages, viz. the people as a corporate 
body and subject of rights, the notion of a reciprocal 
contract, the people as the source of law, pluralism and 
sovereignty-of law. His doctrine may also be regarded as 
an effort to redress the ~Tong turn that political thought 
has taken during the seventeenth century under the impetus 
of 
of the champions of the absolute sovereign state)Which 
Hobbes was the most prominent. 
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CHAPTER 10. 
THE SIGNIFICAlfCE OF THE DOC TRINES OF 
HOBBES .Al\i]) ROUSSEAU FOR OUR TIME. 
Rousseau was, and remains, a controversial figure 
in the history of political thought. Many commentators 
regarded him as a protagonist of collectivism and des-
potism. In this spirit Sir Henry Maine attacked him for 
establishing a "collective despot" and for reintroducing, 
in the Contrat social, "the old divine right of kings in 
1) 
a new dress". Emile Faguet said that the Contrat social 
is antiliberal and that Rousseau's political thought con ... 
2) 
taine "not an atom of liberty or sovereignty". Taine ar-
gued that Rousseau 1 s political theory had been designed 
as the supreme as~~~t on law and the state and had re-
sulted, paradoxically but inevitably, in tyranny: "The 
doctrine of popular sovereignty, interpreted bw the 
masses, will produce perfect anarchy until the moment 
when, interpreted b.Y the rulers, it will produce perfect 
3) 
despotism". Rousseau's state, as he put it, is a "lay .. 
man 1 s monastery 11 , and "in this democratic monastery which 
Rousseau establishes on the model of Sparta and Rome, the 
4} 
individual is nothing and the state everything". Sir 
Ernest Barker also came to the conclusion that 11 in effect, 
and in the last resort, Rousseau is a totalitarian ••• Ima ... 
gine Rousseau a perfect democrat: his perfect democracy 
5) 
is still a multiple autocracy". 
These are just a few examples to show that this 
view has become very prominent in the literature on Rous• 
seau. This view is, however, absolutely wrong. It 
results~·•·••••••l45 
1
2
) Popular government. New York, Holt,l886. pp.l57,160. 
) Dix-hui tH~me si~cle. 43d ed. p.345. 
3) L'Ancien R~gime~ Paris, Hachette, 1896. p.319. 
4
5
) Ibid., pp.323, 321. 
) Introduction to The Social Contract. New York, O.U.P., 
1948. p.xxxv;iii. 
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results, firstly, from a failure on the part of the com ... 
mentators to conalder all Rousseau's writings as a whole. 
Secondly the fact is ignored that Rousseau is dealing in 
his two discourses with the pqlitical and social condi• 
tions of his time, while in his Contrat social he attempts 
to describe the essential features of an ideal state which 
should take the place of the one he rejects. In the third 
place, it is often forgotten that Rousseau's ideal state 
is not a modern nation"state, but a small city-state. 
From such units he apparently thought that a larger con~ 
federation may be for.med, but, unfortunately, he did not 
work out this aspect of his politics8 
All these authors seem to think that Rousseau sa ... 
crifices the individual to an absolute state authority. 
What usually brings them to this view is "l'alienation 
totale de chaque associe avec tous ses droits a toute la 
6} 
communaute". This, they allege, means that the indivi~ 
dual surrenders himself unconditionally to, and is ab-
sorbed by, the state, Such an interpretation may have 
been true if the state is something alien, and perhaps 
even hostlle, to the individuals. Individuals volunta-
rily join the community in which each of them, far from 
abandoning his freedom, continues to exercise it as a 
constituent member of the sovereign assembly. The total 
alienation is necessary, because men are living in an un~ 
just and despotic society and have to make a clean start 
in a just community. Ernst Cassirer puts it like this: 
"The state claims the individual completely and without 
reservations. However, in doing so it does not act as 
a coercive institution but only·puts the individual un~ 
der an obligation which he himself recognizes as valid 
and necessary, and to which he therefore assents for its 
sake ••••••••••• l46 
6) Contrat social. (In Vaughan, vo1.2, p.33.) 
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7) 
sake as well as for his own". Far from being an assa;lillt 
on law and the state' as Taine asserted, Rousseau's poliM 
tical theory, according to Cassirer, has as its essential 
purpose "to place the individual under a law that is uni ... 
versally binding, but this law is to be shaped in such a 
manner that every shadow of caprice and arbitrariness 
8). 
disappears from it". 
These authors also forget that Rousseauts popular 
sovereign, the community as a whole, is not absolute and 
above the law in the same sense as Hobbes' sovereign. 
Men, both in their individual capacity as subjects, and 
in their communal capacity as participants in the sove ... 
reign assembly, remain under the authority of a supreme 
law. "The law", Cassirer says, "as such possesses not 
limited but absolute power; it commands and demands un ... 
conditionally. It is this spirit which underlies the de• 
9) 
sign of the Contrat social and shapes its every detail". 
The best answer that one may thus give to those 
who accused Rousseau of despotism and totalitarianism is 
that they mistook Rousseali'e strict adherence to absolute 
sovereignty of law for absolute sovereignty of some or 
other human beings or rulers who are above the law. 
The same argument may be used against people who 
protest against the so~called tyranny of the majority. 
According to Rousseau both minority and majority are sub-. 
ject to the same universal law and tyranny is thus ruled 
out. 
Instead of ~otalitarianism, Rousseau could rather 
be accused of favouring the individual. "The problem 
10) a 
for him", writes Frederick Watkins, "was to find/society 
in which the group could act without frustrating the will 
of any individual". As Watkins also points out the idea 
that ••••• · •••••• 147 
The 0,Uestion of Jean ... Jacgues Rousseau. p.55. 
Ibid., p.62. 
r bi a. , P. 97 • 
The political tradition of the West. Harvard univ. 
press, 1948. p.97. 
- 147 .., 
that Rousseau favoured totalitarianism is based on the 
role of the legislator in the Contrat social. "He seized 
upon it", Watkins says, ttas the only possible answ.er to 
the difficulty in which he, like the totalitarians of our 
day, had been placed Qy reason of his doubts as to the 
11) 
political capacity of ordinary men". This opinion may be 
true, still it has to be borne in mind that the role of 
the legislator as conceived by Rousseau is merely advi~ 
sory. never coercive. 11 He. therefore, who draws up the 
laws has, or should have, no right, of legislation, and 
the people cannot, even if it wishes, deprive itself of 
this incommunicable right, because, according to the fun~ 
damental compact, only the general will can bind the in ... 
dividuals, and there can be no assurance that a particular 
will is in conformity with the general will~ until it has 
12} 
been put to the free vote of the people 11 • 
All the suggestions that the legislator may make 
is thus subject to the approval of the majority of the 
people. He is merely helping the people to see clear~r 
what their general interests are. How anyone can attri-
bute to this person the absolute coercive powers of a mo-
dern dictator is beyond my comprehension. 
OUr objections against the view that Rousseau was 
a protagonist of collectivism and despotism may perhaps 
further be elucidated by examining a similar interpretas 
13) 
tion of Rousseau's doctrine which was published recently. 
"Although Rousseau explicitly opposed despots and aggres.., 
sive wars", they say, "his idea of the general will was 
14) 
particularly suited to be exploited by tyrants 11 • 
~ making such an assertion, they obviously forget 
that Rousseau rejects the idea of representation uncondi ... 
tionally. Now, as nobody is allowed to represent the 
i~j 
13 
14) 
people •••••••••• l48 
Ibid., p .. l09. 
Contrat social. 11, vii. 
J.Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish: The Western intellec-
tual tradition. London, Hutchinson,l960.pp.300-303. 
Ibid., p.300. 
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people, it is very difficult to see how anybody can, 
theoretically, usurp the sovereignty of the people and 
proclaim hi'S own will as the general will. If we follow 
the text of Rousseau's political writings closely, we 
find no opportunity for the emergence of a tyrant. 
The next complaint of the authors against Rousseau 
is that he allows for no partial associations in the body 
politic. Because of this, they say, "there is to be no 
intermediary barrier between the citizen and the force of 
15) 
the state". Rousseau, according to them, tolerates no 
political parties. It is difficult to establish in what 
sense they use "state" here. If they use it in the sense 
of government, their statement is clearly wrong, because 
then one can say that in Rousseau's political theory the 
whole sovereign body politic stands between the indivi ... 
dual and the executive government. If, however, they use 
"state 11 in the sense of the sovereign legislative body, 
then their statement is true, but in this case it must 
be pointed out that Rousseau envisaged such a small com~ 
munity that everybody may directly participate in the 
activities of the legislative assembly. It is only an a 
monarchy or aristocracy that intermediary barriers be ... 
tween the individual and the state have any use~ The 
authors are quite wrong when they state that by the pro-
hibition of political parties, Rousseau isolates the in-
dividual from his neighbours. 
"The totalitarian implication" of Rousseau's 'VEw, 
the authors say, "is mitigated only if the general will 
is arrived at by counting votes". This, however, they 
say, is not the case and to prove this assertion they re-
fer to a ~aragraph in Rousseau's Discourse on political 
16) 
economy. They neglect to state that this Discours does 
not •••••••••••• l49 
15) Ibid., p.301. 
16) Vaughan: Op.cit., vol.l, p.247. 
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not contain Rousseau's final thoughts on political phi~ 
losophy and studiously avoid any reference to the Contrat 
social where Rousseau explicitly states that the general 
17) 
will resides in the majority. If they had also referred 
to the Disc ours on political e.q,onomy before they complain-
ed about the absence of partial associations in Rousseau's 
political theoryt they would have seen these bodies are 
18} 
allowed there. So it seems that these authors only se~ 
lected bits and pieces from Rousseau's writings which 
suited their allegation of totalitarianism and ignored 
other passages which did not suit them. 
These authors, as most other commentators who share 
their view, base their unfavourable interpretation of 
Rousseau mainly on the absence of intermediary bodies in 
Rousseau's state and on their allegation that the idea of 
the general will lends itself to tyranny because it is 
not established by a majority. The latter allegation is 
clearl~,r false and the absence of intermediary bodies car ... 
ries no great weight in view of Rousseau's insistence on 
a s~nll community and his rejection of representation. 
We concede that it may perhaps be argued that some 
of Rousseau 1 s successors used some of his ideas to jus-
tify totalitarianism. In this respect, however, one 
should rem.ember Bosanquet' s warning: "The popular rende ... 
ring of a great man's views is singularly liable to run 
straight into the pi t.-..falls against which he more par""' 
19) 
ticularly warned the world". 
As we have seen when we discussed the doctrines 
of both Hobbes and Rousseau, the validity of a political 
theory depends almost exclusively on the theoris~s con-
ception of the nature of man. We have seen that Hobbes' 
conception of man may be called atomistic individualism. 
Every individual is conceived as being self~sufficient, 
egoistic ••••••••• 150 
17) Ibid., vo1.2, p.l05. 
18) Ibid., vo1.1, pp.242-3. 
19) The philosophical theo!Y of the state. London,1~c­
Millan, 1920. 3rd ed. p.l3. 
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egoistic and independent. For this reason Hobbes thought 
that the mathematical method can suitably be applied to 
a study of hun~n relations. Rousseau, although he ad~ 
mitted that compassion is an innate quality of man, was 
not able to free himself entirely from the atomistic con-
20) 
ception. As Bosanquet pointed out Rousseau's true meaning 
is often obscured b,y defective terminology. This obser-
vation explains the traces of atomistic individualism im-
plied by Rousseau's rendering of the social contract and 
the alienation of all the individual's rights and proper~ 
ty to the community, as if the individual can have any 
rights and freedom apart from the community. True right 
only begins with that social unity "by which a people is 
a people". However, it is hardly fair to blame Rousseau 
for this slip, because since the time of Hobbes all the 
main political theorists have based their theories on the 
assumption of the existence of pre ... social individual 
rights. 
In chapter 8 we have shown that both the Vindiciae 
and Rousseau advocated the idea that a people can be a 
persona moralis and a subject of rights without the help, 
or rather coercion, of a ruler. We also saw that a people 
is capable of creating its own laws and that it is able 
to recognize and obey a supreme law which is both ratio~ 
nal and universal. 
These ideas are based on a conception of the na ... 
ture of man which differs fundamentally from that of 
Hobbes. The human individual is not exactly born with 
a natural inclination towards society, but he has never~ 
theless the capacity to realize that he can only fulfill 
his destiny in society. This view is confirmed by what 
follows below. 
One of the most satisfactory interpretations of 
the ••••••••• l5l 
20) Ibid., p.87. 
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the political philosophy of Rousseau that I came across 
is undoubtedly that of Bosanquet. Looking for a solution 
to the paradox of self-government, he shows that the theo• 
ries of Bentham, Mill and Spencer are based on the assump-. 
tion of atomistic individualism. According to them indi~ 
21) 
viduals are self-complete, self-satisfied and self-willed. 
Bosanquet goes on to discuss two statements of 
Rousseau which, on a superficial view, appear to be con~ 
tradictory. The first one is that the individual can be 
forced to be free. This can be explained "if", as :Bosan ... 
quet puts it, "instead of the absolute and naturally in,.. 
dependent existence of the physical individual, the so~ 
cial person is taken as reality, it follows that force 
against the physical individual may become a condition 
22) 
of freedom". We shall return to this statement. The se-
cond contradictory passage in Rousseau is that "man is 
born free but everywhere he is in chains". In this case 
I can agree with Bosanquet that the first part of the 
passage should be understood as man is born for the truest 
- 23) 
freedom which he attains Qy subservience to social law. 
I cannot, however, agree with him that "but everywhere he 
is in chains" is necessarily incompatible with his inter-
pretation of the first part. As I see it, the last part 
of Rousseau 1 s famous passage simply refers to political 
conditions of his day. Rousseau asks himself: "What 
happened to the freedom for which man was born?" He sees 
no evidence of this freedom around him, only chains. 
Dealing with Rousseau's notion of the general will, 
Bosanquet remarks that the general will "in its idea, as 
the key to the whole problem of self-government and free--
dom under law, is that identity between my particular will 
and the wills of all my associates in the body politic 
21) Op.cit., pp.?5~?6. 
22) Op.cit., p.90. 
23) Op.cit., p.93. 
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which makes it possible to sa.y that in all social co ... 
-operation, an:lin submitting even to forcible constraint, 
when imposed by society in the true common interest, I am 
obey1n~ only myself, and am actually attaining my free-
24) 
dom ••• The General Will seems to be ••• the ineradicable 
impulse of an intelligent being to a good extending be-
yond itself, in as far as that good takes the form of a 
25) 
common good" • 
As soon as the average individual who sees nothing 
in life but his own private interest, is no longer accep~ 
ted as the real self or individuality, we can regard the 
problem of self~government from a point of view that does 
not represent it as a contradictio in termini. 
]'reedom, Bosanquet asserts, 11 is the condition of 
being ourselves. To be ourselves we must be always be~ 
coming something which we are not. Liberty must be a 
condition revelant to our continued struggle to assert 
the control of something in us, which we recognise as 
imperative upon us or as our real self, but which we on~ 
ly obey in an imperfect way~ This is the meaning of to 
26) 
be forced to be free 11 • 
In short Bosanquet conceives man as a being who 
can only realize his own true self, and can thus only 
be really free, in a community where he feels himself 
with 
at home and where in co..,operation/his fellow ... citizens, 
he can work for the common good. This is the idea which 
Rousseau attempted to express in his political writings, 
and in this respect his political doctrine clearly de~ 
parts from the theories based on atomistic individualism 
which held sway for about a century at the time when his 
writings appeared and which are still with us in many 
shapes and forms. 
Rousseau ••••••• ~~l53 
24) Op.cit., p.lOO. 
25) Op.cit., p.l02. 
26) Op.cit., p.ll?. 
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Rousseau can thus rightly be regarded as a return 
to Aristotle and Plato who regarded society as "a living 
and growing creature in which man 1 s nature expands from 
more to more, having its own essence progressively commu~ 
27) 
nicated to it". 
In the light of Bosanquet 1 s conception of the na• 
ture of man, one can state that all the theorists, of 
whom Hobbes is the foremost, who based their political 
theories on a conception of man as a self-sufficient en ... 
tity, built on false foundations. In this opinion one 
is strongly supported by Martin Buber's thoughts on the 
28) 
nature of man. In an essay,"What is man 11 , this contem ... 
porary philosopher,·one of the keenest intellects of our 
age, brilliantly reviews the progress of philosophical 
anthropology from Aristotle to Max Scheler and Heidegger •• 
He points out that the strict anthropological 
question becomes insistent in times when the original 
contract between the universe and man is dissolved and 
m.an finds himself a stranger and solitary in the world. 
This was the very state of affairs against which the 
Vindiciae was written in an attempt to.restore and main~ 
tain the social conditions under which man could feel at 
home in the world. Such a period occurred after the 
scientific discoveries of Galilee, Copernicus and Kepler. 
The solitude and anguish of man faced with infinite space, 
was admirably expressed by the sensitive Pascal who acute~ 
ly experienced the full impact of the new view of the cos-
mos. "L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la 
na tu.re: mais c 1 est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que 
l'univers entier s'arme pour l'ecraser: une vapeur, une 
goutte d'eau, suffit pour le tuer. Mais, quand l'univers 
l'ecra.serait, l'hornme serait encore plus noble que ce qui 
le •••••.•••••• l54 
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le tue, parce gu•il soit gu'il meurt et l'avantage que 
29) 
l'univers a sur lui. L'univers n'en sait rien". 
To this feeling of insecurity and anguish Kant, 
according to Buber, replied that the terrifYing mystery 
of the world's space and time, is the ~ystery of man's 
own comprehension of the world and 'thus ultimately the 
~ystery of man's own being. An adequate expression of 
the nature of man, we fj.nd in Feuerbach' s Principles of. 
the Philosophy of the future (1843) where he writes: 
"The individual man for himself does not have man's being 
in himself, either as a moral being or a thinking being. 
Man's being is contained only in community, in the unity 
of man with rnan - a unity which rests, however, only on 
30) 
the reality of the difference between I and Thou". Unfor-
tunately Feuerbach never elaborated these remarks. Marx 
did not seem to comprehend the real significance of Feuer-
bach' s '\JVords and opposed an unreal individualism with an 
equally unreal collectivism. No progress was made in this 
respect by Nietzsche who regarded man as an animal that 
has grown out and stepped forth from the animal world. 
He did not see man as a being in himself, but at best as 
a preliminary fir>rm ef being, as the animal that is not 
yet established. 
Buber points out how the old organic forms of the 
direct life of man with man ... the communities which were 
not too big to allow the men who are connected by them to 
be brought together ever anew and in which men understand 
their membership as their destiny and as a vital tradi .... 
tion M were decaying more and more. These organic forms 
of comm:uni ty offered to man a sociological security which 
preserved him from the feeling of being completely ex ... 
posed. New co~munity forms such as the club, the trade 
union and the party have not been able to re~establish 
the ••••••••••• l55 
29) Q,u.oted by :Suber: Op.cit., :p.l64. 
30) Quoted by Buber: Op.cit., pp.l81~182. 
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the security that has been destroyed. 
Husserl, the father of the phenomenological school, 
also made a few rerr~rks which he did not develop, but 
which seem to indicate that man's essence is not to be 
found in isolated individuals, for a human being's bonds 
with his generation and his society are his essence. 
Comparing Kierkegaard and Heidegger,· Buber says: 
"The relation to individual men is a doubtful thing to 
Kierkegaard, because in his view an essential relation to 
God is obstructed by an essential relation to human com-
panions. In Heidegger the relation to individual men 
appears only as a relation of solicitude. A relation of 
mere solicitude cannot be essential ••• An essential rela ... 
tion to individual m.en can only be a direct relation 
from life to life in which man's reserve is resolved and 
31) 
the barriers of his self ... being are breached". 
Discussing Sigmund Freud 1 s influence on Scheler, 
Buber points out that although the psychological cate" 
gories of Freud have general validity, this validity is 
not based on the general life of man, but on the patho-
logical condition of the typical man of to~day. The ob~ 
ject of Freud's psychology and Scheler's anthropology is 
the sick man cut off from the world and divided into 
spirit and instincts. This man is not the normal man. 
Despite the efforts of various contemporary philosophers 
the problem of man remains unresolved. "Individualism 
underste,nds only a part of man, while collectivism un ... 
derstands man only as a part: neither advances to the 
wholeness of rran, to man as a whole. Individualism sees 
man only in relation to himself, but collectivism does 
not see~ at all, it sees only "society". With the 
former man's face is distorted, with the latter it is 
masked ••• The human person feels himself exposed b.Y na ... 
ture ~ as an unwanted child is exposed ~ and at the same 
time •••••••••• l56 
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time a person isolated in the midst of the tumultuous 
human world. The first reaction of the spirit to the 
awareness of this new and uncanny position is modern in~ 
dividualism, the second is modern collectivism ••• To save 
himself from the despair with which his solitary state 
threatens him, man resorts to the expedient of glorify .. 
ing it ••• The second reaction, collectivism, essentially 
follows upon the foundering of the first. Here the hu~ 
man being tries to escape his destiny of solitude by be~ 
com.ing completely embedded in one of the massive modern 
group formations •• ,and let one's own re sponsi bi li ty for 
an existence which has become all too complicated be ab~ 
32) 
sorbed in collective l~~~pGnsibility •• ~ 
This absorption of the individual in a collecti~ 
vity does not result in conm.union of man with man. Man's 
isolation is not overcome, but merely overpowered and 
numbed. In collectivism the person surrenders himself 
when he renounces his responsibility and he is thus un ... 
to 
able to break through/the other, for a genuine relation 
is only possible between genuine persons. 
Finally J3u.ber comes to the following conclusion: 
"The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the 
individual as such, nor the aggregate as such. Each, 
considered by itself, is a mighty abstraction. The in-
dividual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps 
into a living relation with other individuals. The aggre-. 
gate is a fact of existence in so far as it is built up 
of living units of relation. The fundamental fact of 
33) 
human existence is man with man". 
Just as Bosanquet, but in even clearer terms, 
J3u.ber rejects the old notion that there exists an essen.-
tial antithesis between the individual and. society. In 
actual ••••••••• l57 
32) Op.cit., pp.241~2. 
33) Op.cit., p.244. 
... 157 ... 
actual fact the one cannot be conceived without the other. 
Not in isolation and solitude, but only in communion with 
other men can man be his real self. The Vindiciae never 
contemplated the possibility of a conflict between indi~ 
vidual and society. The individual formed so much a part 
of the co:rrJnunity and felt himself so much at home in the 
community that no antithesis between individual and com~ 
munity could be envisaged. ~ 
We also see how much Rousseau anticipated in his 
political philosophy the contemporary conception of man. 
He certainly had an instinctive insight into the true 
nature of man,. His merit in this respect cen only be 
seen in its correct perspective when one bears in mind 
that for a century before and after him, even up to our 
day, numerous thinkers and politicians have based their 
systems on the premise of individualism " a premise which 
reached its dominance in political theory as a result of 
the false assumption that the methods of natural science 
are applicable to a study of human affairs. 
Jose Ortega y Gasset described this futile attempt 
to resolve human affairs in terms of natural science 
brilliantly in the following words: "When naturalist rea-
son studies man it seeks, in consistence with itself, to 
reveal his nature- It observes that man has a body, which 
is a thing, and hastens to submit it to physicsJ and since 
his body is also an organism, it hands it over to biology. 
It observes further that in man as in animals there func-
tions a certain mechanism incorporeally, confusedly atta ... 
ched to the body, the psychic mechanism, which is also a 
thing, and entrusts its study to psychology, a natural 
science. But the fact is that this has been going on for 
three hundred years and that all the naturalist studies 
on man's body and soul put together have not been of the 
slightest use in throwing light on any of our most 
strictly •••••••••• l58 
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strictly human feelings, on what each individual calls 
his own life, that life which, intermingling with others, 
forms societies, that in their turn, persisting, make up 
human destiny. The prodigious achievement of natural 
science in the direction of the knowledge of things con~ 
trasts brutally with the collapse of this same natural 
science when faced with the strictly human element~ The 
human element escapes physico..,mathematical reason as wa ... 
34) 
ter runs from a sieve". 
Many other writers have also stressed the sense of 
solitude and anxiety experienced by man on the advent of 
the individualistic society. So Erich Fromm writes "that 
modern man, freed from the bond of pre.,.individualistic 
society, which simultaneously gave him security and limi ... 
ted him, has gained not freedom in the positive sense of 
the realization of his individual selfJ that is, the ex~ 
pression of his intellectual, emotional and sensuous po ... 
tentialities~ Freedom, though it has brought him inde~ 
and 
pendence and rationality, has made him isolated,/thereby, 
35) 
anxious and powerless". 
Sim.ilarly Lewis Mumford, a sincere student not on .... 
ly of architecture but also of general culture, remarks: 
"Freed from his sense of dependence upon corporation and 
neighbourhood, the 'emancipated individual' was dissocia~ 
ted and delocalized: an atom of power, ruthlessly seeking 
36) 
whatever power can command". 
On the nature of man the Italian philosopher, Gio .... 
vanni Gentile expresses the following view: "The human 
individual is not an atom. Immanent in the concept of 
an individual is the concept of society. For there is no 
ego, no real individual, who does not have within him 
(rather than just with him) an alter who is his essential 
34l 35 
36 
History as a system. 
The Fear of freedom.. 
The City in history .. 
socius •••••••• l59 
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socius ~ that is to say, an object that is not a mere 
'thing' opposed to him as subject, but a subject like him~ 
. 37) 
self". 
It is thus clear that Buber and Bosanquet are not 
alone in their interpretation of the nature of man and in 
their estiw..ation of the predicament of modern man. 
The question now arises: what can be done in the 
field of political theory to alleviate this predicament 
of man? An attempt in this direction has been made by 
H. Krabbe who in his "The modern idea of the state" wor'"' 
ked out a new basis for authority in society. Krabbe 
holds the view that in any political society only the 
impersonal authority of law should be recognized as the 
ruling power. He rejects the idea that law is the crea~ 
tion of a sovereign who stands above the law and above 
the community for which the law is to be binding. He con ... 
tends that the source of all law can only be found in the 
spiritual life of a community and specifically in its fee-
ling or sense of right. The sovereignty which, according 
to Krabbe, used to be regarded as the source of law, he 
describes as an independently valid right to co~mand. He 
rejects the idea of sovereignty when it is employed in 
the sense in which Hobbes used it, namely as an absolute, 
supreme legislative authority eleva.ted above the people 
and having no obligations toward them. 
"~~ 
As Krabbe believes that law originates from the 
sense of right of a community for which thathw is to be 
binding, and as he regards it as imperative that all mem~ 
bers of the community should participate in the creation 
of the sense of right, he definitely favours decentrali-
zation of law ... ma.king. Not only will it be easier for a 
smaller community to achieve unanimity than a bigger one, 
but the~e will also be a smaller variety of interests to 
be ••••••••••• l60 
37) Genesis and structure of society. University of Illi~ 
nois press, 1960. p.98. 
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be catered for in a smaller cotrmunity. To arrive at a 
true sense of right, the ideal is that all members of the 
community should be well acquainted with the issues to be 
decided. Individuals cannot exercise their sense of right 
in connection with subjects of which they have no know~ 
ledge. 
Such a conception of law can of course be accused 
of subjectivity and relativity. This objection Krabbe 
attempts to meet by declaring that, provided that distur ... 
bances of the sense of right can be eliminated, this sense 
will be the same in every one. 
"A state which includes many races or nationalities", 
Krabbe writes, "can be held together only by reducing cen ... 
38) 
tral law,..making to a minimum". 
Krabbe's doctrine can be summarized as follows: he 
replaces the idea of an absolute sovereign standing above 
and outside the community to whom it hands down laws ar~ 
bitrarily, by the idea of the sovereignty of law and this 
law originates from the sense of right of the people who 
has to obey this law. In order that the sense of right 
may emerge more easily and clearly, he favours decentra ... 
lization of lawemaking. 
Now, I am not convinced that Krabbe's modern idea 
of the state is as modern or original as he seems to think. 
Despite its contract of government and recognition of a 
monarch, the Vindiciae has much in common with Krabbets 
idea of the state. The Vindiciae also did not recognize 
an absolute sovereign standing above and outside the com-
munity for whom it makes the laws. No, the community 
creates its own laws and the king has to promise that he 
will govern the people according to their laws. These 
laws also originate, as Krabbe says, from the community 1 s 
sense of right. The Vindiciae further concedes that a 
commonwealth .......... 161 
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commonwealth may consist of many peoples each of whom has 
its own laws. The principle of pluralism is thus also 
maintained by the Vindiciae. As the law binds both the 
people and the ruler and furthe~ore its validity depends 
on the justness of its content. we can say that the Vindi~ 
ciae is even more concerned with sovereignty of law than 
-
Krabbe. 
The same holds good for Althusius. Krabbe acknow~ 
ledges that Althusius has much in common with his own 
doctrine, but the contract with the sovereign and the so-. 
cial contract that feature in Althusius 1 doctrine do not 
meet with his approval. Such formalities which only re~ 
fleet the general political terminology of the time, 
should, however, not blind us to the important fact that 
Althusius consciously propagates soveretgnty of law and 
that he consistently locates the origin of law in the 
spiritual life of the srmll community. In other words, 
he is definitely in favour of pluralism. 
As far as Rousseau is concerned, Krabbe rrakes the 
following remarks: "If Rousseau's political theory had 
been regarded only in the light of its main principles 
criticized 
and had not beenka~a& exclusively with reference to 
what he borrowed from earlier theories, viz., the expla .... 
nation of the community and the establishment of its so ... 
vereign by the social contract, there might have been 
seen in it, what it doubtless contains, the modern idea 
39) 
of the state". In short, Rousseau, despite his retention 
of concepts which were not really essential to:. his idea 
of the state, nevertheless recognized the community as 
the source of its own lam and the sovereignty of this 
law in the community.. VVhen Krabbe thus states that Rous ... 
seau confused the authority of the law with that of the 
40) 
sovereign he neglects to remember that Rousseau's notion 
of ••••••••••• 162 
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of the sovereign is totally different from his own. 
Rousseau's sovereign is not an absolute personal ruler 
who dominates his subjects, but his sovereign is the com" 
m.unity itself. Moreover, when Krabbe states that nthe 
sole rulership of the law emerges only where lawMmaking 
rests exclusively in the hands of the popular assembly, 
since the popular assembly gets its significance from 
. 41) 
what it represents, viz., the nation's sense of right~ 
we can almost mistake his voice for that of Rousseau • 
. And so we come to the conclusion that Krabbe's modern 
idea of the state is in its essential characteristics si-
milar to Rousseau's political doctrine. 
A much more forcible statement of political plu..., 
ralism we find in the writings of John Neville Figgis. 
His position has been summarized as follows: 11Man, whose 
personality is social, develops that personality in nume ... 
rous groups that cannot be said to be derived from the 
state and yet are obviously not private. Either we must 
widen our notion of those things that are public, so as 
to include those groups other than the state or we must 
invent a new category for such associations. Figgis does 
the former by recognizing the real personality of those 
42) 
groups". 
If we interpret Rousseau's formula for the esta~ 
blishment of a model state as expounded in his Contrat so ... 
cial, as that of a primary corporation, association or 
group which will form. autonomous units in a larger federal 
set ... up, it must be acknowledged that he has much in com ... 
mon with a writer like Figgis. Rousseau's real signifi~ 
cance for our time can thus be stated as follows: man can 
only feel himself at home and can only exploit all his 
potentialities •••••• l63 
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42) H.M. Magid: English political pluralism. Columbia 
univ. press, 1941. p.l6. 
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potentialities in a community which is not too big for 
him to comprehend so that he can partake in its politi ... 
cal life in an intelligent manner. As the capacity of 
the average human individual is limited, the effective 
participation of the individual in law ... making can only be 
achieved by recognizing the legitimate existence of such 
groupe iri society and by allowing them to run their own 
affaire as far as possible. In other words, devolution 
or decentralization of law...,making should be allowed,. 
It is precisely the disappearance of many of these 
autonomous groups which grew up spontaneously among men 
which F.A. Hayek bewails when he writes: "No longer is 
the individual generally the member of some small commuM 
nity with which he is intimately concerned and closely 
acquainted. While this has brought him some increase in 
independence, it also deprived him of the security which 
the personal ties and the friendly interest of the neigh-
bours provided ••• In order to be effective, then, respon-
sibility must be so confined as to enable the individual 
to rely on his own concrete knowledge in deciding on the 
importance of the different tasks, to apply his moral 
principles to circumstances he knows, and to help to mi.., 
43) 
tigate evils voluntarily". 
In the light of contemporary political thought and 
the conception of human nature as developed by Euber, one 
is justified, in our opinion, to state that Rousseau's 
political theory implies pluralism and sovereignty of law 
as the main safeguards for true individual liberty and 
happiness in our time. 
In opposition to this view, we still find today 
a strong current of atomistic liberalism which originated 
from the philosophy of Hobbes. Atomistic liberalism is 
based on the premise that there exists an inevitable and. 
necessary ••••••••• l64 
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necessary antithesis between the individual and the com" 
munity. Typical of this view is the following: (Libera• 
lism) "sought to vindicate the right of the individual to 
shape his own destiny, regardless of any authority which 
might seek to limit his possibilities; yet it found that, 
inherent in that claim, there was an inevitable challenge 
44) 
from the cormnunity to the sovereignty of the individual 11 • 
45) 
Professor J.S. Schapiro describes the fundamental postu~ 
late of liberalism inter alia as follows: "Every indivi ... 
dual is therefore to be treated as an end in himself, not 
as a means to advance the interests of others". 
These statements contain clear echoes of Hobbes 1 
original doctrine although the writers concerned may not 
be aware of it. Hobbes consciously rejected history and 
paid no attention to the spontaneous and natural forms of 
community life as it developed through the ages. In order 
to apply the mathematical method, of which he became en ... 
a.moured, to human beings, he had to reduce the dynamic, 
living human being to the level of single, independent 
atoms of matter which are always in motion~ In his state 
there is no place for the historical community which had 
its own character and rights. 
Hobbes had the honesty to follow the implications 
of his view of the nature of man to their logical conclu~ 
sions. His individuals are egoistic, self-sufficient and 
equal. In the state of nature each individual is indeed 
sovereign as Laski said. above. Individuals thus have no 
inherent coherence with their fellow-men, they can never 
form a closely-knit community and consequently only the 
fear of the power of an absolute ruler can keep them from 
flying at each other 1 s throats. Coercion is thus neces-
sary for the maintenance of law and order. 1\iian as 
conceived •••••••••• l65 
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45) Liberalism. Princeton, Van Nostrand, (1958.) p.9. 
... 165 ... 
conceived by Hobbes is devoid of all sense of ethical 
imperative or norms. Each man is a law unto himself as 
long as he is in the state of nature, and in the civil 
state the ruler decides about right and wrong. There is 
no place for a truly rational sovereign law which will be 
obeyed and respected by both sub,jects and monarch in 
Hobbes' state. These are some of the logical consequen~ 
ces of Hobbes' point of view, but the contemporary pro ... 
tagonists of atomistic llberalism are not prepared to 
face them as Hobbes did. 
The practical implications of Hobbes' view of 
man and of any application of mathematical method to hu-
man affairs, can most. clearly be seen today under the 
communist regime. There we find the same concentration 
of all power, legislative, executive and judicial in the 
hands of an absolute dictator. Under this supreme autho,..., 
rity we do not find the people as a corporate body and 
subject of rights, but only isolated individuals.. As no 
spontaneous groups are allowed to grow up in the state 
in a natural way, the individual is exposed to the full 
force of the supreme authority. Such intermediary bodies 
as are allowed in the body politic are instruments of the 
central authority superimposed upon the people to •.'*3en ... 
sure efficient control by the central government. The 
subjects of the state are kept under the influence of 
subtle psychological propaganda, or, if necessary are co ... 
erced by physical force, in order that they should sub~ 
mit to the desires of the state as personified by the 
dictator. Men are dealt with as if they are things and 
no thought is given to the so~called dignity and sove-
reignty of the individual. 
Even in non ... communist countries with a capitalis~ 
tic society where great scope is left to the profit motive, 
the ••••••••••• l66 
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the temptation is great to treat human beings as mecha-
nical units of production, instead of human beings with 
reason, feelings and moral sense. 
This is what happens to man if he is conceived as 
an atomistic individual. Such a view of man militates 
against his human dignity and if one says that human dig-
nity is to be respected, one cannot at the same time pro~ 
fess an atomistic view of man. It should be recognized, 
as the Vindiciae, Rousseau, Bosanquet and Buber did, that 
man can only be regarded as a human being in the full 
sense of the word, if he is regarded as a member of a 
con~unity, for only there can he exercise and develop 
those virtues and values which distinguish man from ani~ 
mal. Similarly man is capable of associating and co-ope~ 
rating with other men in an orderly and harmonious way. 
!fun is capable of acknowledging an ethical and rational 
law which he should observe in his dealings with other 
men. Man is not naturally so egoistic and. selfish that 
he is unable to consider the interests and feelings of 
others, or that he is unable to work in association with 
other men for a common purpose. 
If we ignore these essential characteristics of 
human nature in our civil institutions, we shall not be 
able to ensure durable peace and security as Hobbes thought. 
Only suffering, unhappiness and revolt will result. On~ 
ly an intimate society into which man enters of his own 
free will and in which he can exercise his talents in the 
service of the community without losing his identity, will 
endure. In such a community a moral, rational and uni• 
versal law which all recognize as necessary, will be so~ 
vereign. 
One often hears the remark that such a small poli-
tical unit as Rousseau envisaged in his ci ty ... s.t& te is 
impracticable •••••••• l67 
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impracticable under contemporary economic conditions. 
To this one can reply by pointing out the example of 
Swi tzerla.nd where the cantons and village communi ties 
enjoy a large measure of local autonomy~ Furthermore, 
the ideal state described in the Contrat social cannot 
be realized in practice without adjustments. The ideal 
state is only a model toward which the body politic should 
strive. But it is patently wrong to assume that small 
autonomous political units are incompatible with economic 
and military co~operation, provided that such co~operation 
is based on the free consent of each of these units. 
The fundamental principles enunciated by the 
Vindiciae and Rousseau are still valid to-day becaus~ 
they are based on universal and eternal values. Poli• 
tics should always rest on a moral base and should sub• 
scribe to a universal, rational law and should not be 
based on the mechanical and impersonal methods of physi-
cal science which deny the ethical nature and dignity 
of ma,n. 
The Hobbesian approach may lead to more efficiency 
in the short run, but must fail in the end, because it 
'· ignores the humanity of man. 
~ 
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